tor-browser

commit a03a54e914d50532dbb5165182720f739d8914bc
parent 8cf9ef32f2e30c7568f69b9fb46ffc34c5d6c2fb
Author: Michael Froman <mfroman@mozilla.com>
Date:   Tue, 18 Nov 2025 17:44:41 +0000

Bug 2000353 - remove disabled code from stun_hint.c r=bwc,ng

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D272760

Diffstat:
M
dom/media/webrtc/transport/third_party/nICEr/src/stun/stun_hint.c
 | 
22
----------------------

1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dom/media/webrtc/transport/third_party/nICEr/src/stun/stun_hint.c b/dom/media/webrtc/transport/third_party/nICEr/src/stun/stun_hint.c
@@ -55,9 +55,6 @@ nr_is_stun_message(UCHAR *buf, size_t len)
 {
    const UINT4 cookie = htonl(NR_STUN_MAGIC_COOKIE);
    const UINT4 cookie2 = htonl(NR_STUN_MAGIC_COOKIE2);
-#if 0
-   nr_stun_message msg;
-#endif
    UINT2 type;
    nr_stun_encoded_attribute* attr;
    unsigned int attrLen;
@@ -136,25 +133,6 @@ nr_is_stun_message(UCHAR *buf, size_t len)
    /* the fingerprint is in the right place and looks sane, so we can be quite
     * sure we've got a STUN message */
 
-#if 0
-/* nevermind this check ... there's a reasonable chance that a NAT has modified
- * the message (and thus the fingerprint check will fail), but it's still an
- * otherwise-perfectly-good STUN message, so skip the check since we're going
- * to return "true" whether the check succeeds or fails */
-
-   if (nr_stun_parse_attr_UINT4(buf + (len - 4), attrLen, &msg.fingerprint))
-       return 2;
-
-
-   if (nr_stun_compute_fingerprint(buf, len - 8, &computedFingerprint))
-       return 2;
-
-   if (msg.fingerprint.number != computedFingerprint)
-       return 2;
-
-   /* and the fingerprint is good, so it's gotta be a STUN message */
-#endif
-
    return 3;
 }