tor

The Tor anonymity network
git clone https://git.dasho.dev/tor.git
Log | Files | Refs | README | LICENSE

commit ed3399ab06f9a21a4d200f3c15ef42df78a76477
parent 616c06c0b2748db163cbb6882043d24fdbaaf335
Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git@torproject.org>
Date:   Mon, 25 Apr 2022 19:20:00 +0000

Bug 40598: Demote warn log about odd path lengths with congestion control.

Diffstat:
Msrc/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 27++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1284,11 +1284,28 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_get_cpath_hop(circ, SBWS_ROUTE_LEN) == hop) { hop->ccontrol = congestion_control_new(&params, CC_PATH_SBWS); } else { - static ratelim_t cc_path_limit = RATELIM_INIT(600); - log_fn_ratelim(&cc_path_limit, LOG_WARN, LD_CIRC, - "Unexpected path length %d for circuit", - circ_len); - hop->ccontrol = congestion_control_new(&params, CC_PATH_EXIT); + if (circ_len > DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN) { + /* This can happen for unknown reasons; cannibalization codepaths + * don't seem able to do it, so there is some magic way that hops can + * still get added. Perhaps some cases of circuit pre-build that change + * purpose? */ + static ratelim_t cc_path_limit = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&cc_path_limit, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC, + "Unexpected path length %d for exit circuit %d, purpose %d", + circ_len, circ->global_identifier, + TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose); + hop->ccontrol = congestion_control_new(&params, CC_PATH_EXIT); + } else { + /* This is likely directory requests, which should block on orconn + * before congestion control, but lets give them the lower sbws + * param set anyway just in case. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Unexpected path length %d for exit circuit %d, purpose %d", + circ_len, circ->global_identifier, + TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose); + + hop->ccontrol = congestion_control_new(&params, CC_PATH_SBWS); + } } }