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The Tor anonymity network
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commit 7f9eaec538b7d01e0d1b130dc4cf2ec634252d46
parent b2849f449b2efa4d6826166a92f35c7627d65f91
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date:   Fri, 24 Apr 2020 08:14:59 -0400

Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1862/head'

Diffstat:
Achanges/bug33899 | 9+++++++++
Msrc/core/or/connection_or.c | 26++++++++++++++++++--------
Msrc/core/or/connection_or.h | 4----
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/bug33899 b/changes/bug33899 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (IPv6, relay): + - Consider IPv6 addresses when checking if a connection is canonical. + In 17604, relays assumed that a remote relay could consider an IPv6 + connection canonical, but did not set the canonical flag on their side + of the connection. Fixes bug 33899; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + - Log IPv6 addresses on connections where this relay is the responder. + Previously, responding relays would replace the remote IPv6 address with + the IPv4 address from the consensus. + Fixes bug 33899; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.c b/src/core/or/connection_or.c @@ -902,12 +902,21 @@ connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here) } if (r) { - tor_addr_port_t node_ap; - node_get_pref_orport(r, &node_ap); - /* XXXX proposal 186 is making this more complex. For now, a conn - is canonical when it uses the _preferred_ address. */ - if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr)) + tor_addr_port_t node_ipv4_ap; + tor_addr_port_t node_ipv6_ap; + node_get_prim_orport(r, &node_ipv4_ap); + node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(r, &node_ipv6_ap); + if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv4_ap.addr) || + tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv6_ap.addr)) { connection_or_set_canonical(conn, 1); + } + /* Choose the correct canonical address and port. */ + tor_addr_port_t *node_ap; + if (tor_addr_family(&conn->base_.addr) == AF_INET) { + node_ap = &node_ipv4_ap; + } else { + node_ap = &node_ipv6_ap; + } if (!started_here) { /* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense. * This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by @@ -919,13 +928,14 @@ connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here) * right IP address and port 56244, that wouldn't be as helpful. now we * log the "right" port too, so we know if it's moria1 or moria2. */ - tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr); - conn->base_.port = node_ap.port; + /* See #33898 for a ticket that resolves this technical debt. */ + tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap->addr); + conn->base_.port = node_ap->port; } tor_free(conn->nickname); conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r)); tor_free(conn->base_.address); - conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap.addr); + conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap->addr); } else { tor_free(conn->nickname); conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2); diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.h b/src/core/or/connection_or.h @@ -22,10 +22,6 @@ or_connection_t *TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *); void connection_or_clear_identity(or_connection_t *conn); void connection_or_clear_identity_map(void); void clear_broken_connection_map(int disable); -or_connection_t *connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest, - const tor_addr_t *target_addr, - const char **msg_out, - int *launch_out); void connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn); int connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn);