tor

The Tor anonymity network
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commit 83424cb62f19ee09cba769a6c9a8cc94fc3c4cb7
parent f9812ee5f7336bac9caaf57946e46cd19dfaf0be
Author: teor <teor@torproject.org>
Date:   Mon, 25 Nov 2019 12:33:14 +1000

Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1395' into maint-0.3.5

Diffstat:
Achanges/ticket31548 | 7+++++++
Msrc/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 9+++++++++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/ticket31548 b/changes/ticket31548 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Major bugfixes (hidden service v3): + - Make onion service always use the exact amount of configured intro points + (or less due to node exlusion). Before, a service could sometimes pick + more intro points than configured with the + HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints option. Fixes bug 31548; bugfix on + 0.3.2.1-alpha. + diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -1686,6 +1686,15 @@ build_desc_intro_points(const hs_service_t *service, DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key, const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) { + if (!ip->circuit_established) { + /* Ignore un-established intro points. They can linger in that list + * because their circuit has not opened and they haven't been removed + * yet even though we have enough intro circuits. + * + * Due to #31561, it can stay in that list until rotation so this check + * prevents to publish an intro point without a circuit. */ + continue; + } hs_desc_intro_point_t *desc_ip = hs_desc_intro_point_new(); if (setup_desc_intro_point(&desc->signing_kp, ip, now, desc_ip) < 0) { hs_desc_intro_point_free(desc_ip);