tor

The Tor anonymity network
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commit 12723de00bf8c6b10d01e818e4aec41dffea5474
parent 525a1cfb70c45055aaf42fc695aa24befc35aec7
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Date:   Thu,  9 Nov 2023 09:17:51 -0500

Merge branch 'maint-0.4.8'

Diffstat:
Achanges/ticket40883 | 4++++
Msrc/feature/hs/hs_metrics.c | 7++++++-
Msrc/feature/rend/rendcommon.c | 9++++++++-
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/ticket40883 b/changes/ticket40883 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Major bugfixes (onion service, TROVE-2023-006): + - Fix a possible hard assert on a NULL pointer when recording a failed + rendezvous circuit on the service side for the MetricsPort. Fixes bug + 40883; bugfix on 0.4.8.1-alpha diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_metrics.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_metrics.c @@ -199,7 +199,12 @@ hs_metrics_update_by_ident(const hs_metrics_key_t key, { hs_service_t *service; - tor_assert(ident_pk); + if (!ident_pk) { + /* We can end up here in case this is used from a failure/closing path for + * which we might not have any identity key attacehed to a circuit or + * connection yet. Simply don't assume we have one. */ + return; + } service = hs_service_find(ident_pk); if (!service) { diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c @@ -40,7 +40,14 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, int r = -2; if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - if (!layer_hint || layer_hint != origin_circ->cpath->prev) { + + /* Opened onion service circuit receiving cell MUST have an hs_ident as it + * is the underlying assumption else we can't process the cell. If this is + * the case, we can't recover so close the circuit. */ + if (BUG(!origin_circ->hs_ident)) { + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + origin_circ = NULL; + } else if (!layer_hint || layer_hint != origin_circ->cpath->prev) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP, "Relay cell (rend purpose %d) from wrong hop on origin circ", command);