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The Tor anonymity network
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commit dca105d58853c7ba6f8ef594cca34230dbb87394
parent 954f663831622f281ece83519552f91cd0fdda72
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Date:   Thu, 24 Aug 2017 08:49:24 -0400

prop224: Register RP circuit when it opens

Only register the RP circuit when it opens and not when we send the INTRODUCE1
cell else, when re-extending to a new IP, we would register the same RP
circuit with the same cookie twice leading to the circuit being closed.

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>

Diffstat:
Msrc/or/hs_circuit.c | 4----
Msrc/or/hs_circuitmap.c | 13++++++++++---
Msrc/or/hs_client.c | 6++++++
Msrc/test/test_circuitlist.c | 2+-
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -1070,10 +1070,6 @@ hs_circ_send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ, goto done; } - /* Register rend circuit in circuitmap */ - hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(rend_circ, - rend_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie); - /* Success. */ ret = 0; goto done; diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c @@ -408,7 +408,8 @@ hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_service_side(const uint8_t *cookie) /* Public function: Return client-side rendezvous circuit with rendezvous * <b>cookie</b>. It will first lookup for the CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY - * purpose and then try for CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED. + * purpose and then try for CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED and then + * finally tries for CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND. * * Return NULL if no such circuit is found in the circuitmap. */ origin_circuit_t * @@ -426,6 +427,13 @@ hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(const uint8_t *cookie) circ = hs_circuitmap_get_origin_circuit(HS_TOKEN_REND_CLIENT_SIDE, REND_TOKEN_LEN, cookie, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED); + if (circ) { + return circ; + } + + circ = hs_circuitmap_get_origin_circuit(HS_TOKEN_REND_CLIENT_SIDE, + REND_TOKEN_LEN, cookie, + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND); return circ; } @@ -472,8 +480,7 @@ hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(origin_circuit_t *or_circ, { circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ); { /* Basic circ purpose sanity checking */ - tor_assert_nonfatal(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY || - circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED); + tor_assert_nonfatal(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND); } hs_circuitmap_register_circuit(circ, HS_TOKEN_REND_CLIENT_SIDE, diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -434,6 +434,12 @@ client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* Ignore returned value, nothing we can really do. On failure, the circuit * will be marked for close. */ hs_circ_send_establish_rendezvous(circ); + + /* Register rend circuit in circuitmap if it's still alive. */ + if (!TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close) { + hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(circ, + circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie); + } } /* This is an helper function that convert a descriptor intro point object ip diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitlist.c b/src/test/test_circuitlist.c @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ test_rend_token_maps(void *arg) tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_relay_side(tok3)); /* Now let's do a check for the client-side rend circuitmap */ - c5->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY; + c5->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND; hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(c5, tok1); tt_ptr_op(c5, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(tok1));