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The Tor anonymity network
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commit 305e39d0f8bcc39d45c2877495046bd927347106
parent 1555946e202fef523b35e169c90892b57caea766
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Date:   Tue, 13 Feb 2018 10:41:21 -0500

dos: Add extra safety asserts in cc_stats_refill_bucket()

Never allow the function to set a bucket value above the allowed circuit
burst.

Closes #25202

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>

Diffstat:
Achanges/ticket25202 | 4++++
Msrc/or/dos.c | 10++++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/ticket25202 b/changes/ticket25202 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (DoS mitigation): + - Add extra safety checks when refilling the circuit creation bucket to + ensure we never set a value that is above the allowed burst. Fixes + ticket 25202. diff --git a/src/or/dos.c b/src/or/dos.c @@ -309,6 +309,16 @@ cc_stats_refill_bucket(cc_client_stats_t *stats, const tor_addr_t *addr) new_circuit_bucket_count = MIN(stats->circuit_bucket + (uint32_t)num_token, dos_cc_circuit_burst); } + + /* This function is not allowed to make the bucket count larger than the + * burst value */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(new_circuit_bucket_count <= dos_cc_circuit_burst); + /* This function is not allowed to make the bucket count smaller, unless it + * is decreasing it to a newly configured, lower burst value. We allow the + * bucket to stay the same size, in case the circuit rate is zero. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(new_circuit_bucket_count >= stats->circuit_bucket || + new_circuit_bucket_count == dos_cc_circuit_burst); + log_debug(LD_DOS, "DoS address %s has its circuit bucket value: %" PRIu32 ". Filling it to %" PRIu32 ". Circuit rate is %" PRIu64 ". Elapsed time is %" PRIi64,