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The Tor anonymity network
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commit a1125625449617ef427d8816f6e0174806e2d947
parent 1077e9894cd60d9b991e38d965e57be00fd83277
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Date:   Thu, 24 Aug 2017 09:12:57 -0400

hs: Update intro circuit timestamp when re-extending

A client can re-extend up to 3 intro points on the same circuit. This happens
when we get NACKed by the intro point for which we choose a new intro and
re-extend the circuit to it.

That process can be arbitrarly long so reset the dirty timestamp of the
circuit everytime we choose to re-extend so we get a bit more time to actually
do our introduction.

This is a client circuit so it is short live once opened thus giving us a bit
more time to complete the introduction is ok.

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>

Diffstat:
Msrc/or/hs_client.c | 7+++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -1195,6 +1195,13 @@ hs_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(ei))); ret = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, ei); + if (ret == 0) { + /* We were able to extend so update the timestamp so we avoid expiring + * this circuit too early. The intro circuit is short live so the + * linkability issue is minimized, we just need the circuit to hold a + * bit longer so we can introduce. */ + TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + } } else { log_info(LD_REND, "Closing intro circ %u (out of RELAY_EARLY cells).", (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);