commit 742dbae978d53ffc8ec039dedd0748cbf676d39c
parent dab02adbe475a130b0af45e7f10e49ac3f68724a
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2025 16:36:49 +0000
Merge branch 'too_many_tlssecrets' into 'main'
Remove RSA-SHA256-TLSSecrets link authentication
Closes #41020 and #41021
See merge request tpo/core/tor!862
Diffstat:
21 files changed, 1472 insertions(+), 1933 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug41021 b/changes/bug41021
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (tests):
+ - Fix a test failure with OpenSSL builds running at security level 1 or
+ greater, which does not permit SHA-1 certificates.
+ (Fixes bug 41021; bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha.)
diff --git a/changes/too_many_tlssecrets b/changes/too_many_tlssecrets
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+ o Removed features:
+ - Relays no longer support the obsolete "RSA-SHA256-TLSSecret"
+ authentication method, which used a dangerously short RSA key,
+ and which required access TLS session internals. The current method
+ ("Ed25519-SHA256-RFC5705") has been supported since 0.3.0.1-alpha.
+ Closes ticket 41020.
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
@@ -1122,10 +1122,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
SSL_CIPHER_find \
SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list \
SSL_CTX_set_security_level \
- SSL_SESSION_get_master_key \
SSL_get_client_ciphers \
- SSL_get_client_random \
- SSL_get_server_random \
TLS_method \
])
diff --git a/src/core/or/channeltls.c b/src/core/or/channeltls.c
@@ -2465,22 +2465,20 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
ERR("Authenticator was too short");
expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
- chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1);
+ chan->conn, authtype, NULL, 1);
if (! expected_cell)
ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
- int sig_is_rsa;
- if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET ||
- authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) {
- bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN;
- sig_is_rsa = 1;
+ if (BUG(authtype != AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705)) {
+ /* We should have detected that we don't support this
+ * authentication type earlier, when we called
+ * authchallenge_type_is_supported(). */
+ ERR("Unsupported authentication type");
} else {
- tor_assert(authtype == AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
/* Our earlier check had better have made sure we had room
* for an ed25519 sig (inadvertently) */
tor_assert(V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN;
- sig_is_rsa = 0;
}
if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) {
ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected.");
@@ -2496,47 +2494,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24))
ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
- if (sig_is_rsa) {
- if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign != NULL)
- ERR("RSA-signed AUTHENTICATE response provided with an ED25519 cert");
-
- if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert == NULL)
- ERR("We never got an RSA authentication certificate");
-
- crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key(
- chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert);
- char d[DIGEST256_LEN];
- char *signed_data;
- size_t keysize;
- int signed_len;
-
- if (! pk) {
- ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from AUTH cert.");
- }
- crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256);
-
- keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk);
- signed_data = tor_malloc(keysize);
- signed_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk, signed_data, keysize,
- (char*)auth + V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN,
- authlen - V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN);
- crypto_pk_free(pk);
- if (signed_len < 0) {
- tor_free(signed_data);
- ERR("RSA signature wasn't valid");
- }
- if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) {
- tor_free(signed_data);
- ERR("Not enough data was signed");
- }
- /* Note that we deliberately allow *more* than DIGEST256_LEN bytes here,
- * in case they're later used to hold a SHA3 digest or something. */
- if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
- tor_free(signed_data);
- ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed.");
- }
- tor_free(signed_data);
- } else {
+ {
if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign == NULL)
ERR("We never got an Ed25519 identity certificate.");
if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth == NULL)
@@ -2563,7 +2521,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
const common_digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity_received = NULL;
- if (! sig_is_rsa) {
+ {
chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1;
ed_identity_received =
&chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key;
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.c b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
@@ -1843,7 +1843,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
if (has_cert) {
int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
- conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
+ conn->tls, time(NULL), &identity_rcvd);
if (started_here && v<0) {
log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s: It"
" has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.h b/src/core/or/connection_or.h
@@ -129,8 +129,4 @@ STATIC void note_or_connect_failed(const or_connection_t *or_conn);
MOCK_DECL(void, connection_or_change_state,
(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state));
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-extern int testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported;
-#endif
-
#endif /* !defined(TOR_CONNECTION_OR_H) */
diff --git a/src/core/or/protover.c b/src/core/or/protover.c
@@ -396,11 +396,7 @@ protocol_list_supports_protocol_or_later(const char *list,
#define PR_HSINTRO_V "4-5"
#define PR_HSREND_V "1-2"
#define PR_LINK_V "1-5"
-#ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS
-#define PR_LINKAUTH_V "1,3"
-#else
#define PR_LINKAUTH_V "3"
-#endif
#define PR_MICRODESC_V "1-3"
#define PR_PADDING_V "2"
#define PR_RELAY_V "2-4"
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.c
@@ -183,27 +183,17 @@ connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
return 0;
}
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-int testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported = 0;
-#else
-#define testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported 0
-#endif
-
/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type</b> is an AUTHCHALLENGE type that
* we can send and receive. */
int
authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type)
{
switch (challenge_type) {
- case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
-#ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS
- return 1;
-#else
- return testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported;
-#endif
case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
return 1;
- case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
+
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET: // obsolete.
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705: // never implemented.
default:
return 0;
}
@@ -243,11 +233,6 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
tor_assert(sizeof(ac->challenge) == 32);
crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge));
- if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET))
- auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET);
- /* Disabled, because everything that supports this method also supports
- * the much-superior ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 */
- /* auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705); */
if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705))
auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac,
@@ -283,42 +268,36 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
* determined by the rest of the handshake, and which match the provided value
* exactly.
*
- * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the
+ * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>ed_signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the
* first V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything
* that should be signed), but don't actually sign it.
*
- * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is provided, calculate the
- * entire authenticator, signed with <b>signing_key</b>.
+ * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>ed_signing_key</b> is provided,
+ * calculate the
+ * entire authenticator, signed with <b>ed_signing_key</b>.
*
* Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure.
*/
var_cell_t *
connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
const int authtype,
- crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
const ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
int server)
{
auth1_t *auth = NULL;
- auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
var_cell_t *result = NULL;
- int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
const char *authtype_str = NULL;
- int is_ed = 0;
-
/* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
switch (authtype) {
case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
- authtype_str = "AUTH0001";
- old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 1;
- break;
case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
- authtype_str = "AUTH0002";
+ /* These are unsupported; we should never reach this point. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
+ return NULL;
break;
case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
authtype_str = "AUTH0003";
- is_ed = 1;
break;
default:
tor_assert(0);
@@ -326,7 +305,6 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
}
auth = auth1_new();
- ctx->is_ed = is_ed;
/* Type: 8 bytes. */
memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8);
@@ -355,7 +333,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
memcpy(auth->sid, server_id, 32);
}
- if (is_ed) {
+ {
const ed25519_public_key_t *my_ed_id, *their_ed_id;
if (!conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Ed authenticate without Ed ID cert from peer.");
@@ -367,8 +345,8 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
const uint8_t *cid_ed = (server ? their_ed_id : my_ed_id)->pubkey;
const uint8_t *sid_ed = (server ? my_ed_id : their_ed_id)->pubkey;
- memcpy(auth->u1_cid_ed, cid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
- memcpy(auth->u1_sid_ed, sid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ memcpy(auth->cid_ed, cid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ memcpy(auth->sid_ed, sid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
}
{
@@ -408,15 +386,8 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
}
- /* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */
- if (old_tlssecrets_algorithm) {
- if (tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets) < 0) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Somebody asked us for an older TLS "
- "authentication method (AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET) "
- "which we don't support.");
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
+ /* RFC5709 key exporter material : 32 octets */
+ {
char label[128];
tor_snprintf(label, sizeof(label),
"EXPORTER FOR TOR TLS CLIENT BINDING %s", authtype_str);
@@ -436,11 +407,9 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
* checks it. That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
- ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx);
- if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+ ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth);
+ if (ed_signing_key) {
maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN;
- } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
- maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key);
}
const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */
@@ -452,7 +421,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype));
- if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
+ if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth)) < 0) {
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
goto err;
@@ -461,7 +430,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
if (server) {
auth1_t *tmp = NULL;
- ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len, ctx);
+ ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len);
if (!tmp) {
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data that "
@@ -481,7 +450,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
goto done;
}
- if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+ if (ed_signing_key) {
ed25519_signature_t sig;
if (ed25519_sign(&sig, out, len, ed_signing_key) < 0) {
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
@@ -491,25 +460,9 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
}
auth1_setlen_sig(auth, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
memcpy(auth1_getarray_sig(auth), sig.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
-
- } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
- auth1_setlen_sig(auth, crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key));
-
- char d[32];
- crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, len, DIGEST_SHA256);
- int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key,
- (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth),
- auth1_getlen_sig(auth),
- d, 32);
- if (siglen < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to sign AUTH1 data.");
- goto err;
- }
-
- auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
}
- len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
+ len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth);
if (len < 0) {
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
@@ -527,7 +480,6 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
result = NULL;
done:
auth1_free(auth);
- auth_ctx_free(ctx);
return result;
}
@@ -537,13 +489,8 @@ MOCK_IMPL(int,
connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
{
var_cell_t *cell;
- crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
/* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */
- if (!pk) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't compute authenticate cell: no client auth key");
- return -1;
- }
if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to send authenticate cell with unknown "
"authentication type %d", authtype);
@@ -552,7 +499,6 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
authtype,
- pk,
get_current_auth_keypair(),
0 /* not server */);
if (! cell) {
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.h b/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.h
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ int connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
var_cell_t *connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
or_connection_t *conn,
const int authtype,
- crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
const struct ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
int server);
@@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ static inline var_cell_t *
connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
or_connection_t *conn,
const int authtype,
- crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
const struct ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
int server)
{
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
@@ -93,19 +93,6 @@ tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
return rv;
}
-/**
- * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a
- * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake.
- */
-crypto_pk_t *
-tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
-{
- tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(0);
- if (! context)
- return NULL;
- return context->auth_key;
-}
-
/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
void
tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
@@ -413,7 +400,8 @@ tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
* 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
*/
int
-tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity)
+tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, time_t now,
+ crypto_pk_t **identity)
{
tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
tor_x509_cert_t *peer_x509 = NULL, *id_x509 = NULL;
@@ -432,7 +420,7 @@ tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity)
id_x509 = tor_x509_cert_new(id_cert);
cert = id_cert = NULL; /* Prevent double-free */
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, peer_x509, id_x509, time(NULL), 0)) {
+ if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, peer_x509, id_x509, now, 0)) {
goto done;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ void tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls);
int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls);
MOCK_DECL(struct tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls));
MOCK_DECL(struct tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls));
-int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity);
+int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, time_t now,
+ crypto_pk_t **identity);
MOCK_DECL(int, tor_tls_read, (tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len));
int tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n);
int tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls);
@@ -125,11 +126,6 @@ int tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls);
int tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls);
MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls,
const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert));
-MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out));
-#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
-/* OpenSSL lets us see these master secrets; NSS sensibly does not. */
-#define HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS
-#endif
MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_export_key_material,(
tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
const uint8_t *context,
@@ -151,7 +147,6 @@ void tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
int tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
const struct tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
const struct tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out);
-crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void);
const char *tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls);
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h
@@ -51,12 +51,6 @@ void tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
int type, int val);
void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void);
-#if !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY)
-size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s,
- uint8_t *out,
- size_t len);
-#endif
-
#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
@@ -789,17 +789,6 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls,
}
MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
-{
- tor_assert(tls);
- tor_assert(secrets_out);
-
- /* There's no way to get this information out of NSS. */
-
- return -1;
-}
-
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len,
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
@@ -1589,137 +1589,6 @@ tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
return tls->got_renegotiate;
}
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM
-static size_t
-SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
- if (len == 0)
- return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- tor_assert(s->s3);
- memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len);
- return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM
-static size_t
-SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
- if (len == 0)
- return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- tor_assert(s->s3);
- memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len);
- return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
-size_t
-SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
- tor_assert(s);
- if (len == 0)
- return s->master_key_length;
- tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length);
- tor_assert(out);
- memcpy(out, s->master_key, len);
- return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
-
-/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
- * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
- * connection <b>tls</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
-{
-#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
- uint8_t buf[128];
- size_t len;
- tor_assert(tls);
-
- SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
- SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
-
- tor_assert(ssl);
- tor_assert(session);
-
- const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
- const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
- const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
-
- if (BUG(! server_random_len)) {
- log_warn(LD_NET, "Missing server randomness after handshake "
- "using %s (cipher: %s, server: %s) from %s",
- SSL_get_version(ssl),
- SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl),
- tls->isServer ? "true" : "false",
- ADDR(tls));
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BUG(! client_random_len)) {
- log_warn(LD_NET, "Missing client randomness after handshake "
- "using %s (cipher: %s, server: %s) from %s",
- SSL_get_version(ssl),
- SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl),
- tls->isServer ? "true" : "false",
- ADDR(tls));
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BUG(! master_key_len)) {
- log_warn(LD_NET, "Missing master key after handshake "
- "using %s (cipher: %s, server: %s) from %s",
- SSL_get_version(ssl),
- SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl),
- tls->isServer ? "true" : "false",
- ADDR(tls));
- return -1;
- }
-
- len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
- tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
-
- {
- size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
- tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
- }
-
- {
- size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl,
- buf+client_random_len,
- server_random_len);
- tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
- }
-
- uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
- {
- size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
- tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
- }
-
- uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
- memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
-
- /*
- The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
- client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
- */
- crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
- (char*)master_key,
- master_key_len,
- (char*)buf, len);
- memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len);
- tor_free(master_key);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
* provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
* <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
diff --git a/src/test/test_link_handshake.c b/src/test/test_link_handshake.c
@@ -943,25 +943,15 @@ test_link_handshake_send_authchallenge(void *arg)
cell1 = mock_got_var_cell;
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(c1));
cell2 = mock_got_var_cell;
-#ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS
- tt_int_op(38, OP_EQ, cell1->payload_len);
- tt_int_op(38, OP_EQ, cell2->payload_len);
-#else
tt_int_op(36, OP_EQ, cell1->payload_len);
tt_int_op(36, OP_EQ, cell2->payload_len);
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS) */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, cell1->circ_id);
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, cell2->circ_id);
tt_int_op(CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE, OP_EQ, cell1->command);
tt_int_op(CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE, OP_EQ, cell2->command);
-#ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS
- tt_mem_op("\x00\x02\x00\x01\x00\x03", OP_EQ, cell1->payload + 32, 6);
- tt_mem_op("\x00\x02\x00\x01\x00\x03", OP_EQ, cell2->payload + 32, 6);
-#else
tt_mem_op("\x00\x01\x00\x03", OP_EQ, cell1->payload + 32, 4);
tt_mem_op("\x00\x01\x00\x03", OP_EQ, cell2->payload + 32, 4);
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS) */
tt_mem_op(cell1->payload, OP_NE, cell2->payload, 32);
done:
@@ -1004,7 +994,6 @@ recv_authchallenge_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
{
(void)test;
- testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported = 1;
authchallenge_data_t *d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d));
d->c = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
d->chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d->chan));
@@ -1019,7 +1008,7 @@ recv_authchallenge_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
d->cell->payload_len = 38;
d->cell->payload[33] = 2; /* 2 methods */
d->cell->payload[35] = 7; /* This one isn't real */
- d->cell->payload[37] = 1; /* This is the old RSA one. */
+ d->cell->payload[37] = 3; /* This is the currently supported Ed25519 one. */
d->cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE;
get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
@@ -1043,18 +1032,19 @@ static struct testcase_setup_t setup_recv_authchallenge = {
};
static void
-test_link_handshake_recv_authchallenge_ok(void *arg)
+test_link_handshake_recv_authchallenge_no_ed25519(void *arg)
{
authchallenge_data_t *d = arg;
+ d->cell->payload[33] = 1; /* only 1 type supported. */
+ d->cell->payload_len -= 2;
+
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(d->cell, d->chan);
- tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, mock_close_called);
- tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, d->c->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge);
- tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, mock_send_authenticate_called);
- tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, mock_send_netinfo_called);
- tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, mock_send_authenticate_called_with_type); /* RSA */
+ expect_log_msg_containing("we don't know any of its authentication types");
+
done:
- ;
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
static void
@@ -1154,14 +1144,6 @@ AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(nonzero_circid,
require_failure_message = "It had a nonzero circuit ID";
d->cell->circ_id = 1337)
-static int
-mock_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)
-{
- (void)tls;
- memcpy(secrets_out, "int getRandomNumber(){return 4;}", 32);
- return 0;
-}
-
static void
mock_set_circid_type(channel_t *chan,
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd,
@@ -1173,7 +1155,6 @@ mock_set_circid_type(channel_t *chan,
}
typedef struct authenticate_data_t {
- int is_ed;
or_connection_t *c1, *c2;
channel_tls_t *chan2;
var_cell_t *cell;
@@ -1187,7 +1168,6 @@ authenticate_data_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *arg)
UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert);
UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_own_cert);
- UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_tlssecrets);
UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
UNMOCK(channel_set_circid_type);
UNMOCK(tor_tls_export_key_material);
@@ -1216,16 +1196,12 @@ static void *
authenticate_data_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
{
authenticate_data_t *d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d));
- int is_ed = d->is_ed = (test->setup_data == (void*)3);
-
- testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported = 1;
scheduler_init();
MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, mock_get_peer_cert);
MOCK(tor_tls_get_own_cert, mock_get_own_cert);
- MOCK(tor_tls_get_tlssecrets, mock_get_tlssecrets);
MOCK(connection_or_close_for_error, mock_close_for_err);
MOCK(channel_set_circid_type, mock_set_circid_type);
MOCK(tor_tls_export_key_material, mock_export_key_material);
@@ -1265,7 +1241,7 @@ authenticate_data_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
d->c2->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 1);
d->c2->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1;
- const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL, *auth_cert=NULL;
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
tt_assert(! tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_cert, &id_cert));
const uint8_t *der;
@@ -1274,17 +1250,13 @@ authenticate_data_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
d->c1->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
d->c2->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
- if (is_ed) {
+ {
d->c1->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign =
tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
d->c2->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign =
tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
d->c2->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth =
tor_cert_dup(get_current_auth_key_cert());
- } else {
- tt_assert(! tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &auth_cert, &id_cert));
- tor_x509_cert_get_der(auth_cert, &der, &sz);
- d->c2->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
}
tor_x509_cert_get_der(link_cert, &der, &sz);
@@ -1295,11 +1267,8 @@ authenticate_data_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
tt_assert(mock_own_cert);
/* Make an authenticate cell ... */
- int authtype;
- if (is_ed)
- authtype = AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705;
- else
- authtype = AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET;
+ int authtype = AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705;
+
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(d->c1, authtype));
tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
@@ -1327,50 +1296,27 @@ test_link_handshake_auth_cell(void *arg)
/* Is the cell well-formed on the outer layer? */
tt_int_op(d->cell->command, OP_EQ, CELL_AUTHENTICATE);
tt_int_op(d->cell->payload[0], OP_EQ, 0);
- if (d->is_ed)
- tt_int_op(d->cell->payload[1], OP_EQ, 3);
- else
- tt_int_op(d->cell->payload[1], OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(d->cell->payload[1], OP_EQ, 3);
tt_int_op(ntohs(get_uint16(d->cell->payload + 2)), OP_EQ,
d->cell->payload_len - 4);
/* Check it out for plausibility... */
- auth_ctx_t ctx;
- ctx.is_ed = d->is_ed;
tt_int_op(d->cell->payload_len-4, OP_EQ, auth1_parse(&auth1,
d->cell->payload+4,
- d->cell->payload_len - 4, &ctx));
+ d->cell->payload_len - 4));
tt_assert(auth1);
- if (d->is_ed) {
- tt_mem_op(auth1->type, OP_EQ, "AUTH0003", 8);
- } else {
- tt_mem_op(auth1->type, OP_EQ, "AUTH0001", 8);
- }
+ tt_mem_op(auth1->type, OP_EQ, "AUTH0003", 8);
tt_mem_op(auth1->tlssecrets, OP_EQ, "int getRandomNumber(){return 4;}", 32);
/* Is the signature okay? */
const uint8_t *start = d->cell->payload+4, *end = auth1->end_of_signed;
- if (d->is_ed) {
+ {
ed25519_signature_t sig;
tt_int_op(auth1_getlen_sig(auth1), OP_EQ, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
memcpy(&sig.sig, auth1_getarray_sig(auth1), ED25519_SIG_LEN);
tt_assert(!ed25519_checksig(&sig, start, end-start,
&get_current_auth_keypair()->pubkey));
- } else {
- uint8_t sig[128];
- uint8_t digest[32];
- tt_int_op(auth1_getlen_sig(auth1), OP_GT, 120);
- auth_pubkey = tor_tls_cert_get_key(
- d->c2->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert);
- int n = crypto_pk_public_checksig(
- auth_pubkey,
- (char*)sig, sizeof(sig), (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth1),
- auth1_getlen_sig(auth1));
- tt_int_op(n, OP_EQ, 32);
- crypto_digest256((char*)digest,
- (const char*)start, end-start, DIGEST_SHA256);
- tt_mem_op(sig, OP_EQ, digest, 32);
}
/* Then feed it to c2. */
@@ -1378,12 +1324,9 @@ test_link_handshake_auth_cell(void *arg)
channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(d->cell, d->chan2);
tt_int_op(mock_close_called, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated, OP_EQ, 1);
- if (d->is_ed) {
+ {
tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519, OP_EQ, 1);
tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa, OP_EQ, 1);
- } else {
- tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa, OP_EQ, 1);
}
done:
@@ -1445,11 +1388,6 @@ AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(noidcert,
"certificate";
tor_x509_cert_free(d->c2->handshake_state->certs->id_cert);
d->c2->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = NULL)
-AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(noauthcert,
- require_failure_message = "We never got an RSA "
- "authentication certificate";
- tor_x509_cert_free(d->c2->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert);
- d->c2->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert = NULL)
AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(tooshort,
require_failure_message = "Cell was way too short";
d->cell->payload_len = 3)
@@ -1473,10 +1411,7 @@ AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(badcontent,
"cell body was not as expected";
d->cell->payload[10] ^= 0xff)
AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(badsig_1,
- if (d->is_ed)
- require_failure_message = "Ed25519 signature wasn't valid";
- else
- require_failure_message = "RSA signature wasn't valid";
+ require_failure_message = "Ed25519 signature wasn't valid";
d->cell->payload[d->cell->payload_len - 5] ^= 0xff)
AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(missing_ed_id,
{
@@ -1522,10 +1457,13 @@ AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(missing_ed_auth,
test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ ## name, TT_FORK, \
&setup_recv_certs, (void*)type }
+/* These two used to have different behavior, but since we've
+ disabled RSA-SHAS256-TLSSecret authentication, we no longer
+ have any need to distinguish.
+*/
#define TEST_AUTHENTICATE(name) \
{ "authenticate/" #name , test_link_handshake_auth_ ## name, TT_FORK, \
&setup_authenticate, NULL }
-
#define TEST_AUTHENTICATE_ED(name) \
{ "authenticate/" #name "_ed25519" , test_link_handshake_auth_ ## name, \
TT_FORK, &setup_authenticate, (void*)3 }
@@ -1581,7 +1519,7 @@ struct testcase_t link_handshake_tests[] = {
TEST_RCV_CERTS(server_wrong_labels_1),
TEST_RSA(send_authchallenge, TT_FORK),
- TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(ok),
+ TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(no_ed25519),
TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(ok_ed25519),
TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(ok_noserver),
TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(ok_unrecognized),
@@ -1603,7 +1541,6 @@ struct testcase_t link_handshake_tests[] = {
TEST_AUTHENTICATE(already_authenticated),
TEST_AUTHENTICATE(nocerts),
TEST_AUTHENTICATE(noidcert),
- TEST_AUTHENTICATE(noauthcert),
TEST_AUTHENTICATE(tooshort),
TEST_AUTHENTICATE(badtype),
TEST_AUTHENTICATE(truncated_1),
diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c
@@ -49,62 +49,80 @@ const char* notCompletelyValidCertString =
"evnAhf0cwULaebn+lMs8Pdl7y37+sfluVok=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-const char* validCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
- "MIIDpTCCAY0CAg3+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMF4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMREwDwYD\n"
- "VQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIGA1UECgwLVG9yIFRl\n"
- "c3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkwNjEzMzk1OVoXDTQz\n"
- "MDEyMjEzMzk1OVowVjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAcMB0NoaWNhZ28xFDAS\n"
- "BgNVBAoMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZ0ZXN0aW5nLnRvcnByb2plY3Qu\n"
- "b3JnMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDoT6uyVVhWyOF3wkHjjYbd\n"
- "nKaykyRv4JVtKQdZ4OpEErmX1zw4MmyzpQNV6iR4bQnWiyLfzyVJMZDIC/WILBfX\n"
- "w2Pza/yuLgUvDc3twMuhOACzOQVO8PrEF/aVv2+hbCCy2udXvKhnYn+CCXl3ozc8\n"
- "XcKYvujTXDyvGWY3xwAjlQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4ICAQCUvnhzQWuQ\n"
- "MrN+pERkE+zcTI/9dGS90rUMMLgu8VDNqTa0TUQh8uO0EQ6uDvI8Js6e8tgwS0BR\n"
- "UBahqb7ZHv+rejGCBr5OudqD+x4STiiuPNJVs86JTLN8SpM9CHjIBH5WCCN2KOy3\n"
- "mevNoRcRRyYJzSFULCunIK6FGulszigMYGscrO4oiTkZiHPh9KvWT40IMiHfL+Lw\n"
- "EtEWiLex6064LcA2YQ1AMuSZyCexks63lcfaFmQbkYOKqXa1oLkIRuDsOaSVjTfe\n"
- "vec+X6jvf12cFTKS5WIeqkKF2Irt+dJoiHEGTe5RscUMN/f+gqHPzfFz5dR23sxo\n"
- "g+HC6MZHlFkLAOx3wW6epPS8A/m1mw3zMPoTnb2U2YYt8T0dJMMlUn/7Y1sEAa+a\n"
- "dSTMaeUf6VnJ//11m454EZl1to9Z7oJOgqmFffSrdD4BGIWe8f7hhW6L1Enmqe/J\n"
- "BKL3wbzZh80O1W0bndAwhnEEhlzneFY84cbBo9pmVxpODHkUcStpr5Z7pBDrcL21\n"
- "Ss/aB/1YrsVXhdvJdOGxl3Mnl9dUY57CympLGlT8f0pPS6GAKOelECOhFMHmJd8L\n"
- "dj3XQSmKtYHevZ6IvuMXSlB/fJvSjSlkCuLo5+kJoaqPuRu+i/S1qxeRy3CBwmnE\n"
- "LdSNdcX4N79GQJ996PA8+mUCQG7YRtK+WA==\n"
+// Tor www.torproject.org certificate.
+// Fetched March 6 2025, ~1320 UTC.
+const char* validCertString =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIF8zCCBNugAwIBAgISBMmLkAm3fEUb8UQC5EdseU8ZMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA\n"
+ "MDMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRYwFAYDVQQKEw1MZXQncyBFbmNyeXB0MQwwCgYDVQQD\n"
+ "EwNSMTAwHhcNMjUwMTMwMDA1MTU0WhcNMjUwNDMwMDA1MTUzWjAdMRswGQYDVQQD\n"
+ "ExJ3d3cudG9ycHJvamVjdC5vcmcwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAwggIK\n"
+ "AoICAQDGG3XaG3ZB5QbJisjUbyBW+dgoZy2E3dJ0qMaWyO3/dB8yz4gKKMFCr1Gj\n"
+ "xjcfWYiayN1mcL8/QWOiD8x1s25FHeWBoDpyHX70TlRK6ZL1u2imsgoIiNaOh7f6\n"
+ "zfY7EQHu5UTuwSF9xBVf6FGuJ1b+ZGfXE5dBg3JJ78E8unT+xz6TUzEBUHRF7mgR\n"
+ "nGSgy2vqTT2EpoGq2ZioV8v8JrjkLFUx40XimUPphBs0vdY+gzVCp2wKHRgxglAD\n"
+ "ut3UzLLs7dW/JV9OSSj5L46CQwuaC5xjGEBcarS202oyBdC7DZpolHVKmwJd6IOj\n"
+ "DcachL3VFDGPXQe3/TVcale8y6mfhYbGYn8v9SpeHOdsWv5kCNCpHaHYmdSCiCFG\n"
+ "lmFxnuisu74WghiLrHeHB3oydjACQOyJ4d3u1P9oFKqxPX4ui3ACVWcvksNVQSmR\n"
+ "LlLE2SrK9wIwn2oNs5jJuR68yMV57i20TGvqBSsCZ3m99glpXwG50tzgqfBwFFDX\n"
+ "QElJWI8GQvKQIh43TYBvpZXYIG9srvGdl9eUCNXTFhGosc0+sfKoPpUf7f0R58pj\n"
+ "fjdyDyXb+M6Z60mflOeUM+UR9Q5VeTJ69IfpLypC2JaHy2HCuNekvkbB7TuPuvC9\n"
+ "vANjovgo5zI3MAcp2v9Y6EDgeScKMbZBQM6nuljvw9npaqkHXQIDAQABo4ICFTCC\n"
+ "AhEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
+ "AjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRWG7Q4+uqENJPVGkL74DH+LCrhjzAf\n"
+ "BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS7vMNHpeS8qcbDpHIMEI2iNeHI6DBXBggrBgEFBQcBAQRLMEkw\n"
+ "IgYIKwYBBQUHMAGGFmh0dHA6Ly9yMTAuby5sZW5jci5vcmcwIwYIKwYBBQUHMAKG\n"
+ "F2h0dHA6Ly9yMTAuaS5sZW5jci5vcmcvMB0GA1UdEQQWMBSCEnd3dy50b3Jwcm9q\n"
+ "ZWN0Lm9yZzATBgNVHSAEDDAKMAgGBmeBDAECATCCAQMGCisGAQQB1nkCBAIEgfQE\n"
+ "gfEA7wB1AMz7D2qFcQll/pWbU87psnwi6YVcDZeNtql+VMD+TA2wAAABlLTm/wYA\n"
+ "AAQDAEYwRAIgHWbnkMLOUDDJg7vog3J66Aa2wuRYg4DFS21uUtPVUQgCIFZhio8Z\n"
+ "CQcZsdFpeGzAUjXcyboVrvdMg3/3jwWgdQ82AHYA5tIxY0B3jMEQQQbXcbnOwdJA\n"
+ "9paEhvu6hzId/R43jlAAAAGUtOb/DQAABAMARzBFAiBHNO8CjQdQcMENnXyH5oBL\n"
+ "kfdZghUHzMEfFKlg5p+QDAIhAP0dEqz+Q2A2XCvN09vZJ1gsG8IzQELHpBM8QDyM\n"
+ "KSavMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQDNh8KjUWJKio63zn2JrFlpIsnrVchPP+ee\n"
+ "1XUrHQt/BA1pUdlTFPQrHOCf6KOGpiyjXxKkBdtJvc/5ZJZYJ26E6Ytd0nGOCirE\n"
+ "v0W45Vh22rH1w0Q1fH1xOqZx1qeh4QYr1/QJ3gWWMTOH5uV5dTzK9RWfp0C1pjQ6\n"
+ "Rct/0ZqyZHYqMD9VoAiVap7lwnWNWOj+UEioH2cMqjCkD5g8QGNHEfereB3DtoV3\n"
+ "Qw1Z3KoUEr2zEDfq+Uv6RLKCw3HjzDYKbHWSYkrUO7YyIQ3nlZAT861478k5WSKv\n"
+ "hpy8XisMLpQLAhSByV965gINlmHXbe61anJUh3JJpnOu/JyMfaf/\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
- "MIIFjzCCA3egAwIBAgIJAKd5WgyfPMYRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMF4xCzAJBgNV\n"
- "BAYTAlVTMREwDwYDVQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIG\n"
- "A1UECgwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkw\n"
- "NjEzMzc0MVoXDTQzMDEyMjEzMzc0MVowXjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxETAPBgNVBAgM\n"
- "CElsbGlub2lzMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdDaGljYWdvMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtUb3IgVGVzdGlu\n"
- "ZzEUMBIGA1UEAwwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw\n"
- "ggIKAoICAQCpLMUEiLW5leUgBZoEJms2V7lZRhIAjnJBhVMHD0e3UubNknmaQoxf\n"
- "ARz3rvqOaRd0JlV+qM9qE0DjiYcCVP1cAfqAo9d83uS1vwY3YMVJzADlaIiHfyVW\n"
- "uEgBy0vvkeUBqaua24dYlcwsemOiXYLu41yM1wkcGHW1AhBNHppY6cznb8TyLgNM\n"
- "2x3SGUdzc5XMyAFx51faKGBA3wjs+Hg1PLY7d30nmCgEOBavpm5I1disM/0k+Mcy\n"
- "YmAKEo/iHJX/rQzO4b9znP69juLlR8PDBUJEVIG/CYb6+uw8MjjUyiWXYoqfVmN2\n"
- "hm/lH8b6rXw1a2Aa3VTeD0DxaWeacMYHY/i01fd5n7hCoDTRNdSw5KJ0L3Z0SKTu\n"
- "0lzffKzDaIfyZGlpW5qdouACkWYzsaitQOePVE01PIdO30vUfzNTFDfy42ccx3Di\n"
- "59UCu+IXB+eMtrBfsok0Qc63vtF1linJgjHW1z/8ujk8F7/qkOfODhk4l7wngc2A\n"
- "EmwWFIFoGaiTEZHB9qteXr4unbXZ0AHpM02uGGwZEGohjFyebEb73M+J57WKKAFb\n"
- "PqbLcGUksL1SHNBNAJcVLttX55sO4nbidOS/kA3m+F1R04MBTyQF9qA6YDDHqdI3\n"
- "h/3pw0Z4fxVouTYT4/NfRnX4JTP4u+7Mpcoof28VME0qWqD1LnRhFQIDAQABo1Aw\n"
- "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUMoAgIXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUMoAg\n"
- "IXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n"
- "AgEAUJxacjXR9sT+Xs6ISFiUsyd0T6WVKMnV46xrYJHirGfx+krWHrjxMY+ZtxYD\n"
- "DBDGlo11Qc4v6QrclNf5QUBfIiGQsP9Cm6hHcQ+Tpg9HHCgSqG1YNPwCPReCR4br\n"
- "BLvLfrfkcBL2IWM0PdQdCze+59DBfipsULD2mEn9fjYRXQEwb2QWtQ9qRc20Yb/x\n"
- "Q4b/+CvUodLkaq7B8MHz0BV8HHcBoph6DYaRmO/N+hPauIuSp6XyaGYcEefGKVKj\n"
- "G2+fcsdyXsoijNdL8vNKwm4j2gVwCBnw16J00yfFoV46YcbfqEdJB2je0XSvwXqt\n"
- "14AOTngxso2h9k9HLtrfpO1ZG/B5AcCMs1lzbZ2fp5DPHtjvvmvA2RJqgo3yjw4W\n"
- "4DHAuTglYFlC3mDHNfNtcGP20JvepcQNzNP2UzwcpOc94hfKikOFw+gf9Vf1qd0y\n"
- "h/Sk6OZHn2+JVUPiWHIQV98Vtoh4RmUZDJD+b55ia3fQGTGzt4z1XFzQYSva5sfs\n"
- "wocS/papthqWldQU7x+3wofNd5CNU1x6WKXG/yw30IT/4F8ADJD6GeygNT8QJYvt\n"
- "u/8lAkbOy6B9xGmSvr0Kk1oq9P2NshA6kalxp1Oz/DTNDdL4AeBXV3JmM6WWCjGn\n"
- "Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n"
+// Let's encrypt certificate, used to sign validCertString.
+// Also fetched March 6 2025, ~1320 UTC.
+const char* caCertString =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIFBTCCAu2gAwIBAgIQS6hSk/eaL6JzBkuoBI110DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBP\n"
+ "MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEpMCcGA1UEChMgSW50ZXJuZXQgU2VjdXJpdHkgUmVzZWFy\n"
+ "Y2ggR3JvdXAxFTATBgNVBAMTDElTUkcgUm9vdCBYMTAeFw0yNDAzMTMwMDAwMDBa\n"
+ "Fw0yNzAzMTIyMzU5NTlaMDMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRYwFAYDVQQKEw1MZXQncyBF\n"
+ "bmNyeXB0MQwwCgYDVQQDEwNSMTAwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEK\n"
+ "AoIBAQDPV+XmxFQS7bRH/sknWHZGUCiMHT6I3wWd1bUYKb3dtVq/+vbOo76vACFL\n"
+ "YlpaPAEvxVgD9on/jhFD68G14BQHlo9vH9fnuoE5CXVlt8KvGFs3Jijno/QHK20a\n"
+ "/6tYvJWuQP/py1fEtVt/eA0YYbwX51TGu0mRzW4Y0YCF7qZlNrx06rxQTOr8IfM4\n"
+ "FpOUurDTazgGzRYSespSdcitdrLCnF2YRVxvYXvGLe48E1KGAdlX5jgc3421H5KR\n"
+ "mudKHMxFqHJV8LDmowfs/acbZp4/SItxhHFYyTr6717yW0QrPHTnj7JHwQdqzZq3\n"
+ "DZb3EoEmUVQK7GH29/Xi8orIlQ2NAgMBAAGjgfgwgfUwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgGG\n"
+ "MB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDATASBgNVHRMBAf8ECDAGAQH/\n"
+ "AgEAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBS7vMNHpeS8qcbDpHIMEI2iNeHI6DAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBR5\n"
+ "tFnme7bl5AFzgAiIyBpY9umbbjAyBggrBgEFBQcBAQQmMCQwIgYIKwYBBQUHMAKG\n"
+ "Fmh0dHA6Ly94MS5pLmxlbmNyLm9yZy8wEwYDVR0gBAwwCjAIBgZngQwBAgEwJwYD\n"
+ "VR0fBCAwHjAcoBqgGIYWaHR0cDovL3gxLmMubGVuY3Iub3JnLzANBgkqhkiG9w0B\n"
+ "AQsFAAOCAgEAkrHnQTfreZ2B5s3iJeE6IOmQRJWjgVzPw139vaBw1bGWKCIL0vIo\n"
+ "zwzn1OZDjCQiHcFCktEJr59L9MhwTyAWsVrdAfYf+B9haxQnsHKNY67u4s5Lzzfd\n"
+ "u6PUzeetUK29v+PsPmI2cJkxp+iN3epi4hKu9ZzUPSwMqtCceb7qPVxEbpYxY1p9\n"
+ "1n5PJKBLBX9eb9LU6l8zSxPWV7bK3lG4XaMJgnT9x3ies7msFtpKK5bDtotij/l0\n"
+ "GaKeA97pb5uwD9KgWvaFXMIEt8jVTjLEvwRdvCn294GPDF08U8lAkIv7tghluaQh\n"
+ "1QnlE4SEN4LOECj8dsIGJXpGUk3aU3KkJz9icKy+aUgA+2cP21uh6NcDIS3XyfaZ\n"
+ "QjmDQ993ChII8SXWupQZVBiIpcWO4RqZk3lr7Bz5MUCwzDIA359e57SSq5CCkY0N\n"
+ "4B6Vulk7LktfwrdGNVI5BsC9qqxSwSKgRJeZ9wygIaehbHFHFhcBaMDKpiZlBHyz\n"
+ "rsnnlFXCb5s8HKn5LsUgGvB24L7sGNZP2CX7dhHov+YhD+jozLW2p9W4959Bz2Ei\n"
+ "RmqDtmiXLnzqTpXbI+suyCsohKRg6Un0RC47+cpiVwHiXZAW+cn8eiNIjqbVgXLx\n"
+ "KPpdzvvtTnOPlC7SQZSYmdunr3Bf9b77AiC/ZidstK36dRILKz7OA54=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+// A time at which the certs above are valid.
+const time_t cert_strings_valid_at = 1741267580;
+
static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_x509_cert = NULL;
static tor_x509_cert_t *
get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed(tor_tls_t *tls)
@@ -482,6 +500,7 @@ test_tortls_verify(void *ignored)
crypto_pk_t *k = NULL;
tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *invalidCert = NULL,
*validCert = NULL, *caCert = NULL;
+ time_t now = cert_strings_valid_at;
validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
caCert = read_cert_from(caCertString);
@@ -492,23 +511,23 @@ test_tortls_verify(void *ignored)
MOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls);
fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = cert1;
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, now, &k);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = cert2;
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, now, &k);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = invalidCert;
fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = invalidCert;
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, now, &k);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = validCert;
fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = caCert;
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, now, &k);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(k);
diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.h b/src/test/test_tortls.h
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ tor_x509_cert_impl_t *read_cert_from(const char *str);
extern const char *notCompletelyValidCertString;
extern const char *validCertString;
extern const char *caCertString;
+extern const time_t cert_strings_valid_at;
#endif /* !defined(TEST_TORTLS_H) */
diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c
@@ -505,32 +505,6 @@ test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored)
}
#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-static void
-test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- crypto_pk_t *ret;
- crypto_pk_t *expected;
- tor_tls_context_t *ctx;
- RSA *k = RSA_new();
-
- ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
- expected = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(k);
- ctx->auth_key = expected;
-
- client_tls_context = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- client_tls_context = ctx;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
- tt_assert(ret == expected);
-
- done:
- crypto_pk_free(expected);
- tor_free(ctx);
-}
-
#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
static SSL_CIPHER *
get_cipher_by_name(const char *name)
@@ -2068,20 +2042,21 @@ test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
(void)ignored;
int ret;
tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL, *scert = NULL;
+ time_t now = cert_strings_valid_at;
scert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tor_free(scert);
tor_free(cert);
cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
@@ -2092,7 +2067,7 @@ test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
ASN1_TIME_free(cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter);
cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter =
ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, time(NULL)-1000000);
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
@@ -2101,7 +2076,7 @@ test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
X509_PUBKEY_free(cert->cert->cert_info->key);
cert->cert->cert_info->key = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
@@ -2112,7 +2087,7 @@ test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
/* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
BN_one(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert))->n);
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
@@ -2121,7 +2096,7 @@ test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
/* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
@@ -2130,7 +2105,7 @@ test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
/* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
@@ -2140,7 +2115,7 @@ test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
/* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->ameth = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, now, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
#endif /* 0 */
@@ -2187,7 +2162,6 @@ struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[] = {
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0),
INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0),
INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK),
INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0),
INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(classify_client_ciphers, 0),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(client_is_using_v2_ciphers, 0),
diff --git a/src/trunnel/link_handshake.c b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.c
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ int linkhandshake_deadcode_dummy__ = 0;
} \
} while (0)
-auth_challenge_cell_t *
-auth_challenge_cell_new(void)
+auth1_t *
+auth1_new(void)
{
- auth_challenge_cell_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth_challenge_cell_t));
+ auth1_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth1_t));
if (NULL == val)
return NULL;
return val;
@@ -40,535 +40,608 @@ auth_challenge_cell_new(void)
/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
*/
static void
-auth_challenge_cell_clear(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+auth1_clear(auth1_t *obj)
{
(void) obj;
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->methods);
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->methods);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->sig);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->sig);
}
void
-auth_challenge_cell_free(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+auth1_free(auth1_t *obj)
{
if (obj == NULL)
return;
- auth_challenge_cell_clear(obj);
- trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth_challenge_cell_t));
+ auth1_clear(obj);
+ trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth1_t));
trunnel_free_(obj);
}
size_t
-auth_challenge_cell_getlen_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+auth1_getlen_type(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ (void)inp; return 8;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 8);
+ return inp->type[idx];
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_getconst_type(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ return auth1_get_type((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+}
+int
+auth1_set_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 8);
+ inp->type[idx] = elt;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_type(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return inp->type;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_type(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_type((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_cid(const auth1_t *inp)
{
(void)inp; return 32;
}
uint8_t
-auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
+auth1_get_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->challenge[idx];
+ return inp->cid[idx];
}
uint8_t
-auth_challenge_cell_getconst_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
+auth1_getconst_cid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp, idx);
+ return auth1_get_cid((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth_challenge_cell_set_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+auth1_set_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->challenge[idx] = elt;
+ inp->cid[idx] = elt;
return 0;
}
uint8_t *
-auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+auth1_getarray_cid(auth1_t *inp)
{
- return inp->challenge;
+ return inp->cid;
}
const uint8_t *
-auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+auth1_getconstarray_cid(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp);
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_cid((auth1_t*)inp);
}
-uint16_t
-auth_challenge_cell_get_n_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_sid(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- return inp->n_methods;
+ (void)inp; return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ return inp->sid[idx];
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_getconst_sid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ return auth1_get_sid((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t val)
+auth1_set_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
- inp->n_methods = val;
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ inp->sid[idx] = elt;
return 0;
}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_sid(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return inp->sid;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_sid(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_sid((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
size_t
-auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+auth1_getlen_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->methods);
+ (void)inp; return 32;
}
-uint16_t
-auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->methods, idx);
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ return inp->cid_ed[idx];
}
-uint16_t
-auth_challenge_cell_getconst_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
+uint8_t
+auth1_getconst_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return auth_challenge_cell_get_methods((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp, idx);
+ return auth1_get_cid_ed((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth_challenge_cell_set_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint16_t elt)
+auth1_set_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->methods, idx, elt);
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ inp->cid_ed[idx] = elt;
return 0;
}
-int
-auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t elt)
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp)
{
-#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT16_MAX
- if (inp->methods.n_ == UINT16_MAX)
- goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
-#endif
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint16_t, &inp->methods, elt, {});
- return 0;
- trunnel_alloc_failed:
- TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
- return -1;
+ return inp->cid_ed;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_cid_ed((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ (void)inp; return 32;
}
-uint16_t *
-auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return inp->methods.elts_;
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ return inp->sid_ed[idx];
}
-const uint16_t *
-auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_getconst_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return (const uint16_t *)auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp);
+ return auth1_get_sid_ed((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth_challenge_cell_setlen_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+auth1_set_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
- uint16_t *newptr;
-#if UINT16_MAX < SIZE_MAX
- if (newlen > UINT16_MAX)
- goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
-#endif
- newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->methods.allocated_,
- &inp->methods.n_, inp->methods.elts_, newlen,
- sizeof(inp->methods.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
- &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
- if (newlen != 0 && newptr == NULL)
- goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
- inp->methods.elts_ = newptr;
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ inp->sid_ed[idx] = elt;
return 0;
- trunnel_alloc_failed:
- TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
- return -1;
}
-const char *
-auth_challenge_cell_check(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp)
{
- if (obj == NULL)
- return "Object was NULL";
- if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
- return "A set function failed on this object";
- if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods) != obj->n_methods)
- return "Length mismatch for methods";
- return NULL;
+ return inp->sid_ed;
}
-
-ssize_t
-auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- ssize_t result = 0;
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_sid_ed((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_slog(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ (void)inp; return 32;
+}
- if (NULL != auth_challenge_cell_check(obj))
- return -1;
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ return inp->slog[idx];
+}
+uint8_t
+auth1_getconst_slog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ return auth1_get_slog((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+}
+int
+auth1_set_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ inp->slog[idx] = elt;
+ return 0;
+}
- /* Length of u8 challenge[32] */
- result += 32;
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_slog(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return inp->slog;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_slog(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_slog((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_clog(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ (void)inp; return 32;
+}
- /* Length of u16 n_methods */
- result += 2;
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_clog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ return inp->clog[idx];
+}
- /* Length of u16 methods[n_methods] */
- result += 2 * TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods);
- return result;
+uint8_t
+auth1_getconst_clog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ return auth1_get_clog((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth_challenge_cell_clear_errors(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+auth1_set_clog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
- int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
- obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
- return r;
-}
-ssize_t
-auth_challenge_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
-{
- ssize_t result = 0;
- size_t written = 0;
- uint8_t *ptr = output;
- const char *msg;
-#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
- const ssize_t encoded_len = auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(obj);
-#endif
-
- if (NULL != (msg = auth_challenge_cell_check(obj)))
- goto check_failed;
-
-#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
- trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
-#endif
-
- /* Encode u8 challenge[32] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->challenge, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Encode u16 n_methods */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 2)
- goto truncated;
- trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->n_methods));
- written += 2; ptr += 2;
-
- /* Encode u16 methods[n_methods] */
- {
-
- unsigned idx;
- for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods); ++idx) {
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 2)
- goto truncated;
- trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->methods, idx)));
- written += 2; ptr += 2;
- }
- }
-
-
- trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
-#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
- {
- trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
- trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
- }
-
-#endif
-
- return written;
-
- truncated:
- result = -2;
- goto fail;
- check_failed:
- (void)msg;
- result = -1;
- goto fail;
- fail:
- trunnel_assert(result < 0);
- return result;
-}
-
-/** As auth_challenge_cell_parse(), but do not allocate the output
- * object.
- */
-static ssize_t
-auth_challenge_cell_parse_into(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
-{
- const uint8_t *ptr = input;
- size_t remaining = len_in;
- ssize_t result = 0;
- (void)result;
-
- /* Parse u8 challenge[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->challenge, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Parse u16 n_methods */
- CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
- obj->n_methods = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
- remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
-
- /* Parse u16 methods[n_methods] */
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint16_t, &obj->methods, obj->n_methods, {});
- {
- uint16_t elt;
- unsigned idx;
- for (idx = 0; idx < obj->n_methods; ++idx) {
- CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
- elt = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
- remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint16_t, &obj->methods, elt, {});
- }
- }
- trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
- return len_in - remaining;
-
- truncated:
- return -2;
- trunnel_alloc_failed:
- return -1;
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ inp->clog[idx] = elt;
+ return 0;
}
-ssize_t
-auth_challenge_cell_parse(auth_challenge_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_clog(auth1_t *inp)
{
- ssize_t result;
- *output = auth_challenge_cell_new();
- if (NULL == *output)
- return -1;
- result = auth_challenge_cell_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
- if (result < 0) {
- auth_challenge_cell_free(*output);
- *output = NULL;
- }
- return result;
+ return inp->clog;
}
-auth_ctx_t *
-auth_ctx_new(void)
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_clog(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- auth_ctx_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth_ctx_t));
- if (NULL == val)
- return NULL;
- return val;
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_clog((auth1_t*)inp);
}
-
-/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
- */
-static void
-auth_ctx_clear(auth_ctx_t *obj)
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_scert(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- (void) obj;
+ (void)inp; return 32;
}
-void
-auth_ctx_free(auth_ctx_t *obj)
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_scert(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- if (obj == NULL)
- return;
- auth_ctx_clear(obj);
- trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth_ctx_t));
- trunnel_free_(obj);
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ return inp->scert[idx];
}
uint8_t
-auth_ctx_get_is_ed(const auth_ctx_t *inp)
+auth1_getconst_scert(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return inp->is_ed;
+ return auth1_get_scert((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth_ctx_set_is_ed(auth_ctx_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+auth1_set_scert(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
- inp->is_ed = val;
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ inp->scert[idx] = elt;
return 0;
}
-certs_cell_cert_t *
-certs_cell_cert_new(void)
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_scert(auth1_t *inp)
{
- certs_cell_cert_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(certs_cell_cert_t));
- if (NULL == val)
- return NULL;
- return val;
+ return inp->scert;
}
-
-/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
- */
-static void
-certs_cell_cert_clear(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_scert(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- (void) obj;
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->body);
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->body);
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_scert((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ (void)inp; return 32;
}
-void
-certs_cell_cert_free(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- if (obj == NULL)
- return;
- certs_cell_cert_clear(obj);
- trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(certs_cell_cert_t));
- trunnel_free_(obj);
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ return inp->tlssecrets[idx];
}
uint8_t
-certs_cell_cert_get_cert_type(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+auth1_getconst_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return inp->cert_type;
+ return auth1_get_tlssecrets((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-certs_cell_cert_set_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+auth1_set_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
- inp->cert_type = val;
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+ inp->tlssecrets[idx] = elt;
return 0;
}
-uint16_t
-certs_cell_cert_get_cert_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp)
{
- return inp->cert_len;
+ return inp->tlssecrets;
}
-int
-certs_cell_cert_set_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint16_t val)
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- inp->cert_len = val;
- return 0;
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_tlssecrets((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_get_end_of_fixed_part(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return inp->end_of_fixed_part;
}
size_t
-certs_cell_cert_getlen_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+auth1_getlen_rand(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->body);
+ (void)inp; return 24;
}
uint8_t
-certs_cell_cert_get_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+auth1_get_rand(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->body, idx);
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 24);
+ return inp->rand[idx];
}
uint8_t
-certs_cell_cert_getconst_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- return certs_cell_cert_get_body((certs_cell_cert_t*)inp, idx);
-}
-int
-certs_cell_cert_set_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+auth1_getconst_rand(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->body, idx, elt);
- return 0;
+ return auth1_get_rand((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-certs_cell_cert_add_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+auth1_set_rand(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
-#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT16_MAX
- if (inp->body.n_ == UINT16_MAX)
- goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
-#endif
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->body, elt, {});
+ trunnel_assert(idx < 24);
+ inp->rand[idx] = elt;
return 0;
- trunnel_alloc_failed:
- TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
- return -1;
}
uint8_t *
-certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+auth1_getarray_rand(auth1_t *inp)
{
- return inp->body.elts_;
+ return inp->rand;
}
const uint8_t *
-certs_cell_cert_getconstarray_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+auth1_getconstarray_rand(const auth1_t *inp)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)certs_cell_cert_getarray_body((certs_cell_cert_t*)inp);
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_rand((auth1_t*)inp);
}
-int
-certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_get_end_of_signed(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return inp->end_of_signed;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_sig(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->sig);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->sig, idx);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_getconst_sig(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+ return auth1_get_sig((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+}
+int
+auth1_set_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->sig, idx, elt);
+ return 0;
+}
+int
+auth1_add_sig(auth1_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+{
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->sig, elt, {});
+ return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+ TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_sig(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return inp->sig.elts_;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_getconstarray_sig(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_sig((auth1_t*)inp);
+}
+int
+auth1_setlen_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t newlen)
{
uint8_t *newptr;
-#if UINT16_MAX < SIZE_MAX
- if (newlen > UINT16_MAX)
- goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
-#endif
- newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->body.allocated_,
- &inp->body.n_, inp->body.elts_, newlen,
- sizeof(inp->body.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+ newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->sig.allocated_,
+ &inp->sig.n_, inp->sig.elts_, newlen,
+ sizeof(inp->sig.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
&inp->trunnel_error_code_);
if (newlen != 0 && newptr == NULL)
goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
- inp->body.elts_ = newptr;
+ inp->sig.elts_ = newptr;
return 0;
trunnel_alloc_failed:
TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
return -1;
}
const char *
-certs_cell_cert_check(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+auth1_check(const auth1_t *obj)
{
if (obj == NULL)
return "Object was NULL";
if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
return "A set function failed on this object";
- if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body) != obj->cert_len)
- return "Length mismatch for body";
return NULL;
}
ssize_t
-certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+auth1_encoded_len(const auth1_t *obj)
{
ssize_t result = 0;
- if (NULL != certs_cell_cert_check(obj))
+ if (NULL != auth1_check(obj))
return -1;
- /* Length of u8 cert_type */
- result += 1;
+ /* Length of u8 type[8] */
+ result += 8;
- /* Length of u16 cert_len */
- result += 2;
+ /* Length of u8 cid[32] */
+ result += 32;
- /* Length of u8 body[cert_len] */
- result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body);
+ /* Length of u8 sid[32] */
+ result += 32;
+
+ /* Length of u8 cid_ed[32] */
+ result += 32;
+
+ /* Length of u8 sid_ed[32] */
+ result += 32;
+
+ /* Length of u8 slog[32] */
+ result += 32;
+
+ /* Length of u8 clog[32] */
+ result += 32;
+
+ /* Length of u8 scert[32] */
+ result += 32;
+
+ /* Length of u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+ result += 32;
+
+ /* Length of u8 rand[24] */
+ result += 24;
+
+ /* Length of u8 sig[] */
+ result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
return result;
}
int
-certs_cell_cert_clear_errors(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+auth1_clear_errors(auth1_t *obj)
{
int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
return r;
}
ssize_t
-certs_cell_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+auth1_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth1_t *obj)
{
ssize_t result = 0;
size_t written = 0;
uint8_t *ptr = output;
const char *msg;
#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
- const ssize_t encoded_len = certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(obj);
+ const ssize_t encoded_len = auth1_encoded_len(obj);
#endif
- if (NULL != (msg = certs_cell_cert_check(obj)))
+ if (NULL != (msg = auth1_check(obj)))
goto check_failed;
#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
#endif
- /* Encode u8 cert_type */
+ /* Encode u8 type[8] */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 1)
+ if (avail - written < 8)
goto truncated;
- trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->cert_type));
- written += 1; ptr += 1;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->type, 8);
+ written += 8; ptr += 8;
- /* Encode u16 cert_len */
+ /* Encode u8 cid[32] */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 2)
+ if (avail - written < 32)
goto truncated;
- trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->cert_len));
- written += 2; ptr += 2;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->cid, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
- /* Encode u8 body[cert_len] */
+ /* Encode u8 sid[32] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 32)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->sid, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Encode u8 cid_ed[32] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 32)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->cid_ed, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Encode u8 sid_ed[32] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 32)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->sid_ed, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Encode u8 slog[32] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 32)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->slog, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Encode u8 clog[32] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 32)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->clog, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Encode u8 scert[32] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 32)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->scert, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Encode u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 32)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->tlssecrets, 32);
+ written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Encode u8 rand[24] */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 24)
+ goto truncated;
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->rand, 24);
+ written += 24; ptr += 24;
+
+ /* Encode u8 sig[] */
{
- size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body);
- trunnel_assert(obj->cert_len == elt_len);
+ size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
if (avail - written < elt_len)
goto truncated;
if (elt_len)
- memcpy(ptr, obj->body.elts_, elt_len);
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->sig.elts_, elt_len);
written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len;
}
@@ -596,33 +669,74 @@ certs_cell_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const certs_cell_cer
return result;
}
-/** As certs_cell_cert_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
+/** As auth1_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
*/
static ssize_t
-certs_cell_cert_parse_into(certs_cell_cert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+auth1_parse_into(auth1_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
const uint8_t *ptr = input;
size_t remaining = len_in;
ssize_t result = 0;
(void)result;
- /* Parse u8 cert_type */
- CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
- obj->cert_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
- remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+ /* Parse u8 type[8] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(8, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->type, ptr, 8);
+ remaining -= 8; ptr += 8;
- /* Parse u16 cert_len */
- CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
- obj->cert_len = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
- remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
+ /* Parse u8 cid[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->cid, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
- /* Parse u8 body[cert_len] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(obj->cert_len, truncated);
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->body, obj->cert_len, {});
- obj->body.n_ = obj->cert_len;
- if (obj->cert_len)
- memcpy(obj->body.elts_, ptr, obj->cert_len);
- ptr += obj->cert_len; remaining -= obj->cert_len;
+ /* Parse u8 sid[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->sid, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Parse u8 cid_ed[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->cid_ed, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Parse u8 sid_ed[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->sid_ed, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Parse u8 slog[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->slog, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Parse u8 clog[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->clog, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Parse u8 scert[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->scert, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+ /* Parse u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->tlssecrets, ptr, 32);
+ remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+ obj->end_of_fixed_part = ptr;
+
+ /* Parse u8 rand[24] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(24, truncated);
+ memcpy(obj->rand, ptr, 24);
+ remaining -= 24; ptr += 24;
+ obj->end_of_signed = ptr;
+
+ /* Parse u8 sig[] */
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->sig, remaining, {});
+ obj->sig.n_ = remaining;
+ if (remaining)
+ memcpy(obj->sig.elts_, ptr, remaining);
+ ptr += remaining; remaining -= remaining;
trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
return len_in - remaining;
@@ -633,23 +747,23 @@ certs_cell_cert_parse_into(certs_cell_cert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const s
}
ssize_t
-certs_cell_cert_parse(certs_cell_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+auth1_parse(auth1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
ssize_t result;
- *output = certs_cell_cert_new();
+ *output = auth1_new();
if (NULL == *output)
return -1;
- result = certs_cell_cert_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+ result = auth1_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
if (result < 0) {
- certs_cell_cert_free(*output);
+ auth1_free(*output);
*output = NULL;
}
return result;
}
-rsa_ed_crosscert_t *
-rsa_ed_crosscert_new(void)
+auth_challenge_cell_t *
+auth_challenge_cell_new(void)
{
- rsa_ed_crosscert_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(rsa_ed_crosscert_t));
+ auth_challenge_cell_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth_challenge_cell_t));
if (NULL == val)
return NULL;
return val;
@@ -658,243 +772,218 @@ rsa_ed_crosscert_new(void)
/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
*/
static void
-rsa_ed_crosscert_clear(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+auth_challenge_cell_clear(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
{
(void) obj;
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->sig);
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->sig);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->methods);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->methods);
}
void
-rsa_ed_crosscert_free(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+auth_challenge_cell_free(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
{
if (obj == NULL)
return;
- rsa_ed_crosscert_clear(obj);
- trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(rsa_ed_crosscert_t));
+ auth_challenge_cell_clear(obj);
+ trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth_challenge_cell_t));
trunnel_free_(obj);
}
size_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+auth_challenge_cell_getlen_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
{
(void)inp; return 32;
}
uint8_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->ed_key[idx];
+ return inp->challenge[idx];
}
uint8_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+auth_challenge_cell_getconst_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp, idx);
+ return auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-rsa_ed_crosscert_set_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+auth_challenge_cell_set_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->ed_key[idx] = elt;
+ inp->challenge[idx] = elt;
return 0;
}
uint8_t *
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
{
- return inp->ed_key;
+ return inp->challenge;
}
const uint8_t *
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
-{
- return (const uint8_t *)rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp);
-}
-uint32_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_get_expiration(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
-{
- return inp->expiration;
-}
-int
-rsa_ed_crosscert_set_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint32_t val)
-{
- inp->expiration = val;
- return 0;
-}
-const uint8_t *
-rsa_ed_crosscert_get_end_of_signed(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
{
- return inp->end_of_signed;
+ return (const uint8_t *)auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp);
}
-uint8_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+uint16_t
+auth_challenge_cell_get_n_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
{
- return inp->sig_len;
+ return inp->n_methods;
}
int
-rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t val)
{
- inp->sig_len = val;
+ inp->n_methods = val;
return 0;
}
size_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
{
- return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->sig);
+ return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->methods);
}
-uint8_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+uint16_t
+auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->sig, idx);
+ return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->methods, idx);
}
-uint8_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+uint16_t
+auth_challenge_cell_getconst_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp, idx);
+ return auth_challenge_cell_get_methods((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+auth_challenge_cell_set_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint16_t elt)
{
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->sig, idx, elt);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->methods, idx, elt);
return 0;
}
int
-rsa_ed_crosscert_add_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t elt)
{
-#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT8_MAX
- if (inp->sig.n_ == UINT8_MAX)
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT16_MAX
+ if (inp->methods.n_ == UINT16_MAX)
goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
#endif
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->sig, elt, {});
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint16_t, &inp->methods, elt, {});
return 0;
trunnel_alloc_failed:
TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
return -1;
}
-uint8_t *
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+uint16_t *
+auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
{
- return inp->sig.elts_;
+ return inp->methods.elts_;
}
-const uint8_t *
-rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+const uint16_t *
+auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp);
+ return (const uint16_t *)auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods((auth_challenge_cell_t*)inp);
}
int
-rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+auth_challenge_cell_setlen_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen)
{
- uint8_t *newptr;
-#if UINT8_MAX < SIZE_MAX
- if (newlen > UINT8_MAX)
+ uint16_t *newptr;
+#if UINT16_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+ if (newlen > UINT16_MAX)
goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
#endif
- newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->sig.allocated_,
- &inp->sig.n_, inp->sig.elts_, newlen,
- sizeof(inp->sig.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+ newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->methods.allocated_,
+ &inp->methods.n_, inp->methods.elts_, newlen,
+ sizeof(inp->methods.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
&inp->trunnel_error_code_);
if (newlen != 0 && newptr == NULL)
goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
- inp->sig.elts_ = newptr;
+ inp->methods.elts_ = newptr;
return 0;
trunnel_alloc_failed:
TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
return -1;
}
const char *
-rsa_ed_crosscert_check(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+auth_challenge_cell_check(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
{
if (obj == NULL)
return "Object was NULL";
if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
return "A set function failed on this object";
- if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig) != obj->sig_len)
- return "Length mismatch for sig";
+ if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods) != obj->n_methods)
+ return "Length mismatch for methods";
return NULL;
}
ssize_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
{
ssize_t result = 0;
- if (NULL != rsa_ed_crosscert_check(obj))
+ if (NULL != auth_challenge_cell_check(obj))
return -1;
- /* Length of u8 ed_key[32] */
+ /* Length of u8 challenge[32] */
result += 32;
- /* Length of u32 expiration */
- result += 4;
-
- /* Length of u8 sig_len */
- result += 1;
+ /* Length of u16 n_methods */
+ result += 2;
- /* Length of u8 sig[sig_len] */
- result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
+ /* Length of u16 methods[n_methods] */
+ result += 2 * TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods);
return result;
}
int
-rsa_ed_crosscert_clear_errors(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+auth_challenge_cell_clear_errors(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
{
int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
return r;
}
ssize_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+auth_challenge_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
{
ssize_t result = 0;
size_t written = 0;
uint8_t *ptr = output;
const char *msg;
#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
- const ssize_t encoded_len = rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(obj);
+ const ssize_t encoded_len = auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(obj);
#endif
- if (NULL != (msg = rsa_ed_crosscert_check(obj)))
+ if (NULL != (msg = auth_challenge_cell_check(obj)))
goto check_failed;
#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
#endif
- /* Encode u8 ed_key[32] */
+ /* Encode u8 challenge[32] */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
if (avail - written < 32)
goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->ed_key, 32);
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->challenge, 32);
written += 32; ptr += 32;
- /* Encode u32 expiration */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 4)
- goto truncated;
- trunnel_set_uint32(ptr, trunnel_htonl(obj->expiration));
- written += 4; ptr += 4;
-
- /* Encode u8 sig_len */
+ /* Encode u16 n_methods */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 1)
+ if (avail - written < 2)
goto truncated;
- trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->sig_len));
- written += 1; ptr += 1;
+ trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->n_methods));
+ written += 2; ptr += 2;
- /* Encode u8 sig[sig_len] */
+ /* Encode u16 methods[n_methods] */
{
- size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
- trunnel_assert(obj->sig_len == elt_len);
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < elt_len)
- goto truncated;
- if (elt_len)
- memcpy(ptr, obj->sig.elts_, elt_len);
- written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len;
+
+ unsigned idx;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods); ++idx) {
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 2)
+ goto truncated;
+ trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->methods, idx)));
+ written += 2; ptr += 2;
+ }
}
@@ -921,40 +1010,39 @@ rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const rsa_ed_crossc
return result;
}
-/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(), but do not allocate the output
+/** As auth_challenge_cell_parse(), but do not allocate the output
* object.
*/
static ssize_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_parse_into(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+auth_challenge_cell_parse_into(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
const uint8_t *ptr = input;
size_t remaining = len_in;
ssize_t result = 0;
(void)result;
- /* Parse u8 ed_key[32] */
+ /* Parse u8 challenge[32] */
CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->ed_key, ptr, 32);
+ memcpy(obj->challenge, ptr, 32);
remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
- /* Parse u32 expiration */
- CHECK_REMAINING(4, truncated);
- obj->expiration = trunnel_ntohl(trunnel_get_uint32(ptr));
- remaining -= 4; ptr += 4;
- obj->end_of_signed = ptr;
-
- /* Parse u8 sig_len */
- CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
- obj->sig_len = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
- remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+ /* Parse u16 n_methods */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
+ obj->n_methods = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
+ remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
- /* Parse u8 sig[sig_len] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(obj->sig_len, truncated);
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->sig, obj->sig_len, {});
- obj->sig.n_ = obj->sig_len;
- if (obj->sig_len)
- memcpy(obj->sig.elts_, ptr, obj->sig_len);
- ptr += obj->sig_len; remaining -= obj->sig_len;
+ /* Parse u16 methods[n_methods] */
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint16_t, &obj->methods, obj->n_methods, {});
+ {
+ uint16_t elt;
+ unsigned idx;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < obj->n_methods; ++idx) {
+ CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
+ elt = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
+ remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint16_t, &obj->methods, elt, {});
+ }
+ }
trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
return len_in - remaining;
@@ -965,23 +1053,23 @@ rsa_ed_crosscert_parse_into(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const
}
ssize_t
-rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(rsa_ed_crosscert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+auth_challenge_cell_parse(auth_challenge_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
ssize_t result;
- *output = rsa_ed_crosscert_new();
+ *output = auth_challenge_cell_new();
if (NULL == *output)
return -1;
- result = rsa_ed_crosscert_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+ result = auth_challenge_cell_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
if (result < 0) {
- rsa_ed_crosscert_free(*output);
+ auth_challenge_cell_free(*output);
*output = NULL;
}
return result;
}
-auth1_t *
-auth1_new(void)
+certs_cell_cert_t *
+certs_cell_cert_new(void)
{
- auth1_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth1_t));
+ certs_cell_cert_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(certs_cell_cert_t));
if (NULL == val)
return NULL;
return val;
@@ -990,419 +1078,390 @@ auth1_new(void)
/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
*/
static void
-auth1_clear(auth1_t *obj)
+certs_cell_cert_clear(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
{
(void) obj;
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->sig);
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->sig);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->body);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->body);
}
void
-auth1_free(auth1_t *obj)
+certs_cell_cert_free(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
{
if (obj == NULL)
return;
- auth1_clear(obj);
- trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth1_t));
+ certs_cell_cert_clear(obj);
+ trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(certs_cell_cert_t));
trunnel_free_(obj);
}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_type(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- (void)inp; return 8;
-}
-
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 8);
- return inp->type[idx];
-}
-
uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_type(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+certs_cell_cert_get_cert_type(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
{
- return auth1_get_type((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+ return inp->cert_type;
}
int
-auth1_set_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+certs_cell_cert_set_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 8);
- inp->type[idx] = elt;
+ inp->cert_type = val;
return 0;
}
-
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_type(auth1_t *inp)
+uint16_t
+certs_cell_cert_get_cert_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
{
- return inp->type;
+ return inp->cert_len;
}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_type(const auth1_t *inp)
+int
+certs_cell_cert_set_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint16_t val)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_type((auth1_t*)inp);
+ inp->cert_len = val;
+ return 0;
}
size_t
-auth1_getlen_cid(const auth1_t *inp)
+certs_cell_cert_getlen_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
{
- (void)inp; return 32;
+ return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->body);
}
uint8_t
-auth1_get_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+certs_cell_cert_get_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->cid[idx];
+ return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->body, idx);
}
uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_cid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+certs_cell_cert_getconst_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return auth1_get_cid((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+ return certs_cell_cert_get_body((certs_cell_cert_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth1_set_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+certs_cell_cert_set_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->cid[idx] = elt;
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->body, idx, elt);
return 0;
}
-
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_cid(auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return inp->cid;
-}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_cid(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_cid((auth1_t*)inp);
-}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_sid(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- (void)inp; return 32;
-}
-
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->sid[idx];
-}
-
-uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_sid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- return auth1_get_sid((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
-}
int
-auth1_set_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+certs_cell_cert_add_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->sid[idx] = elt;
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT16_MAX
+ if (inp->body.n_ == UINT16_MAX)
+ goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->body, elt, {});
return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+ TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+ return -1;
}
uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_sid(auth1_t *inp)
+certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
{
- return inp->sid;
+ return inp->body.elts_;
}
const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_sid(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_sid((auth1_t*)inp);
-}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- (void)inp; return 32;
-}
-
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->u1_cid_ed[idx];
-}
-
-uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+certs_cell_cert_getconstarray_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
{
- return auth1_get_u1_cid_ed((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+ return (const uint8_t *)certs_cell_cert_getarray_body((certs_cell_cert_t*)inp);
}
int
-auth1_set_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->u1_cid_ed[idx] = elt;
+ uint8_t *newptr;
+#if UINT16_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+ if (newlen > UINT16_MAX)
+ goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+ newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->body.allocated_,
+ &inp->body.n_, inp->body.elts_, newlen,
+ sizeof(inp->body.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+ &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+ if (newlen != 0 && newptr == NULL)
+ goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+ inp->body.elts_ = newptr;
return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+ TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+ return -1;
}
-
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return inp->u1_cid_ed;
-}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_u1_cid_ed((auth1_t*)inp);
-}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
+const char *
+certs_cell_cert_check(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
{
- (void)inp; return 32;
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return "Object was NULL";
+ if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+ return "A set function failed on this object";
+ if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body) != obj->cert_len)
+ return "Length mismatch for body";
+ return NULL;
}
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->u1_sid_ed[idx];
-}
+ ssize_t result = 0;
-uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- return auth1_get_u1_sid_ed((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
-}
-int
-auth1_set_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->u1_sid_ed[idx] = elt;
- return 0;
-}
+ if (NULL != certs_cell_cert_check(obj))
+ return -1;
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return inp->u1_sid_ed;
-}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_u1_sid_ed((auth1_t*)inp);
-}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_slog(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- (void)inp; return 32;
-}
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->slog[idx];
-}
+ /* Length of u8 cert_type */
+ result += 1;
-uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_slog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- return auth1_get_slog((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
-}
-int
-auth1_set_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->slog[idx] = elt;
- return 0;
-}
+ /* Length of u16 cert_len */
+ result += 2;
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_slog(auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return inp->slog;
+ /* Length of u8 body[cert_len] */
+ result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body);
+ return result;
}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_slog(const auth1_t *inp)
+int
+certs_cell_cert_clear_errors(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_slog((auth1_t*)inp);
+ int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+ obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+ return r;
}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_clog(const auth1_t *inp)
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
{
- (void)inp; return 32;
-}
+ ssize_t result = 0;
+ size_t written = 0;
+ uint8_t *ptr = output;
+ const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+ const ssize_t encoded_len = certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(obj);
+#endif
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_clog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->clog[idx];
-}
+ if (NULL != (msg = certs_cell_cert_check(obj)))
+ goto check_failed;
-uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_clog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
-{
- return auth1_get_clog((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
-}
-int
-auth1_set_clog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
-{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->clog[idx] = elt;
- return 0;
-}
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+ trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_clog(auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return inp->clog;
-}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_clog(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_clog((auth1_t*)inp);
-}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_scert(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- (void)inp; return 32;
+ /* Encode u8 cert_type */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 1)
+ goto truncated;
+ trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->cert_type));
+ written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+ /* Encode u16 cert_len */
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < 2)
+ goto truncated;
+ trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->cert_len));
+ written += 2; ptr += 2;
+
+ /* Encode u8 body[cert_len] */
+ {
+ size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body);
+ trunnel_assert(obj->cert_len == elt_len);
+ trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+ if (avail - written < elt_len)
+ goto truncated;
+ if (elt_len)
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->body.elts_, elt_len);
+ written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len;
+ }
+
+
+ trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+ {
+ trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+ trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+ return written;
+
+ truncated:
+ result = -2;
+ goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+ (void)msg;
+ result = -1;
+ goto fail;
+ fail:
+ trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+ return result;
}
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_scert(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+/** As certs_cell_cert_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_parse_into(certs_cell_cert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->scert[idx];
+ const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+ size_t remaining = len_in;
+ ssize_t result = 0;
+ (void)result;
+
+ /* Parse u8 cert_type */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+ obj->cert_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+ remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+ /* Parse u16 cert_len */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
+ obj->cert_len = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
+ remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
+
+ /* Parse u8 body[cert_len] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(obj->cert_len, truncated);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->body, obj->cert_len, {});
+ obj->body.n_ = obj->cert_len;
+ if (obj->cert_len)
+ memcpy(obj->body.elts_, ptr, obj->cert_len);
+ ptr += obj->cert_len; remaining -= obj->cert_len;
+ trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+ return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+ return -2;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+ return -1;
}
-uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_scert(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_parse(certs_cell_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
- return auth1_get_scert((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+ ssize_t result;
+ *output = certs_cell_cert_new();
+ if (NULL == *output)
+ return -1;
+ result = certs_cell_cert_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ certs_cell_cert_free(*output);
+ *output = NULL;
+ }
+ return result;
}
-int
-auth1_set_scert(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_t *
+rsa_ed_crosscert_new(void)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->scert[idx] = elt;
- return 0;
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(rsa_ed_crosscert_t));
+ if (NULL == val)
+ return NULL;
+ return val;
}
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_scert(auth1_t *inp)
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+rsa_ed_crosscert_clear(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
{
- return inp->scert;
+ (void) obj;
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->sig);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->sig);
}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_scert(const auth1_t *inp)
+
+void
+rsa_ed_crosscert_free(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_scert((auth1_t*)inp);
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return;
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_clear(obj);
+ trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(rsa_ed_crosscert_t));
+ trunnel_free_(obj);
}
+
size_t
-auth1_getlen_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
(void)inp; return 32;
}
uint8_t
-auth1_get_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- return inp->tlssecrets[idx];
+ return inp->ed_key[idx];
}
uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return auth1_get_tlssecrets((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+ return rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth1_set_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
- inp->tlssecrets[idx] = elt;
+ inp->ed_key[idx] = elt;
return 0;
}
uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
- return inp->tlssecrets;
+ return inp->ed_key;
}
const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_tlssecrets((auth1_t*)inp);
-}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_get_end_of_fixed_part(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- return inp->end_of_fixed_part;
-}
-size_t
-auth1_getlen_rand(const auth1_t *inp)
-{
- (void)inp; return 24;
-}
-
-uint8_t
-auth1_get_rand(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 24);
- return inp->rand[idx];
+ return (const uint8_t *)rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp);
}
-
-uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_rand(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+uint32_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_expiration(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
- return auth1_get_rand((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+ return inp->expiration;
}
int
-auth1_set_rand(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint32_t val)
{
- trunnel_assert(idx < 24);
- inp->rand[idx] = elt;
+ inp->expiration = val;
return 0;
}
-
-uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_rand(auth1_t *inp)
+const uint8_t *
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_end_of_signed(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
- return inp->rand;
+ return inp->end_of_signed;
}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_rand(const auth1_t *inp)
+uint8_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_rand((auth1_t*)inp);
+ return inp->sig_len;
}
-const uint8_t *
-auth1_get_end_of_signed(const auth1_t *inp)
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
{
- return inp->end_of_signed;
+ inp->sig_len = val;
+ return 0;
}
size_t
-auth1_getlen_sig(const auth1_t *inp)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->sig);
}
uint8_t
-auth1_get_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->sig, idx);
}
uint8_t
-auth1_getconst_sig(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
{
- return auth1_get_sig((auth1_t*)inp, idx);
+ return rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp, idx);
}
int
-auth1_set_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
{
TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->sig, idx, elt);
return 0;
}
int
-auth1_add_sig(auth1_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_add_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
{
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT8_MAX
+ if (inp->sig.n_ == UINT8_MAX)
+ goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->sig, elt, {});
return 0;
trunnel_alloc_failed:
@@ -1411,19 +1470,23 @@ auth1_add_sig(auth1_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
}
uint8_t *
-auth1_getarray_sig(auth1_t *inp)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
return inp->sig.elts_;
}
const uint8_t *
-auth1_getconstarray_sig(const auth1_t *inp)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
{
- return (const uint8_t *)auth1_getarray_sig((auth1_t*)inp);
+ return (const uint8_t *)rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig((rsa_ed_crosscert_t*)inp);
}
int
-auth1_setlen_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t newlen)
{
uint8_t *newptr;
+#if UINT8_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+ if (newlen > UINT8_MAX)
+ goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->sig.allocated_,
&inp->sig.n_, inp->sig.elts_, newlen,
sizeof(inp->sig.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
@@ -1437,197 +1500,89 @@ auth1_setlen_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t newlen)
return -1;
}
const char *
-auth1_check(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_check(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
{
if (obj == NULL)
return "Object was NULL";
if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
return "A set function failed on this object";
- if (auth_ctx_ctx == NULL)
- return "Context was NULL";
- switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
-
- case 0:
- break;
-
- case 1:
- break;
-
- default:
- return "Bad tag for union";
- break;
- }
+ if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig) != obj->sig_len)
+ return "Length mismatch for sig";
return NULL;
}
ssize_t
-auth1_encoded_len(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
{
ssize_t result = 0;
- if (NULL != auth1_check(obj, auth_ctx_ctx))
+ if (NULL != rsa_ed_crosscert_check(obj))
return -1;
- /* Length of u8 type[8] */
- result += 8;
-
- /* Length of u8 cid[32] */
- result += 32;
-
- /* Length of u8 sid[32] */
- result += 32;
- switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
-
- case 0:
- break;
-
- case 1:
-
- /* Length of u8 u1_cid_ed[32] */
- result += 32;
-
- /* Length of u8 u1_sid_ed[32] */
- result += 32;
- break;
-
- default:
- trunnel_assert(0);
- break;
- }
-
- /* Length of u8 slog[32] */
- result += 32;
-
- /* Length of u8 clog[32] */
- result += 32;
-
- /* Length of u8 scert[32] */
+ /* Length of u8 ed_key[32] */
result += 32;
- /* Length of u8 tlssecrets[32] */
- result += 32;
+ /* Length of u32 expiration */
+ result += 4;
- /* Length of u8 rand[24] */
- result += 24;
+ /* Length of u8 sig_len */
+ result += 1;
- /* Length of u8 sig[] */
+ /* Length of u8 sig[sig_len] */
result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
return result;
}
int
-auth1_clear_errors(auth1_t *obj)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_clear_errors(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
{
int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
return r;
}
ssize_t
-auth1_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
{
ssize_t result = 0;
size_t written = 0;
uint8_t *ptr = output;
const char *msg;
#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
- const ssize_t encoded_len = auth1_encoded_len(obj, auth_ctx_ctx);
+ const ssize_t encoded_len = rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(obj);
#endif
- if (NULL != (msg = auth1_check(obj, auth_ctx_ctx)))
+ if (NULL != (msg = rsa_ed_crosscert_check(obj)))
goto check_failed;
#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
#endif
- /* Encode u8 type[8] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 8)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->type, 8);
- written += 8; ptr += 8;
-
- /* Encode u8 cid[32] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->cid, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Encode u8 sid[32] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->sid, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Encode union u1[auth_ctx.is_ed] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
-
- case 0:
- break;
-
- case 1:
-
- /* Encode u8 u1_cid_ed[32] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->u1_cid_ed, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Encode u8 u1_sid_ed[32] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->u1_sid_ed, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
- break;
-
- default:
- trunnel_assert(0);
- break;
- }
-
- /* Encode u8 slog[32] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->slog, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Encode u8 clog[32] */
- trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
- goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->clog, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Encode u8 scert[32] */
+ /* Encode u8 ed_key[32] */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
if (avail - written < 32)
goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->scert, 32);
+ memcpy(ptr, obj->ed_key, 32);
written += 32; ptr += 32;
- /* Encode u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+ /* Encode u32 expiration */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 32)
+ if (avail - written < 4)
goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->tlssecrets, 32);
- written += 32; ptr += 32;
+ trunnel_set_uint32(ptr, trunnel_htonl(obj->expiration));
+ written += 4; ptr += 4;
- /* Encode u8 rand[24] */
+ /* Encode u8 sig_len */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
- if (avail - written < 24)
+ if (avail - written < 1)
goto truncated;
- memcpy(ptr, obj->rand, 24);
- written += 24; ptr += 24;
+ trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->sig_len));
+ written += 1; ptr += 1;
- /* Encode u8 sig[] */
+ /* Encode u8 sig[sig_len] */
{
size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
+ trunnel_assert(obj->sig_len == elt_len);
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
if (avail - written < elt_len)
goto truncated;
@@ -1660,90 +1615,40 @@ auth1_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth1_t *obj, const auth
return result;
}
-/** As auth1_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
+/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(), but do not allocate the output
+ * object.
*/
static ssize_t
-auth1_parse_into(auth1_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_parse_into(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
const uint8_t *ptr = input;
size_t remaining = len_in;
ssize_t result = 0;
(void)result;
- if (auth_ctx_ctx == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- /* Parse u8 type[8] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(8, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->type, ptr, 8);
- remaining -= 8; ptr += 8;
-
- /* Parse u8 cid[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->cid, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Parse u8 sid[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->sid, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Parse union u1[auth_ctx.is_ed] */
- switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
-
- case 0:
- break;
-
- case 1:
-
- /* Parse u8 u1_cid_ed[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->u1_cid_ed, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Parse u8 u1_sid_ed[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->u1_sid_ed, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
- break;
-
- default:
- goto fail;
- break;
- }
-
- /* Parse u8 slog[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->slog, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Parse u8 clog[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->clog, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
-
- /* Parse u8 scert[32] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->scert, ptr, 32);
- remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
- /* Parse u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+ /* Parse u8 ed_key[32] */
CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->tlssecrets, ptr, 32);
+ memcpy(obj->ed_key, ptr, 32);
remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
- obj->end_of_fixed_part = ptr;
- /* Parse u8 rand[24] */
- CHECK_REMAINING(24, truncated);
- memcpy(obj->rand, ptr, 24);
- remaining -= 24; ptr += 24;
+ /* Parse u32 expiration */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(4, truncated);
+ obj->expiration = trunnel_ntohl(trunnel_get_uint32(ptr));
+ remaining -= 4; ptr += 4;
obj->end_of_signed = ptr;
- /* Parse u8 sig[] */
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->sig, remaining, {});
- obj->sig.n_ = remaining;
- if (remaining)
- memcpy(obj->sig.elts_, ptr, remaining);
- ptr += remaining; remaining -= remaining;
+ /* Parse u8 sig_len */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+ obj->sig_len = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+ remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+ /* Parse u8 sig[sig_len] */
+ CHECK_REMAINING(obj->sig_len, truncated);
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->sig, obj->sig_len, {});
+ obj->sig.n_ = obj->sig_len;
+ if (obj->sig_len)
+ memcpy(obj->sig.elts_, ptr, obj->sig_len);
+ ptr += obj->sig_len; remaining -= obj->sig_len;
trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
return len_in - remaining;
@@ -1751,21 +1656,18 @@ auth1_parse_into(auth1_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in, const
return -2;
trunnel_alloc_failed:
return -1;
- fail:
- result = -1;
- return result;
}
ssize_t
-auth1_parse(auth1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(rsa_ed_crosscert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
{
ssize_t result;
- *output = auth1_new();
+ *output = rsa_ed_crosscert_new();
if (NULL == *output)
return -1;
- result = auth1_parse_into(*output, input, len_in, auth_ctx_ctx);
+ result = rsa_ed_crosscert_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
if (result < 0) {
- auth1_free(*output);
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_free(*output);
*output = NULL;
}
return result;
diff --git a/src/trunnel/link_handshake.h b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.h
@@ -15,6 +15,25 @@
#define CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK 5
#define CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH 6
#define CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID 7
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_AUTH1)
+struct auth1_st {
+ uint8_t type[8];
+ uint8_t cid[32];
+ uint8_t sid[32];
+ uint8_t cid_ed[32];
+ uint8_t sid_ed[32];
+ uint8_t slog[32];
+ uint8_t clog[32];
+ uint8_t scert[32];
+ uint8_t tlssecrets[32];
+ const uint8_t *end_of_fixed_part;
+ uint8_t rand[24];
+ const uint8_t *end_of_signed;
+ TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) sig;
+ uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct auth1_st auth1_t;
#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_AUTH_CHALLENGE_CELL)
struct auth_challenge_cell_st {
uint8_t challenge[32];
@@ -24,13 +43,6 @@ struct auth_challenge_cell_st {
};
#endif
typedef struct auth_challenge_cell_st auth_challenge_cell_t;
-#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_AUTH_CTX)
-struct auth_ctx_st {
- uint8_t is_ed;
- uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
-};
-#endif
-typedef struct auth_ctx_st auth_ctx_t;
#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_CERTS_CELL_CERT)
struct certs_cell_cert_st {
uint8_t cert_type;
@@ -51,25 +63,6 @@ struct rsa_ed_crosscert_st {
};
#endif
typedef struct rsa_ed_crosscert_st rsa_ed_crosscert_t;
-#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_AUTH1)
-struct auth1_st {
- uint8_t type[8];
- uint8_t cid[32];
- uint8_t sid[32];
- uint8_t u1_cid_ed[32];
- uint8_t u1_sid_ed[32];
- uint8_t slog[32];
- uint8_t clog[32];
- uint8_t scert[32];
- uint8_t tlssecrets[32];
- const uint8_t *end_of_fixed_part;
- uint8_t rand[24];
- const uint8_t *end_of_signed;
- TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) sig;
- uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
-};
-#endif
-typedef struct auth1_st auth1_t;
#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_CERTS_CELL)
struct certs_cell_st {
uint8_t n_certs;
@@ -78,475 +71,160 @@ struct certs_cell_st {
};
#endif
typedef struct certs_cell_st certs_cell_t;
-/** Return a newly allocated auth_challenge_cell with all elements set
- * to zero.
+/** Return a newly allocated auth1 with all elements set to zero.
*/
-auth_challenge_cell_t *auth_challenge_cell_new(void);
-/** Release all storage held by the auth_challenge_cell in 'victim'.
- * (Do nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+auth1_t *auth1_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the auth1 in 'victim'. (Do nothing if
+ * 'victim' is NULL.)
*/
-void auth_challenge_cell_free(auth_challenge_cell_t *victim);
-/** Try to parse a auth_challenge_cell from the buffer in 'input',
- * using up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success,
- * return the number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly
- * allocated auth_challenge_cell_t. On failure, return -2 if the input
- * appears truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+void auth1_free(auth1_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a auth1 from the buffer in 'input', using up to
+ * 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the number
+ * of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated auth1_t.
+ * On failure, return -2 if the input appears truncated, and -1 if the
+ * input is otherwise invalid.
*/
-ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_parse(auth_challenge_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
-/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
- * auth_challenge_cell in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value.
- * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
- * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ssize_t auth1_parse(auth1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the auth1
+ * in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note that this value
+ * may be an overestimate, and can even be an underestimate for
+ * certain unencodeable objects.
*/
-ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
-/** Try to encode the auth_challenge_cell from 'input' into the buffer
- * at 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
- * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
- * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ssize_t auth1_encoded_len(const auth1_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the auth1 from 'input' into the buffer at 'output',
+ * using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On success, return
+ * the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if the buffer was
+ * not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
*/
-ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const auth_challenge_cell_t *input);
-/** Check whether the internal state of the auth_challenge_cell in
- * 'obj' is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if
- * it is not.
+ssize_t auth1_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const auth1_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the auth1 in 'obj' is
+ * consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is not.
*/
-const char *auth_challenge_cell_check(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
+const char *auth1_check(const auth1_t *obj);
/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
* functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
*/
-int auth_challenge_cell_clear_errors(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the challenge
- * field of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t auth_challenge_cell_getlen_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * challenge of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+int auth1_clear_errors(auth1_t *obj);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the type field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-uint8_t auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge, but take and return a const
- * pointer
+size_t auth1_getlen_type(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field type
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-uint8_t auth_challenge_cell_getconst_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * challenge of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp', so that it will
- * hold the value 'elt'.
+uint8_t auth1_get_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth1_get_type, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-int auth_challenge_cell_set_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field challenge of 'inp'.
+uint8_t auth1_getconst_type(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field type
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
*/
-uint8_t * auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
-/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge, but take and return a const
- * pointer
+int auth1_set_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 8-element array field type of 'inp'.
*/
-const uint8_t * auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
-/** Return the value of the n_methods field of the
- * auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_type(auth1_t *inp);
+/** As auth1_get_type, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_get_n_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
-/** Set the value of the n_methods field of the auth_challenge_cell_t
- * in 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
- * code on 'inp' on failure.
+const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_type(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the cid field of
+ * the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-int auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t val);
-/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the methods field
- * of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+size_t auth1_getlen_cid(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field cid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-size_t auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
- * methods of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+uint8_t auth1_get_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth1_get_cid, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_methods, but take and return a const
- * pointer
+uint8_t auth1_getconst_cid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field cid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
*/
-uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_getconst_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
- * methods of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp', so that it will hold
- * the value 'elt'.
+int auth1_set_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field cid of 'inp'.
*/
-int auth_challenge_cell_set_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint16_t elt);
-/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field methods of
- * the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_cid(auth1_t *inp);
+/** As auth1_get_cid, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-int auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field methods of
- * 'inp'.
+const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_cid(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the sid field of
+ * the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-uint16_t * auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
-/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_methods, but take and return a const
- * pointer
+size_t auth1_getlen_sid(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field sid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-const uint16_t * auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
-/** Change the length of the variable-length array field methods of
- * 'inp' to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success;
- * return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+uint8_t auth1_get_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth1_get_sid, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-int auth_challenge_cell_setlen_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen);
-/** Return a newly allocated auth_ctx with all elements set to zero.
+uint8_t auth1_getconst_sid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field sid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
*/
-auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_new(void);
-/** Release all storage held by the auth_ctx in 'victim'. (Do nothing
- * if 'victim' is NULL.)
+int auth1_set_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field sid of 'inp'.
*/
-void auth_ctx_free(auth_ctx_t *victim);
-/** Return the value of the is_ed field of the auth_ctx_t in 'inp'
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_sid(auth1_t *inp);
+/** As auth1_get_sid, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-uint8_t auth_ctx_get_is_ed(const auth_ctx_t *inp);
-/** Set the value of the is_ed field of the auth_ctx_t in 'inp' to
- * 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on
- * 'inp' on failure.
+const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_sid(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the cid_ed field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-int auth_ctx_set_is_ed(auth_ctx_t *inp, uint8_t val);
-/** Return a newly allocated certs_cell_cert with all elements set to
- * zero.
+size_t auth1_getlen_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * cid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-certs_cell_cert_t *certs_cell_cert_new(void);
-/** Release all storage held by the certs_cell_cert in 'victim'. (Do
- * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+uint8_t auth1_get_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth1_get_cid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-void certs_cell_cert_free(certs_cell_cert_t *victim);
-/** Try to parse a certs_cell_cert from the buffer in 'input', using
- * up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the
- * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
- * certs_cell_cert_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears
- * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+uint8_t auth1_getconst_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * cid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'.
*/
-ssize_t certs_cell_cert_parse(certs_cell_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
-/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
- * certs_cell_cert in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note
- * that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
- * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+int auth1_set_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field cid_ed of 'inp'.
*/
-ssize_t certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
-/** Try to encode the certs_cell_cert from 'input' into the buffer at
- * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
- * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
- * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp);
+/** As auth1_get_cid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-ssize_t certs_cell_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const certs_cell_cert_t *input);
-/** Check whether the internal state of the certs_cell_cert in 'obj'
- * is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is
- * not.
+const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the sid_ed field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-const char *certs_cell_cert_check(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
-/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
- * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+size_t auth1_getlen_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * sid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-int certs_cell_cert_clear_errors(certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
-/** Return the value of the cert_type field of the certs_cell_cert_t
- * in 'inp'
+uint8_t auth1_get_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth1_get_sid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-uint8_t certs_cell_cert_get_cert_type(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
-/** Set the value of the cert_type field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
- * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
- * code on 'inp' on failure.
+uint8_t auth1_getconst_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * sid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'.
*/
-int certs_cell_cert_set_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
-/** Return the value of the cert_len field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
- * 'inp'
+int auth1_set_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field sid_ed of 'inp'.
*/
-uint16_t certs_cell_cert_get_cert_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
-/** Set the value of the cert_len field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
- * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
- * code on 'inp' on failure.
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp);
+/** As auth1_get_sid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-int certs_cell_cert_set_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint16_t val);
-/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the body field of
- * the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the slog field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-size_t certs_cell_cert_getlen_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
- * body of the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+size_t auth1_getlen_slog(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field slog
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
*/
-uint8_t certs_cell_cert_get_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As certs_cell_cert_get_body, but take and return a const pointer
+uint8_t auth1_get_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth1_get_slog, but take and return a const pointer
*/
-uint8_t certs_cell_cert_getconst_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
- * body of the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
- * value 'elt'.
- */
-int certs_cell_cert_set_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field body of the
- * certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
- */
-int certs_cell_cert_add_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field body of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
-/** As certs_cell_cert_get_body, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * certs_cell_cert_getconstarray_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
-/** Change the length of the variable-length array field body of 'inp'
- * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success; return
- * -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
- */
-int certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen);
-/** Return a newly allocated rsa_ed_crosscert with all elements set to
- * zero.
- */
-rsa_ed_crosscert_t *rsa_ed_crosscert_new(void);
-/** Release all storage held by the rsa_ed_crosscert in 'victim'. (Do
- * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
- */
-void rsa_ed_crosscert_free(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *victim);
-/** Try to parse a rsa_ed_crosscert from the buffer in 'input', using
- * up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the
- * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
- * rsa_ed_crosscert_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears
- * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
- */
-ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(rsa_ed_crosscert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
-/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
- * rsa_ed_crosscert in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value.
- * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
- * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
- */
-ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
-/** Try to encode the rsa_ed_crosscert from 'input' into the buffer at
- * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
- * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
- * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
- */
-ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *input);
-/** Check whether the internal state of the rsa_ed_crosscert in 'obj'
- * is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is
- * not.
- */
-const char *rsa_ed_crosscert_check(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
-/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
- * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
- */
-int rsa_ed_crosscert_clear_errors(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the ed_key field
- * of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * ed_key of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key, but take and return a const
- * pointer
- */
-uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * ed_key of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
- * value 'elt'.
- */
-int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field ed_key of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key, but take and return a const
- * pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** Return the value of the expiration field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t
- * in 'inp'
- */
-uint32_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_expiration(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** Set the value of the expiration field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
- * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
- * code on 'inp' on failure.
- */
-int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint32_t val);
-/** Return the position for end_of_signed when we parsed this object
- */
-const uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_get_end_of_signed(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** Return the value of the sig_len field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
- * 'inp'
- */
-uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** Set the value of the sig_len field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
- * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
- * code on 'inp' on failure.
- */
-int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
-/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the sig field of
- * the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
- * sig of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
- * sig of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
- * value 'elt'.
- */
-int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field sig of the
- * rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
- */
-int rsa_ed_crosscert_add_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
-/** Change the length of the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'
- * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success; return
- * -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
- */
-int rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t newlen);
-/** Return a newly allocated auth1 with all elements set to zero.
- */
-auth1_t *auth1_new(void);
-/** Release all storage held by the auth1 in 'victim'. (Do nothing if
- * 'victim' is NULL.)
- */
-void auth1_free(auth1_t *victim);
-/** Try to parse a auth1 from the buffer in 'input', using up to
- * 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the number
- * of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated auth1_t.
- * On failure, return -2 if the input appears truncated, and -1 if the
- * input is otherwise invalid.
- */
-ssize_t auth1_parse(auth1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
-/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the auth1
- * in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note that this value
- * may be an overestimate, and can even be an underestimate for
- * certain unencodeable objects.
- */
-ssize_t auth1_encoded_len(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
-/** Try to encode the auth1 from 'input' into the buffer at 'output',
- * using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On success, return
- * the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if the buffer was
- * not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
- */
-ssize_t auth1_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const auth1_t *input, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
-/** Check whether the internal state of the auth1 in 'obj' is
- * consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is not.
- */
-const char *auth1_check(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
-/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
- * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
- */
-int auth1_clear_errors(auth1_t *obj);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the type field
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t auth1_getlen_type(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field type
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t auth1_get_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth1_get_type, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-uint8_t auth1_getconst_type(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field type
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
- */
-int auth1_set_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the 8-element array field type of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * auth1_getarray_type(auth1_t *inp);
-/** As auth1_get_type, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_type(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the cid field of
- * the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t auth1_getlen_cid(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field cid
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t auth1_get_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth1_get_cid, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-uint8_t auth1_getconst_cid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field cid
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
- */
-int auth1_set_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field cid of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * auth1_getarray_cid(auth1_t *inp);
-/** As auth1_get_cid, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_cid(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the sid field of
- * the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t auth1_getlen_sid(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field sid
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t auth1_get_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth1_get_sid, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-uint8_t auth1_getconst_sid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field sid
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
- */
-int auth1_set_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field sid of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * auth1_getarray_sid(auth1_t *inp);
-/** As auth1_get_sid, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_sid(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the u1_cid_ed
- * field of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t auth1_getlen_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * u1_cid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t auth1_get_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth1_get_u1_cid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-uint8_t auth1_getconst_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * u1_cid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
- * 'elt'.
- */
-int auth1_set_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field u1_cid_ed of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * auth1_getarray_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp);
-/** As auth1_get_u1_cid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the u1_sid_ed
- * field of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t auth1_getlen_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * u1_sid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t auth1_get_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth1_get_u1_sid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-uint8_t auth1_getconst_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
- * u1_sid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
- * 'elt'.
- */
-int auth1_set_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
-/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field u1_sid_ed of 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t * auth1_getarray_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp);
-/** As auth1_get_u1_sid_ed, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the slog field
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-size_t auth1_getlen_slog(const auth1_t *inp);
-/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field slog
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
- */
-uint8_t auth1_get_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** As auth1_get_slog, but take and return a const pointer
- */
-uint8_t auth1_getconst_slog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
-/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field slog
- * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+uint8_t auth1_getconst_slog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field slog
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
*/
int auth1_set_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field slog of 'inp'.
@@ -679,6 +357,306 @@ const uint8_t * auth1_getconstarray_sig(const auth1_t *inp);
* -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
*/
int auth1_setlen_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated auth_challenge_cell with all elements set
+ * to zero.
+ */
+auth_challenge_cell_t *auth_challenge_cell_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the auth_challenge_cell in 'victim'.
+ * (Do nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void auth_challenge_cell_free(auth_challenge_cell_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a auth_challenge_cell from the buffer in 'input',
+ * using up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success,
+ * return the number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly
+ * allocated auth_challenge_cell_t. On failure, return -2 if the input
+ * appears truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_parse(auth_challenge_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * auth_challenge_cell in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value.
+ * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
+ * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the auth_challenge_cell from 'input' into the buffer
+ * at 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const auth_challenge_cell_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the auth_challenge_cell in
+ * 'obj' is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if
+ * it is not.
+ */
+const char *auth_challenge_cell_check(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_clear_errors(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the challenge
+ * field of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth_challenge_cell_getlen_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * challenge of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge, but take and return a const
+ * pointer
+ */
+uint8_t auth_challenge_cell_getconst_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * challenge of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp', so that it will
+ * hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_set_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field challenge of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge, but take and return a const
+ * pointer
+ */
+const uint8_t * auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Return the value of the n_methods field of the
+ * auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'
+ */
+uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_get_n_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the n_methods field of the auth_challenge_cell_t
+ * in 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the methods field
+ * of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * methods of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_methods, but take and return a const
+ * pointer
+ */
+uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_getconst_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * methods of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp', so that it will hold
+ * the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_set_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint16_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field methods of
+ * the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field methods of
+ * 'inp'.
+ */
+uint16_t * auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** As auth_challenge_cell_get_methods, but take and return a const
+ * pointer
+ */
+const uint16_t * auth_challenge_cell_getconstarray_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field methods of
+ * 'inp' to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success;
+ * return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_setlen_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated certs_cell_cert with all elements set to
+ * zero.
+ */
+certs_cell_cert_t *certs_cell_cert_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the certs_cell_cert in 'victim'. (Do
+ * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void certs_cell_cert_free(certs_cell_cert_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a certs_cell_cert from the buffer in 'input', using
+ * up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the
+ * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
+ * certs_cell_cert_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears
+ * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_cert_parse(certs_cell_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * certs_cell_cert in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note
+ * that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
+ * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the certs_cell_cert from 'input' into the buffer at
+ * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const certs_cell_cert_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the certs_cell_cert in 'obj'
+ * is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is
+ * not.
+ */
+const char *certs_cell_cert_check(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_clear_errors(certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
+/** Return the value of the cert_type field of the certs_cell_cert_t
+ * in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t certs_cell_cert_get_cert_type(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the cert_type field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_set_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the value of the cert_len field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
+ * 'inp'
+ */
+uint16_t certs_cell_cert_get_cert_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the cert_len field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_set_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint16_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the body field of
+ * the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t certs_cell_cert_getlen_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * body of the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t certs_cell_cert_get_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As certs_cell_cert_get_body, but take and return a const pointer
+ */
+uint8_t certs_cell_cert_getconst_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * body of the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
+ * value 'elt'.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_set_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field body of the
+ * certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_add_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field body of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** As certs_cell_cert_get_body, but take and return a const pointer
+ */
+const uint8_t * certs_cell_cert_getconstarray_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field body of 'inp'
+ * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success; return
+ * -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated rsa_ed_crosscert with all elements set to
+ * zero.
+ */
+rsa_ed_crosscert_t *rsa_ed_crosscert_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the rsa_ed_crosscert in 'victim'. (Do
+ * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void rsa_ed_crosscert_free(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a rsa_ed_crosscert from the buffer in 'input', using
+ * up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the
+ * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
+ * rsa_ed_crosscert_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears
+ * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(rsa_ed_crosscert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * rsa_ed_crosscert in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value.
+ * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
+ * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the rsa_ed_crosscert from 'input' into the buffer at
+ * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the rsa_ed_crosscert in 'obj'
+ * is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is
+ * not.
+ */
+const char *rsa_ed_crosscert_check(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_clear_errors(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the ed_key field
+ * of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * ed_key of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key, but take and return a const
+ * pointer
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * ed_key of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
+ * value 'elt'.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field ed_key of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key, but take and return a const
+ * pointer
+ */
+const uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the value of the expiration field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t
+ * in 'inp'
+ */
+uint32_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_expiration(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the expiration field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint32_t val);
+/** Return the position for end_of_signed when we parsed this object
+ */
+const uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_get_end_of_signed(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the value of the sig_len field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
+ * 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the sig_len field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the sig field of
+ * the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * sig of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig, but take and return a const pointer
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getconst_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * sig of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
+ * value 'elt'.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field sig of the
+ * rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_add_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig, but take and return a const pointer
+ */
+const uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getconstarray_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'
+ * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success; return
+ * -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t newlen);
/** Return a newly allocated certs_cell with all elements set to zero.
*/
certs_cell_t *certs_cell_new(void);
diff --git a/src/trunnel/link_handshake.trunnel b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.trunnel
@@ -32,20 +32,12 @@ struct auth_challenge_cell {
u16 methods[n_methods];
}
-context auth_ctx {
- u8 is_ed;
-}
-
-struct auth1 with context auth_ctx {
+struct auth1 {
u8 type[8];
u8 cid[32];
u8 sid[32];
- union u1[auth_ctx.is_ed] {
- 0 : ;
- 1 : u8 cid_ed[32];
- u8 sid_ed[32];
- default: fail;
- };
+ u8 cid_ed[32];
+ u8 sid_ed[32];
u8 slog[32];
u8 clog[32];
u8 scert[32];
