tor

The Tor anonymity network
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commit 5cc80692b8397d8b87fd69d0f0165a6156534f0b
parent e9b4624cc589d830d7a78128649f7945ac808737
Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
Date:   Tue, 29 Aug 2017 18:29:05 +0300

prop224: Fix memleak in client_get_random_intro().

The memleak was occuring because of the way ExcludeNodes is handled in
that function. Basically, we were putting excluded intro points extend
infos in a special variable which was never freed. Also, if there were
multiple excluded intro points then that variable was overwritten
everytime leaking more memory. This commit should fix both issues.

Diffstat:
Msrc/or/hs_client.c | 7+++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -646,6 +646,12 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) /* If this pick is in the ExcludeNodes list, we keep its reference so if * we ever end up not being able to pick anything else and StrictNodes is * unset, we'll use it. */ + if (ei_excluded) { + /* If something was already here free it. After the loop is gone we + * will examine the last excluded intro point, and that's fine since + * that's random anyway */ + extend_info_free(ei_excluded); + } ei_excluded = ei; continue; } @@ -662,6 +668,7 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) if (options->StrictNodes) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction points are in the ExcludeNodes set " "and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect."); + extend_info_free(ei); ei = NULL; }