tor

The Tor anonymity network
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commit d9edf143abd05378246ebeadf0834d6ef57928fd
parent 085bf61a351a6fce94046afe68a17eda0b133606
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date:   Thu, 10 Jun 2021 08:42:15 -0400

Merge branch 'maint-0.4.6'

Diffstat:
Achanges/bug40391 | 9+++++++++
Msrc/core/or/circuitmux.c | 7++++---
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/bug40391 b/changes/bug40391 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security): + - Resist a hashtable-based CPU denial-of-service attack against + relays. Previously we used a naive unkeyed hash function to look up + circuits in a circuitmux object. An attacker could exploit this to + construct circuits with chosen circuit IDs in order to try to create + collisions and make the hash table inefficient. Now we use a SipHash + construction for this hash table instead. Fixes bug 40391; bugfix on + 0.2.4.4-alpha. This issue is also tracked as TROVE-2021-005. + Reported by Jann Horn from Google's Project Zero. diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitmux.c b/src/core/or/circuitmux.c @@ -169,9 +169,10 @@ chanid_circid_entries_eq(chanid_circid_muxinfo_t *a, static inline unsigned int chanid_circid_entry_hash(chanid_circid_muxinfo_t *a) { - return (((unsigned int)(a->circ_id) << 8) ^ - ((unsigned int)((a->chan_id >> 32) & 0xffffffff)) ^ - ((unsigned int)(a->chan_id & 0xffffffff))); + uint8_t data[8 + 4]; + set_uint64(data, a->chan_id); + set_uint32(data + 8, a->circ_id); + return (unsigned) siphash24g(data, sizeof(data)); } /* Emit a bunch of hash table stuff */