tor

The Tor anonymity network
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commit df9d2de44119e09e8fc485c6ff57ca01c226abd1
parent 338dbdab93328e00b5e80934ce0352bebaf9ce25
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date:   Sat,  3 Mar 2018 12:02:30 -0500

Merge remote-tracking branch 'fristonio/ticket4187'

Diffstat:
Achanges/ticket4187 | 3+++
Msrc/or/networkstatus.c | 11++++++++++-
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/changes/ticket4187 b/changes/ticket4187 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfix (rename verfied unverified consensus): + - Rename a verified unverfied consensus to cached-consenus on the disk. + Fixes bug 4187; bugfix on 0.3.3.0-alpha diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ router_reload_consensus_networkstatus(void) s = networkstatus_read_cached_consensus_impl(flav, flavor, 1); if (s) { if (networkstatus_set_current_consensus(s, flavor, - flags|NSSET_WAS_WAITING_FOR_CERTS, + flags | NSSET_WAS_WAITING_FOR_CERTS, NULL)) { log_info(LD_FS, "Couldn't load unverified consensus %s networkstatus " "from cache", flavor); @@ -1917,6 +1917,15 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus, } } + /* Signatures from the consensus are verified */ + if (from_cache && was_waiting_for_certs) { + /* We check if the consensus is loaded from disk cache and that it + * it is an unverified consensus. If it is unverified, rename it to + * cached-*-consensus since it has been verified. */ + log_info(LD_DIR, "Unverified consensus signatures verified."); + tor_rename(unverified_fname, consensus_fname); + } + if (!from_cache && flav == usable_consensus_flavor()) control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CONSENSUS_ARRIVED");