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The Tor anonymity network
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commit 9ca2394d6b51242bb5cf380757be5869d2a44c3c
parent 94fb308c5d0f0d76b46b25d5f7c584f2b5a900c3
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Date:   Tue, 23 Mar 2021 09:19:41 -0400

channel: Fix use after free in channel_do_open_actions()

Fortunately, our tor_free() is setting the variable to NULL after so we were
in a situation where NULL was always used instead of the transport name.

This first appeared in 894ff2dc8422cb86312c512698acd76476224f87 and results in
basically no bridge with a transport being able to use DoS defenses.

Fixes #40345

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>

Diffstat:
Achanges/ticket40345 | 5+++++
Msrc/core/or/channel.c | 2+-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/changes/ticket40345 b/changes/ticket40345 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (channel, DoS): + - Fix a possible non fatal assertion BUG() due to a too early free of a + string when noting down the client connection for the DoS defenses + subsystem. Fixes bug 40345; bugfix on 0.4.3.4-rc + diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.c b/src/core/or/channel.c @@ -1887,11 +1887,11 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &remote_addr, transport_name, now); - tor_free(transport_name); /* Notify the DoS subsystem of a new client. */ if (tlschan && tlschan->conn) { dos_new_client_conn(tlschan->conn, transport_name); } + tor_free(transport_name); } /* Otherwise the underlying transport can't tell us this, so skip it */ }