tor

The Tor anonymity network
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commit 412bcc5b2afcc965a6c8e6d09c3bda62df39bcc5
parent 454bdb22eeb4637a8bb5e40deb8454311f4ba4a2
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date:   Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:31:33 -0400

Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/926' into maint-0.4.0

Diffstat:
Achanges/bug30040 | 9+++++++++
Msrc/ext/getdelim.c | 3++-
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/changes/bug30040 b/changes/bug30040 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (security): + - Fix a potential double free bug when reading huge bandwidth files. The + issue is not exploitable in the current Tor network because the + vulnerable code is only reached when directory authorities read bandwidth + files, but bandwidth files come from a trusted source (usually the + authorities themselves). Furthermore, the issue is only exploitable in + rare (non-POSIX) 32-bit architectures which are not used by any of the + current authorities. Fixes bug 30040; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. Bug found + and fixed by Tobias Stoeckmann. diff --git a/src/ext/getdelim.c b/src/ext/getdelim.c @@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ compat_getdelim_(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, int delimiter, FILE *fp) char *nbuf; size_t nbufsiz = *bufsiz * 2; ssize_t d = ptr - *buf; - if ((nbuf = raw_realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL) + if (nbufsiz < *bufsiz || + (nbuf = raw_realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL) return -1; *buf = nbuf; *bufsiz = nbufsiz;