tor

The Tor anonymity network
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commit c8aa3cc17d9cf28ea98c4619984b3f9c0afa3f3a
parent acd27f4b419907052d0677933fe5068a5c25953f
Author: teor <teor@torproject.org>
Date:   Fri, 25 Oct 2019 10:38:01 +1000

Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1466' into maint-0.4.2

Diffstat:
Achanges/ticket31958 | 5+++++
Msrc/feature/dircache/dircache.c | 10++++++++--
Msrc/feature/dircommon/directory.c | 23+++++++++++++++++++----
3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/ticket31958 b/changes/ticket31958 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (directory): + - When checking if a directory connection is anonymous, test if the circuit + was marked for close before looking at its channel. This avoids a BUG() + stacktrace in case it was previously closed. Fixes bug 31958; bugfix on + 0.4.2.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c b/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c @@ -1393,7 +1393,8 @@ handle_get_hs_descriptor_v3(dir_connection_t *conn, /* Reject non anonymous dir connections (which also tests if encrypted). We * do not allow single hop clients to query an HSDir. */ if (!connection_dir_is_anonymous(conn)) { - write_short_http_response(conn, 404, "Not found"); + write_short_http_response(conn, 503, + "Rejecting single hop HS v3 descriptor request"); goto done; } @@ -1636,7 +1637,12 @@ directory_handle_command_post,(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers, /* Handle HS descriptor publish request. We force an anonymous connection * (which also tests for encrypted). We do not allow single-hop client to * post a descriptor onto an HSDir. */ - if (connection_dir_is_anonymous(conn) && !strcmpstart(url, "/tor/hs/")) { + if (!strcmpstart(url, "/tor/hs/")) { + if (!connection_dir_is_anonymous(conn)) { + write_short_http_response(conn, 503, + "Rejecting single hop HS descriptor post"); + goto done; + } const char *msg = "HS descriptor stored successfully."; /* We most probably have a publish request for an HS descriptor. */ diff --git a/src/feature/dircommon/directory.c b/src/feature/dircommon/directory.c @@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ connection_dir_is_anonymous(const dir_connection_t *dir_conn) * be closed or marked for close. */ if (linked_conn == NULL || linked_conn->magic != EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC || conn->linked_conn_is_closed || conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close) { - log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: not linked to edge"); + log_debug(LD_DIR, "Directory connection is not anonymous: " + "not linked to edge"); return false; } @@ -221,13 +222,27 @@ connection_dir_is_anonymous(const dir_connection_t *dir_conn) /* Can't be a circuit we initiated and without a circuit, no channel. */ if (circ == NULL || CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: not on OR circuit"); + log_debug(LD_DIR, "Directory connection is not anonymous: " + "not on OR circuit"); return false; } - /* Get the previous channel to learn if it is a client or relay link. */ + /* It is possible that the circuit was closed because one of the channel was + * closed or a DESTROY cell was received. Either way, this connection can + * not continue so return that it is not anonymous since we can not know for + * sure if it is. */ + if (circ->marked_for_close) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "Directory connection is not anonymous: " + "circuit marked for close"); + return false; + } + + /* Get the previous channel to learn if it is a client or relay link. We + * BUG() because if the circuit is not mark for close, we ought to have a + * p_chan else we have a code flow issue. */ if (BUG(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan == NULL)) { - log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: no p_chan"); + log_debug(LD_DIR, "Directory connection is not anonymous: " + "no p_chan on circuit"); return false; }