commit 3695ef6343fa1c05cd15a3ddf35c3fe6991ff2ad
parent 6583d1e7091ba368b66c6f3038df223d3b7652cb
Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 18:06:44 +0300
HSv3: Don't assert when reading bad client-side privkeys.
Diffstat:
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c
@@ -1500,6 +1500,12 @@ parse_auth_file_content(const char *client_key_str)
goto err;
}
+ if (strlen(seckey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 private key "
+ "length is invalid: %s", seckey_b32);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
auth = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_client_service_authorization_t));
if (base32_decode((char *) auth->enc_seckey.secret_key,
sizeof(auth->enc_seckey.secret_key),
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_client.c b/src/test/test_hs_client.c
@@ -660,7 +660,9 @@ test_parse_auth_file_content(void *arg)
"x:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq"));
/* Some malformed string. */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:aa=="));
-
+ /* Bigger key than it should be */
+ tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:"
+ "vjqea4jbhwwc4hto7ekyvqfbeodghbaq6nxi45hz4wr3qvhqv3yqa"));
done:
tor_free(auth);
}