tor

tor.1.txt (221279B)

---

// Copyright (c) The Tor Project, Inc.
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:man source:   Tor
:man manual:   Tor Manual
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:dbl_: __
= TOR(1)
:toc:

== NAME

tor - The second-generation onion router

== SYNOPSIS

**tor** [__OPTION__ __value__]...

== DESCRIPTION

Tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication service. Users
choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and negotiate a
"virtual circuit" through the network. Each node in a virtual circuit
knows its predecessor and successor nodes, but no other nodes. Traffic
flowing down the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node,
which reveals the downstream node. +

Basically, Tor provides a distributed network of servers or relays
("onion routers").  Users bounce their TCP streams, including web
traffic, ftp, ssh, etc., around the network, so that recipients,
observers, and even the relays themselves have difficulty tracking the
source of the stream.

[NOTE]
By default, **tor** acts as a client only.  To help the network by
providing bandwidth as a relay, change the **ORPort** configuration
option as mentioned below.  Please also consult the documentation on
the Tor Project's website.

== COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS

Tor has a powerful command-line interface. This section lists optional
arguments you can specify at the command line using the **`tor`**
command.

Configuration options can be specified on the command line in the
format **`--`**_OptionName_ _OptionValue_, on the command line in the
format _OptionName_ _OptionValue_, or in a configuration file.  For
instance, you can tell Tor to start listening for SOCKS connections on
port 9999 by passing either **`--SocksPort 9999`** or **`SocksPort
9999`** on the command line, or by specifying **`SocksPort 9999`** in
the configuration file.  On the command line, quote option values that
contain spaces. For instance, if you want Tor to log all debugging
messages to **`debug.log`**, you must specify **`--Log "debug file
debug.log"`**.

NOTE: Configuration options on the command line override those in
configuration files.  See **<<conf-format,THE CONFIGURATION FILE
FORMAT>>** for more information.

The following options in this section are only recognized on the
**`tor`** command line, not in a configuration file.

[[opt-h]] **`-h`**, **`--help`**::
   Display a short help message and exit.

[[opt-f]] **`-f`**, **`--torrc-file`** __FILE__::
   Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor configuration
   options, or pass *-* to make Tor read its configuration from standard
   input. (Default: **`@CONFDIR@/torrc`**, or **`$HOME/.torrc`** if
   that file is not found.)

[[opt-allow-missing-torrc]] **`--allow-missing-torrc`**::
   Allow the configuration file specified by **`-f`** to be missing,
   if the defaults-torrc file (see below) is accessible.

[[opt-defaults-torrc]] **`--defaults-torrc`** __FILE__::
   Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor options.  The
   contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular
   configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default:
   **`@CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults`**.)

[[opt-ignore-missing-torrc]] **`--ignore-missing-torrc`**::
   Specify that Tor should treat a missing torrc file as though it
   were empty. Ordinarily, Tor does this for missing default torrc files,
   but not for those specified on the command line.

[[opt-hash-password]] **`--hash-password`** __PASSWORD__::
   Generate a hashed password for control port access.

[[opt-list-fingerprint]] **`--list-fingerprint`** [__key type__]::
   Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint. Optionally,
   you can specify the key type as `rsa` (default) or `ed25519`.

[[opt-verify-config]] **`--verify-config`**::
   Verify whether the configuration file is valid.

[[opt-dump-config]] **`--dump-config`** **`short`**|**`full`**::
   Write a list of Tor's configured options to standard output.
   When the `short` flag is selected, only write the options that
   are different from their default values.
   When `full` is selected, write every option.

[[opt-serviceinstall]] **`--service install`** [**`--options`** __command-line options__]::
   Install an instance of Tor as a Windows service, with the provided
   command-line options. Current instructions can be found at
   https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#NTService

[[opt-service]] **`--service`** **`remove`**|**`start`**|**`stop`**::
   Remove, start, or stop a configured Tor Windows service.

[[opt-nt-service]] **`--nt-service`**::
   Used internally to implement a Windows service.

[[opt-list-torrc-options]] **`--list-torrc-options`**::
   List all valid options.

[[opt-list-deprecated-options]] **`--list-deprecated-options`**::
   List all valid options that are scheduled to become obsolete in a
   future version. (This is a warning, not a promise.)

[[opt-list-modules]] **`--list-modules`**::
   List whether each optional module has been compiled into Tor.
   (Any module not listed is not optional in this version of Tor.)

[[opt-version]] **`--version`**::
   Display Tor version and exit. The output is a single line of the format
   "Tor version [version number]."  (The version number format
   is as specified in version-spec.txt.)

[[opt-quiet]] **`--quiet`**|**`--hush`**::
   Override the default console logging behavior.  By default, Tor
   starts out logging messages at level "notice" and higher to the
   console.  It stops doing so after it parses its configuration, if
   the configuration tells it to log anywhere else.  These options
   override the default console logging behavior.  Use the
   **`--hush`** option if you want Tor to log only warnings and
   errors to the console, or use the **`--quiet`** option if you want
   Tor not to log to the console at all.

[[opt-keygen]] **`--keygen`** [**`--newpass`**]::
   Running **`tor --keygen`** creates a new ed25519 master identity key
   for a relay, or only a fresh temporary signing key and
   certificate, if you already have a master key.  Optionally, you
   can encrypt the master identity key with a passphrase.  When Tor
   asks you for a passphrase and you don't want to encrypt the master
   key, just don't enter any passphrase when asked. +
    +
   Use the **`--newpass`** option with **`--keygen`** only when you
   need to add, change, or remove a passphrase on an existing ed25519
   master identity key. You will be prompted for the old passphrase
   (if any), and the new passphrase (if any).
+
[NOTE]
   When generating a master key, you may want to use
   **`--DataDirectory`** to control where the keys and certificates
   will be stored, and **`--SigningKeyLifetime`** to control their
   lifetimes.  See <<server-options,SERVER OPTIONS>> to learn more about the
   behavior of these options.  You must have write access to the
   specified DataDirectory.
+
[normal]
   To use the generated files, you must copy them to the
   __DataDirectory__/**`keys`** directory of your Tor daemon, and
   make sure that they are owned by the user actually running the Tor
   daemon on your system.

[[opt-keygen-family]] **`--keygen-family`** __basename__::
   Generate a new family ID key in __basename__`.secret_family_key`.
   To use this key, install it on every relay in your family.
   (Put it in the relay's `KeyDirectory`.)
   Also, store the corresponding family ID in __basename__`.public_family_id`.
   Then enable the corresponding FamilyID option on your relays.
   This command overwrites these files if they already exist.
   See https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/post-install/family-ids/
   for more information.

**`--passphrase-fd`** __FILEDES__::
   File descriptor to read the passphrase from.  Note that unlike with the
   tor-gencert program, the entire file contents are read and used as
   the passphrase, including any trailing newlines.
   If the file descriptor is not specified, the passphrase is read
   from the terminal by default.

[[opt-key-expiration]] **`--key-expiration`** [__purpose__] [**`--format`** **`iso8601`**|**`timestamp`**]::
   The __purpose__ specifies which type of key certificate to determine
   the expiration of.  The only currently recognised __purpose__ is
   "sign". +
    +
   Running **`tor --key-expiration sign`** will attempt to find your
   signing key certificate and will output, both in the logs as well
   as to stdout.  The optional **`--format`** argument lets you specify
   the time format.  Currently, **`iso8601`** and **`timestamp`** are
   supported.  If **`--format`** is not specified, the signing key
   certificate's expiration time will be in ISO-8601 format.  For example,
   the output sent to stdout will be of the form:
   "signing-cert-expiry: 2017-07-25 08:30:15 UTC".  If **`--format`** **`timestamp`**
   is specified, the signing key certificate's expiration time will be in
   Unix timestamp format. For example, the output sent to stdout will be of the form:
   "signing-cert-expiry: 1500971415".

[[opt-dbg]] **--dbg-**...::
   Tor may support other options beginning with the string "dbg". These
   are intended for use by developers to debug and test Tor. They are
   not supported or guaranteed to be stable, and you should probably
   not use them.


[[conf-format]]
== THE CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT

All configuration options in a configuration are written on a single line by
default.  They take the form of an option name and a value, or an option name
and a quoted value (option value or option "value"). Anything after a #
character is treated as a comment.  Options are
case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside quoted
values. To split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single
backslash character (\) before the end of the line.  Comments can be used in
such multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a line.

Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
option with the value being a path. This path can have wildcards. Wildcards are
expanded first, then sorted using lexical order. Then, for each matching file or
folder, the following rules are followed: if the path is a file, the options from
the file will be parsed as if they were written where the %include option is. If
the path is a folder, all files on that folder will be parsed following lexical
order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files in subfolders are ignored.
The %include option can be used recursively.
New configuration files or directories cannot be added to already running Tor
instance if **Sandbox** is enabled.

The supported wildcards are * meaning any number of characters including none
and ? meaning exactly one character. These characters can be escaped by preceding
them with a backslash, except on Windows. Files starting with a dot are not matched
when expanding wildcards unless the starting dot is explicitly in the pattern, except
on Windows.

By default, an option on the command line overrides an option found in the
configuration file, and an option in a configuration file overrides one in
the defaults file.

This rule is simple for options that take a single value, but it can become
complicated for options that are allowed to occur more than once: if you
specify four SocksPorts in your configuration file, and one more SocksPort on
the command line, the option on the command line will replace __all__ of the
SocksPorts in the configuration file.  If this isn't what you want, prefix
the option name with a plus sign (+), and it will be appended to the previous
set of options instead.  For example, setting SocksPort 9100 will use only
port 9100, but setting +SocksPort 9100 will use ports 9100 and 9050 (because
this is the default).

Alternatively, you might want to remove every instance of an option in the
configuration file, and not replace it at all: you might want to say on the
command line that you want no SocksPorts at all.  To do that, prefix the
option name with a forward slash (/).  You can use the plus sign (+) and the
forward slash (/) in the configuration file and on the command line.

== GENERAL OPTIONS

// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
// Please keep them that way!

[[AccelDir]] **AccelDir** __DIR__::
   Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
   implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
   Can not be changed while tor is running.

[[AccelName]] **AccelName** __NAME__::
   When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
   engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.
   Names can be verified with the openssl engine command. Can not be changed
   while tor is running. +
    +
   If the engine name is prefixed with a "!", then Tor will exit if the
   engine cannot be loaded.

[[AlternateBridgeAuthority]] **AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__::
[[AlternateDirAuthority]] **AlternateDirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__port__ __fingerprint__::
   These options behave as DirAuthority, but they replace fewer of the
   default directory authorities. Using
   AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
   leaves the default bridge authorities in
   place.  Similarly,
   AlternateBridgeAuthority replaces the default bridge authority,
   but leaves the directory authorities alone.

[[AvoidDiskWrites]] **AvoidDiskWrites** **0**|**1**::
   If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
   This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
   only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)

[[BandwidthBurst]] **BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
   number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1 GByte)

[[BandwidthRate]] **BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
   to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
   bandwidth usage to that same value.  If you want to run a relay in the
   public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 75 KBytes for a
   relay (that is, 600 kbits) or 50 KBytes for a bridge (400 kbits) -- but of
   course, more is better; we recommend at least 250 KBytes (2 mbits) if
   possible.  (Default: 1 GByte) +
    +
   Note that this option, and other bandwidth-limiting options, apply to TCP
   data only: They do not count TCP headers or DNS traffic. +
    +
   Tor uses powers of two, not powers of ten, so 1 GByte is
   1024*1024*1024 bytes as opposed to 1 billion bytes. +
    +
   With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes,
   KBytes, and so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" can
   also be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can be written as
   "megabytes" or "MB"; "kbits" can be written as "kilobits"; and so forth.
   Case doesn't matter.
   Tor also accepts "byte" and "bit" in the singular.
   The prefixes "tera" and "T" are also recognized.
   If no units are given, we default to bytes.
   To avoid confusion, we recommend writing "bytes" or "bits" explicitly,
   since it's easy to forget that "B" means bytes, not bits.

[[CacheDirectory]] **CacheDirectory** __DIR__::
   Store cached directory data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
   running.
   (Default: uses the value of DataDirectory.)

[[CacheDirectoryGroupReadable]] **CacheDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
   CacheDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the CacheDirectory readable
   by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the
   setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the CacheDirectory is the
   same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto)

[[CircuitPriorityHalflife]] **CircuitPriorityHalflife** __NUM__::
   If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
   circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. It is delivered first to the
   circuit that has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted
   exponentially according to this value (in seconds). If the value is -1, it
   is taken from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the
   default value of 30. Minimum: 1, Maximum: 2147483647. This can be defined
   as a float value. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have
   to mess with it. (Default: -1)

[[ClientTransportPlugin]] **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ socks4|socks5 __IP__:__PORT__::
[[ClientTransportPlugin-2]] **ClientTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
   In its first form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
   client forwards its traffic to a SOCKS-speaking proxy on "IP:PORT".
   (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in
   square brackets.) It's the
   duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge. +
    +
   In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
   client launches the pluggable transport proxy executable in
   __path-to-binary__ using __options__ as its command-line options, and
   forwards its traffic to it. It's the duty of that proxy to properly forward
   the traffic to the bridge. (Default: none)

[[ConfluxEnabled]] **ConfluxEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   If this option is set to 1, general purpose traffic will use Conflux which
   is traffic splitting among multiple legs (circuits). Onion services are not
   supported at the moment. Default value is set to "auto" meaning the
   consensus is used to decide unless set. (Default: auto)

[[ConfluxClientUX]] **ConfluxClientUX** **throughput**|**latency**|**throughput_lowmem**|**latency_lowmem**::
   This option configures the user experience that the client requests from
   the exit, for data that the exit sends to the client. The default is
   "throughput", which maximizes throughput. "Latency" will tell the exit to
   only use the circuit with lower latency for all data. The lowmem versions
   minimize queue usage memory at the client. (Default: "throughput")

[[ConnLimit]] **ConnLimit** __NUM__::
   The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
   process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
   descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
   If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. +
    +
   Tor relays need thousands of sockets, to connect to every other relay.
   If you are running a private bridge, you can reduce the number of sockets
   that Tor uses. For example, to limit Tor to 500 sockets, run
   "ulimit -n 500" in a shell. Then start tor in the same shell, with
   **ConnLimit 500**. You may also need to set **DisableOOSCheck 0**. +
    +
   Unless you have severely limited sockets, you probably don't need to
   adjust **ConnLimit** itself. It has no effect on Windows, since that
   platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)

[[ConstrainedSockets]] **ConstrainedSockets** **0**|**1**::
   If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
   sockets to the size specified in **ConstrainedSockSize**. This is useful for
   virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
   be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
   creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
   likely experiencing this problem. +
    +
   The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
   the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
   this configuration option is a second-resort. +
    +
   The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
   cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
   the problem. +
    +
   You should **not** enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
   space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
   the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
   time on long paths. (Default: 0)

[[ConstrainedSockSize]] **ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**::
   When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
   all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
   262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.

[[ControlPort]] **ControlPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [__flags__]::
   If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
   connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
   (described in control-spec.txt in
   https://spec.torproject.org[torspec]). Note: unless you also
   specify one or more of **HashedControlPassword** or
   **CookieAuthentication**, setting this option will cause Tor to allow
   any process on the local host to control it. (Setting both authentication
   methods means either method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This
   option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
   If a unix domain socket is used, you may quote the path using standard
   C escape sequences. You can specify this directive multiple times, to
   bind to multiple address/port pairs.
   Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0) +
    +
   Recognized flags are:
   **GroupWritable**;;
       Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
       group-writable.
   **WorldWritable**;;
       Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
       world-writable.
   **RelaxDirModeCheck**;;
       Unix domain sockets only: Do not insist that the directory
       that holds the socket be read-restricted.

[[ControlPortFileGroupReadable]] **ControlPortFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
   control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port
   file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0)

[[ControlPortWriteToFile]] **ControlPortWriteToFile** __Path__::
   If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to
   this address.  Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port
   when ControlPort is set to "auto".

[[ControlSocket]] **ControlSocket** __Path__::
   Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
   socket. '0' disables ControlSocket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
   (Default: 0)

[[ControlSocketsGroupWritable]] **ControlSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
   write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make
   the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)

[[CookieAuthentication]] **CookieAuthentication** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port
   when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
   "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
   authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
   security. (Default: 0)

[[CookieAuthFile]] **CookieAuthFile** __Path__::
   If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
   for Tor's cookie file. (See <<CookieAuthentication,CookieAuthentication>>.)

[[CookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **CookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
   cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
   the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
   implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0)

[[CountPrivateBandwidth]] **CountPrivateBandwidth** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set, then Tor's rate-limiting applies not only to
   remote connections, but also to connections to private addresses like
   127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1.  This is mostly useful for debugging
   rate-limiting.  (Default: 0)

[[DataDirectory]] **DataDirectory** __DIR__::
   Store working data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is running.
   (Default: ~/.tor if your home directory is not /; otherwise,
   @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor.  On Windows, the default is
   your ApplicationData folder.)

[[DataDirectoryGroupReadable]] **DataDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
   DataDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the DataDirectory readable
   by the default GID. (Default: 0)

[[DirAuthority]] **DirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __ipv4address__:__dirport__ __fingerprint__::
   Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
   and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
   many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
   separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
   is. By default, an authority is not authoritative for any directory style
   or version unless an appropriate flag is given. +
    +
   Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
   "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**orport**" is given, Tor will
   use the given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. If a
   flag "weight=**num**" is given, then the directory server is chosen
   randomly with probability proportional to that weight (default 1.0). If a
   flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
   whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. Lastly,
   if an "ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__" flag is present, then
   the directory authority is listening for IPv6 connections on the
   indicated IPv6 address and OR Port. +
    +
   Tor will contact the authority at __ipv4address__ to
   download directory documents. Clients always use the ORPort. Relays
   usually use the DirPort, but will use the ORPort in some circumstances.
   If an IPv6 ORPort is supplied, clients will also download directory
   documents at the IPv6 ORPort, if they are configured to use IPv6. +
    +
   If no **DirAuthority** line is given, Tor will use the default directory
   authorities. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
   network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
   distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same
   authorities they do.

[[DirAuthorityFallbackRate]] **DirAuthorityFallbackRate** __NUM__::
   When configured to use both directory authorities and fallback
   directories, the directory authorities also work as fallbacks. They are
   chosen with their regular weights, multiplied by this number, which
   should be 1.0 or less. The default is less than 1, to reduce load on
   authorities. (Default: 0.1)

[[DisableAllSwap]] **DisableAllSwap** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages,
   so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently
   not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux
   distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This
   option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the
   **User** option to properly reduce Tor's privileges.
   Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)

[[DisableDebuggerAttachment]] **DisableDebuggerAttachment** **0**|**1**::
  If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging attachment attempts
  by other processes. This may also keep Tor from generating core files if
  it crashes. It has no impact for users who wish to attach if they
  have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root.  We believe that this feature
  works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD
  systems (untested).  Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the
  kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an attempt to
  limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by default. This feature will
  attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor specifically - it will not attempt
  to alter the system wide ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish
  to attach to Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set
  this to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should leave it
  on. Disabling this option while Tor is running is prohibited. (Default: 1)

[[DisableNetwork]] **DisableNetwork** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set, we don't listen for or accept any connections
   other than controller connections, and we close (and don't reattempt)
   any outbound
   connections.  Controllers sometimes use this option to avoid using
   the network until Tor is fully configured.  Tor will make still certain
   network-related calls (like DNS lookups) as a part of its configuration
   process, even if DisableNetwork is set. (Default: 0)

[[ExtendByEd25519ID]] **ExtendByEd25519ID** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   If this option is set to 1, we always try to include a relay's Ed25519 ID
   when telling the preceding relay in a circuit to extend to it.
   If this option is set to 0, we never include Ed25519 IDs when extending
   circuits.  If the option is set to "auto", we obey a
   parameter in the consensus document. (Default: auto)

[[ExtORPort]] **ExtORPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto**::
   Open this port to listen for Extended ORPort connections from your
   pluggable transports. +
   (Default: **DataDirectory**/extended_orport_auth_cookie)

[[ExtORPortCookieAuthFile]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFile** __Path__::
   If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
   for the Extended ORPort's cookie file -- the cookie file is needed
   for pluggable transports to communicate through the Extended ORPort.

[[ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
   Extended OR Port cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie
   file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
   groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
   reason.] (Default: 0)

[[FallbackDir]] **FallbackDir** __ipv4address__:__dirport__ orport=__orport__ id=__fingerprint__ [weight=__num__] [ipv6=**[**__ipv6address__**]**:__orport__]::
   When tor is unable to connect to any directory cache for directory info
   (usually because it doesn't know about any yet) it tries a hard-coded
   directory. Relays try one directory authority at a time. Clients try
   multiple directory authorities and FallbackDirs, to avoid hangs on
   startup if a hard-coded directory is down. Clients wait for a few seconds
   between each attempt, and retry FallbackDirs more often than directory
   authorities, to reduce the load on the directory authorities.  +
    +
   FallbackDirs should be stable relays with stable IP addresses, ports,
   and identity keys. They must have a DirPort. +
    +
   By default, the directory authorities are also FallbackDirs. Specifying a
   FallbackDir replaces Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any).
   (See <<DirAuthority,DirAuthority>> for an explanation of each flag.)

[[FetchDirInfoEarly]] **FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
   directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching
   early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)

[[FetchDirInfoExtraEarly]] **FetchDirInfoExtraEarly** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory
   caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the
   start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
   (Default: 0)

[[FetchHidServDescriptors]] **FetchHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
   rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor
   controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)

[[FetchServerDescriptors]] **FetchServerDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
   descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
   you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
   (Default: 1)

[[FetchUselessDescriptors]] **FetchUselessDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will fetch every consensus flavor, and all server
   descriptors and authority certificates referenced by those consensuses,
   except for extra info descriptors. When this option is 1, Tor will also
   keep fetching descriptors, even when idle.
   If set to 0, Tor will avoid fetching useless descriptors: flavors that it
   is not using to build circuits, and authority certificates it does not
   trust. When Tor hasn't built any application circuits, it will go idle,
   and stop fetching descriptors. This option is useful if you're using a
   tor client with an external parser that uses a full consensus.
   This option fetches all documents except extrainfo descriptors,
   **DirCache** fetches and serves all documents except extrainfo
   descriptors, **DownloadExtraInfo*** fetches extrainfo documents, and serves
   them if **DirCache** is on, and **UseMicrodescriptors** changes the
   flavor of consensuses and descriptors that is fetched and used for
   building circuits. (Default: 0)

[[HardwareAccel]] **HardwareAccel** **0**|**1**::
   If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
   available. Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0)

[[HashedControlPassword]] **HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__::
   Allow connections on the control port if they present
   the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You
   can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
   __password__". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
   than one HashedControlPassword line.

[[HTTPProxy]] **HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
   Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
   if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
   servers. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use HTTPSProxy.)

[[HTTPProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
   If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
   authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
   proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
   want it to support others. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use
   HTTPSProxyAuthenticator.)

[[HTTPSProxy]] **HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
   Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
   host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
   directly to servers. You may want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict
   the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
   allows connecting to certain ports.

[[HTTPSProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPSProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
   If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
   authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
   proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
   want it to support others.

[[KeepalivePeriod]] **KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__::
   To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
   every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. (Default: 5 minutes)

[[KeepBindCapabilities]] **KeepBindCapabilities** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   On Linux, when we are started as root and we switch our identity using
   the **User** option, the **KeepBindCapabilities** option tells us whether to
   try to retain our ability to bind to low ports.  If this value is 1, we
   try to keep the capability; if it is 0 we do not; and if it is **auto**,
   we keep the capability only if we are configured to listen on a low port.
   Can not be changed while tor is running.
   (Default: auto.)

[[Log]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
   Send all messages between __minSeverity__ and __maxSeverity__ to the standard
   output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
   "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
   debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
   since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
   attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
   messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination. +
    +
   Some low-level logs may be sent from signal handlers, so their destination
   logs must be signal-safe. These low-level logs include backtraces,
   logging function errors, and errors in code called by logging functions.
   Signal-safe logs are always sent to stderr or stdout. They are also sent to
   a limited number of log files that are configured to log messages at error
   severity from the bug or general domains. They are never sent as syslogs,
   control port log events, or to any API-based log
   destinations.

[[Log2]] **Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **file** __FILENAME__::
   As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
   "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
   Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
   level.

[[Log3]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **file** __FILENAME__ +

[[Log4]] **Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
   As above, but select messages by range of log severity __and__ by a
   set of "logging domains".  Each logging domain corresponds to an area of
   functionality inside Tor.  You can specify any number of severity ranges
   for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated
   list of logging domains.  You can prefix a domain with $$~$$ to indicate
   negation, and use * to indicate "all domains".  If you specify a severity
   range without a list of domains, it matches all domains. +
    +
   This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two
   of Tor's subsystems at a time. +
    +
   The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs,
   protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge,
   acct, hist, handshake, heartbeat, channel, sched, guard, consdiff, dos,
   process, pt, btrack, and mesg.
   Domain names are case-insensitive. +
    +
   For example, "`Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout`" sends
   to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher
   messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all
   messages of severity notice or higher.

[[LogMessageDomains]] **LogMessageDomains** **0**|**1**::
   If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message.  Every log
   message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly
   one.  This doesn't affect controller log messages. (Default: 0)

[[LogTimeGranularity]] **LogTimeGranularity** __NUM__::
   Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor's logs to NUM milliseconds.
   NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1 second.
   Note that this option only controls the granularity written by Tor to
   a file or console log.  Tor does not (for example) "batch up" log
   messages to affect times logged by a controller, times attached to
   syslog messages, or the mtime fields on log files.  (Default: 1 second)

[[MaxAdvertisedBandwidth]] **MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
   BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
   who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
   advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
   without impacting network performance.

[[MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog]] **MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**::
   Unparseable descriptors (e.g. for votes, consensuses, routers) are logged
   in separate files by hash, up to the specified size in total.  Note that
   only files logged during the lifetime of this Tor process count toward the
   total; this is intended to be used to debug problems without opening live
   servers to resource exhaustion attacks. (Default: 10 MBytes)

[[MetricsPort]] **MetricsPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__ [__format__]::
   WARNING: Before enabling this, it is important to understand that exposing
   tor metrics publicly is dangerous to the Tor network users. Please take
   extra precaution and care when opening this port. Set a very strict access
   policy with MetricsPortPolicy and consider using your operating systems
   firewall features for defense in depth.
    +
   We recommend, for the prometheus __format__, that the only address that
   can access this port should be the Prometheus server itself. Remember that
   the connection is unencrypted (HTTP) hence consider using a tool like
   stunnel to secure the link from this port to the server.
    +
   If set, open this port to listen for an HTTP GET request to "/metrics".
   Upon a request, the collected metrics in the the tor instance are
   formatted for the given format and then sent back. If this is set,
   MetricsPortPolicy must be defined else every request will be rejected.
    +
   Supported format is "prometheus" which is also the default if not set. The
   Prometheus data model can be found here:
   https://prometheus.io/docs/concepts/data_model/
    +
   The tor metrics are constantly collected and they solely consists of
   counters. Thus, asking for those metrics is very lightweight on the tor
   process. (Default: None)
    +
   As an example, here only 5.6.7.8 will be allowed to connect:

       MetricsPort 1.2.3.4:9035
       MetricsPortPolicy accept 5.6.7.8

[[MetricsPortPolicy]] **MetricsPortPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
   Set an entrance policy for the **MetricsPort**, to limit who can access
   it. The policies have the same form as exit policies below, except that
   port specifiers are ignored. For multiple entries, this line can be used
   multiple times. It is a reject all by default policy.  (Default: None)
    +
   Please, keep in mind here that if the server collecting metrics on the
   MetricsPort is behind a NAT, then everything behind it can access it. This
   is similar for the case of allowing localhost, every users on the server
   will be able to access it. Again, strongly consider using a tool like
   stunnel to secure the link or to strengthen access control.

[[NoExec]] **NoExec** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 1, then Tor will never launch another
   executable, regardless of the settings of ClientTransportPlugin
   or ServerTransportPlugin.  Once this option has been set to 1,
   it cannot be set back to 0 without restarting Tor. (Default: 0)

[[OutboundBindAddress]] **OutboundBindAddress** __IP__::
   Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
   is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
   of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This option may
   be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6 address.
   IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
   This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses
   (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1), and is not used for DNS requests as well.

[[OutboundBindAddressExit]] **OutboundBindAddressExit** __IP__::
   Make all outbound exit connections originate from the IP address
   specified. This option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the
   same IP version. This option may be used twice, once with an IPv4
   address and once with an IPv6 address.
   IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
   This setting will be ignored
   for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).

[[OutboundBindAddressOR]] **OutboundBindAddressOR** __IP__::
   Make all outbound non-exit (relay and other) connections
   originate from the IP address specified. This option overrides
   **OutboundBindAddress** for the same IP version. This option may
   be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6
   address. IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.
   This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback
   addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).

[[OwningControllerProcess]] **{dbl_}OwningControllerProcess** __PID__::
   Make Tor instance periodically check for presence of a controller process
   with given PID and terminate itself if this process is no longer alive.
   Polling interval is 15 seconds.

[[PerConnBWBurst]] **PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwburst" consensus
   field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
   from a non-relay. (Default: 0)

[[PerConnBWRate]] **PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   If this option is set manually, or via the "perconnbwrate" consensus
   field, Tor will use it for separate rate limiting for each connection
   from a non-relay. (Default: 0)

[[OutboundBindAddressPT]] **OutboundBindAddressPT** __IP__::
   Request that pluggable transports makes all outbound connections
   originate from the IP address specified. Because outgoing connections
   are handled by the pluggable transport itself, it is not possible for
   Tor to enforce whether the pluggable transport honors this option. This
   option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the same IP version. This
   option may be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an
   IPv6 address. IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets. This
   setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses
   (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).

[[PidFile]] **PidFile** __FILE__::
   On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
   FILE. Can not be changed while tor is running.

[[ProtocolWarnings]] **ProtocolWarnings** **0**|**1**::
   If 1, Tor will log with severity \'warn' various cases of other parties not
   following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
   \'info'. (Default: 0)

[[RelayBandwidthBurst]] **RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
   \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
   They do not include directory fetches by the relay (from authority
   or other relays), because that is considered "client" activity. (Default: 0)
   RelayBandwidthBurst defaults to the value of RelayBandwidthRate if unset.

[[RelayBandwidthRate]] **RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
   usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
   per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
   Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
   requests, but that may change in future versions. They do not include directory
   fetches by the relay (from authority or other relays), because that is considered
   "client" activity.  (Default: 0)
   RelayBandwidthRate defaults to the value of RelayBandwidthBurst if unset.

[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,
   that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't
   changed for a given amount of time.  (Default: 24 hours)

[[RunAsDaemon]] **RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
   If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
   on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
   Can not be changed while tor is running.
   (Default: 0)

[[SafeLogging]] **SafeLogging** **0**|**1**|**relay**::
   Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
   addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
   still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying
   information about what sites a user might have visited. +
    +
   If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
   set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
   relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but
   all messages generated when acting as a client are not.
   Note: Tor may not heed this option when logging at log levels more
   verbose than Notice.
   (Default: 1)

[[Sandbox]] **Sandbox** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will run securely through the use of a syscall sandbox.
   Otherwise the sandbox will be disabled. The option only works on
   Linux-based operating systems, and only when Tor has been built with the
   libseccomp library.  Note that this option may be incompatible with some
   versions of libc, and some kernel versions.  This option can not be
   changed while tor is running. +
    +
   When the **Sandbox** is 1, the following options can not be changed when tor
   is running:
   **Address**,
   **ConnLimit**,
   **CookieAuthFile**,
   **DirPortFrontPage**,
   **ExtORPortCookieAuthFile**,
   **Logs**,
   **ServerDNSResolvConfFile**,
   **ClientOnionAuthDir** (and any files in it won't reload on HUP signal). +
    +
   Launching new Onion Services through the control port is not supported
   with current syscall sandboxing implementation. +
    +
   Tor must remain in client or server mode (some changes to **ClientOnly**
   and **ORPort** are not allowed). Currently, if **Sandbox** is 1,
   **ControlPort** command "GETINFO address" will not work. +
    +
   When using %include in the tor configuration files, reloading the tor
   configuration is not supported after adding new configuration files or
   directories. +
    +
   (Default: 0)

[[Schedulers]] **Schedulers** **KIST**|**KISTLite**|**Vanilla**::
   Specify the scheduler type that tor should use. The scheduler is
   responsible for moving data around within a Tor process. This is an ordered
   list by priority which means that the first value will be tried first and if
   unavailable, the second one is tried and so on. It is possible to change
   these values at runtime. This option mostly effects relays, and most
   operators should leave it set to its default value.
   (Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla) +
    +
   The possible scheduler types are:
    +
   **KIST**: Kernel-Informed Socket Transport. Tor will use TCP information
   from the kernel to make informed decisions regarding how much data to send
   and when to send it. KIST also handles traffic in batches (see
   <<KISTSchedRunInterval,KISTSchedRunInterval>>) in order to improve traffic prioritization decisions.
   As implemented, KIST will only work on Linux kernel version 2.6.39 or
   higher. +
    +
   **KISTLite**: Same as KIST but without kernel support. Tor will use all
   the same mechanics as with KIST, including the batching, but its decisions
   regarding how much data to send will not be as good. KISTLite will work on
   all kernels and operating systems, and the majority of the benefits of KIST
   are still realized with KISTLite. +
    +
   **Vanilla**: The scheduler that Tor used before KIST was implemented. It
   sends as much data as possible, as soon as possible. Vanilla will work on
   all kernels and operating systems.

// Out of order because it logically belongs near the Schedulers option
[[KISTSchedRunInterval]] **KISTSchedRunInterval** __NUM__ **msec**::
   If KIST or KISTLite is used in the Schedulers option, this controls at which
   interval the scheduler tick is. If the value is 0 msec, the value is taken
   from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the default 10
   msec. Maximum possible value is 100 msec. (Default: 0 msec)

// Out of order because it logically belongs near the Schedulers option
[[KISTSockBufSizeFactor]] **KISTSockBufSizeFactor** __NUM__::
   If KIST is used in Schedulers, this is a multiplier of the per-socket
   limit calculation of the KIST algorithm. (Default: 1.0)

[[Socks4Proxy]] **Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
   Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
   (or host:1080 if port is not specified).

[[Socks5Proxy]] **Socks5Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
   Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
   (or host:1080 if port is not specified).

// Out of order because Username logically precedes Password
[[Socks5ProxyUsername]] **Socks5ProxyUsername** __username__ +

[[Socks5ProxyPassword]] **Socks5ProxyPassword** __password__::
   If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
   in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and
   255 characters.

[[SyslogIdentityTag]] **SyslogIdentityTag** __tag__::
   When logging to syslog, adds a tag to the syslog identity such that
   log entries are marked with "Tor-__tag__". Can not be changed while tor is
   running. (Default: none)

[[TCPProxy]] **TCPProxy** __protocol__ __host__:__port__::
   Tor will use the given protocol to make all its OR (SSL) connections through
   a TCP proxy on host:port, rather than connecting directly to servers. You may
   want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict the set of ports you might try to
   connect to, if your proxy only allows connecting to certain ports. There is no
   equivalent option for directory connections, because all Tor client versions
   that support this option download directory documents via OR connections. +
+
   The only protocol supported right now is 'haproxy'. This option is only for
   clients. (Default: none) +
+
   The HAProxy version 1 proxy protocol is described in detail at
   https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt +
+
   Both source IP address and source port will be set to zero.

[[TruncateLogFile]] **TruncateLogFile** **0**|**1**::
   If 1, Tor will overwrite logs at startup and in response to a HUP signal,
   instead of appending to them. (Default: 0)

[[UnixSocksGroupWritable]] **UnixSocksGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
   write unix sockets (e.g. SocksPort unix:). If the option is set to 1, make
   the Unix socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)

[[UseDefaultFallbackDirs]] **UseDefaultFallbackDirs** **0**|**1**::
   Use Tor's default hard-coded FallbackDirs (if any). (When a
   FallbackDir line is present, it replaces the hard-coded FallbackDirs,
   regardless of the value of UseDefaultFallbackDirs.) (Default: 1)

[[User]] **User** __Username__::
   On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
   Can not be changed while tor is running.

== CLIENT OPTIONS

// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
// Please keep them that way!

The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
**SocksPort**, **HTTPTunnelPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or
**NATDPort** is non-zero):

[[AllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
   characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
   resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
   (Default: 0)

[[AutomapHostsOnResolve]] **AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
   that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
   unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
   This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
   resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0)

[[AutomapHostsSuffixes]] **AutomapHostsSuffixes** __SUFFIX__,__SUFFIX__,__...__::
   A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with **AutomapHostsOnResolve**.
   The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).

[[Bridge]] **Bridge** [__transport__] __IP__:__ORPort__ [__fingerprint__]::
   When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
   "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
   is provided (using the same format as for DirAuthority), we will verify that
   the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
   fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
   it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.  +
    +
   If "transport" is provided, it must match a ClientTransportPlugin line. We
   then use that pluggable transport's proxy to transfer data to the bridge,
   rather than connecting to the bridge directly. Some transports use a
   transport-specific method to work out the remote address to connect to.
   These transports typically ignore the "IP:ORPort" specified in the bridge
   line.  +
    +
   Tor passes any "key=val" settings to the pluggable transport proxy as
   per-connection arguments when connecting to the bridge.  Consult
   the documentation of the pluggable transport for details of what
   arguments it supports.

[[CircuitPadding]] **CircuitPadding** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 0, Tor will not pad client circuits with additional cover
   traffic. Only clients may set this option. This option should be offered
   via the UI to mobile users for use where bandwidth may be expensive. If
   set to 1, padding will be negotiated as per the consensus and relay
   support (unlike ConnectionPadding, CircuitPadding cannot be force-enabled).
   (Default: 1)

// Out of order because it logically belongs after CircuitPadding
[[ReducedCircuitPadding]] **ReducedCircuitPadding** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will only use circuit padding algorithms that have low
   overhead. Only clients may set this option. This option should be offered
   via the UI to mobile users for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
   (Default: 0)

[[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
   if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
   live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
   directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by (potentially concurrent)
   connection attempts, unlike other schedules, which are advanced by
   connection failures. (Default: 6)

[[ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
   if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
   live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
   from a list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
   (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
   which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)

[[ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
   directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
   usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
   list of fallback directory mirrors. This schedule is advanced by
   (potentially concurrent) connection attempts, unlike other schedules,
   which are advanced by connection failures. (Default: 0)

[[ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries]] **ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries** __NUM__::
   Try this many simultaneous connections to download a consensus before
   waiting for one to complete, timeout, or error out. (Default: 3)

[[ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
   If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
   tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
   192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; it
   is not allowed to be set on the default network. (Default: 1)

[[ClientOnionAuthDir]] **ClientOnionAuthDir** __path__::
   Path to the directory containing v3 hidden service authorization files.
   Each file is for a single onion address, and the files MUST have the suffix
   ".auth_private" (i.e. "bob_onion.auth_private"). The content format MUST be:
    +
     <onion-address>:descriptor:x25519:<base32-encoded-privkey>
    +
   The <onion-address> MUST NOT have the ".onion" suffix. The
   <base32-encoded-privkey> is the base32 representation of the raw key bytes
   only (32 bytes for x25519). See Appendix G in the rend-spec-v3.txt file of
   https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec] for more information.

[[ClientOnly]] **ClientOnly** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will not run as a relay or serve
   directory requests, even if the ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort options are
   set. (This config option is
   mostly unnecessary: we added it back when we were considering having
   Tor clients auto-promote themselves to being relays if they were stable
   and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a client
   unless ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort are configured.) (Default: 0)

[[ClientPreferIPv6DirPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6DirPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers a directory port with an IPv6
   address over one with IPv4, for direct connections, if a given directory
   server has both. (Tor also prefers an IPv6 DirPort if IPv4Client is set to
   0.) If this option is set to auto, clients prefer IPv4. Other things may
   influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6.
   (Default: auto)  (DEPRECATED: This option has had no effect for some
   time.)

[[ClientPreferIPv6ORPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with an IPv6
   address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. (Tor also
   prefers an IPv6 ORPort if IPv4Client is set to 0.) If this option is set
   to auto, Tor bridge clients prefer the configured bridge address, and
   other clients prefer IPv4. Other things may influence the choice. This
   option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6. (Default: auto)

[[ClientRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
   If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal
   address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) __unless an exit node is
   specifically requested__ (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
   controller request).  If true, multicast DNS hostnames for machines on the
   local network (of the form *.local) are also rejected.  (Default: 1)

[[ClientUseIPv4]] **ClientUseIPv4** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 0, Tor will avoid connecting to directory servers
   and entry nodes over IPv4. Note that clients with an IPv4
   address in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transport line will try
   connecting over IPv4 even if **ClientUseIPv4** is set to 0. (Default: 1)

[[ClientUseIPv6]] **ClientUseIPv6** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to directory servers or
   entry nodes over IPv6. For IPv6 only hosts, you need to also set
   **ClientUseIPv4** to 0 to disable IPv4. Note that clients configured with
   an IPv6 address in a **Bridge**, proxy, or pluggable transportline will
   try connecting over IPv6 even if **ClientUseIPv6** is set to 0. (Default: 1)

[[ConnectionPadding]] **ConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   This option governs Tor's use of padding to defend against some forms of
   traffic analysis. If it is set to 'auto', Tor will send padding only
   if both the client and the relay support it. If it is set to 0, Tor will
   not send any padding cells. If it is set to 1, Tor will still send padding
   for client connections regardless of relay support. Only clients may set
   this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
   for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
   (Default: auto)

// Out of order because it logically belongs after ConnectionPadding
[[ReducedConnectionPadding]] **ReducedConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will not not hold OR connections open for very long,
   and will send less padding on these connections. Only clients may set
   this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
   for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0)

[[DNSPort]] **DNSPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
   If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve
   them anonymously.  This port only handles A, AAAA, and PTR requests---it
   doesn't handle arbitrary DNS request types. Set the port to "auto" to
   have Tor pick a port for
   you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
   addresses/ports. See <<SocksPort,SocksPort>> for an explanation of isolation
   flags. (Default: 0)

[[DownloadExtraInfo]] **DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
   If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
   contain information about servers other than the information in their
   regular server descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
   itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0)

[[EnforceDistinctSubnets]] **EnforceDistinctSubnets** **0**|**1**::
   If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
   the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
   the same /16 range. (Default: 1)

[[FascistFirewall]] **FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
   If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
   that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see <<FirewallPorts,FirewallPorts>>).
   This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
   restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
   a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
   ReachableAddresses instead.

[[FirewallPorts]] **FirewallPorts** __PORTS__::
   A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
   **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
   instead. (Default: 80, 443)

[[HTTPTunnelPort]] **HTTPTunnelPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
   Open this port to listen for proxy connections using the "HTTP CONNECT"
   protocol instead of SOCKS. Set this to
   0 if you don't want to allow "HTTP CONNECT" connections. Set the port
   to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
   specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. If multiple
   entries of this option are present in your configuration file, Tor will
   perform stream isolation between listeners by default. See
   <<SocksPort,SocksPort>> for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0)

[[LongLivedPorts]] **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
   A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
   (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
   ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
   will go down before the stream is finished. Note that the list is also
   honored for circuits (both client and service side) involving hidden
   services whose virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706,
   1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)

[[MapAddress]] **MapAddress** __address__ __newaddress__::
   When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will transform to newaddress
   before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
   www.example.com to exit via __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the
   fingerprint of the server), use "MapAddress www.example.com
   www.example.com.torserver.exit". If the value is prefixed with a
   "\*.", matches an entire domain. For example, if you
   always want connections to example.com and any if its subdomains
   to exit via
   __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the fingerprint of the server), use
   "MapAddress \*.example.com \*.example.com.torserver.exit". (Note the
   leading "*." in each part of the directive.) You can also redirect all
   subdomains of a domain to a single address. For example, "MapAddress
   *.example.com www.example.com". If the specified exit is not available,
   or the exit can not connect to the site, Tor will fail any connections
   to the mapped address.+
    +
   NOTES:

   1. When evaluating MapAddress expressions Tor stops when it hits the most
   recently added expression that matches the requested address. So if you
   have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to
   198.51.100.1:

    MapAddress www.torproject.org 192.0.2.1
    MapAddress www.torproject.org 198.51.100.1

   2. Tor evaluates the MapAddress configuration until it finds no matches. So
   if you have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to
   203.0.113.1:

     MapAddress 198.51.100.1 203.0.113.1
     MapAddress www.torproject.org 198.51.100.1

   3. The following MapAddress expression is invalid (and will be
   ignored) because you cannot map from a specific address to a wildcard
   address:

     MapAddress www.torproject.org *.torproject.org.torserver.exit

   4. Using a wildcard to match only part of a string (as in *ample.com) is
   also invalid.

   5. Tor maps hostnames and IP addresses separately. If you MapAddress
      a DNS name, but use an IP address to connect, then Tor will ignore the
      DNS name mapping.

   6. MapAddress does not apply to redirects in the application protocol.
      For example, HTTP redirects and alt-svc headers will ignore mappings
      for the original address. You can use a wildcard mapping to handle
      redirects within the same site.

[[MaxCircuitDirtiness]] **MaxCircuitDirtiness** __NUM__::
   Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
   but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old.  For hidden
   services, this applies to the __last__ time a circuit was used, not the
   first. Circuits with streams constructed with SOCKS authentication via
   SocksPorts that have **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth** also remain alive
   for MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds after carrying the last such stream.
   (Default: 10 minutes)

[[MaxClientCircuitsPending]] **MaxClientCircuitsPending** __NUM__::
   Do not allow more than NUM circuits to be pending at a time for handling
   client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun constructing it,
   but it has not yet been completely constructed.  (Default: 32)

[[NATDPort]] **NATDPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
   Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as
   included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol.
   Use 0 if you don't want to allow NATD connections.  Set the port
   to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
   specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.  If multiple
   entries of this option are present in your configuration file, Tor will
   perform stream isolation between listeners by default. See
   <<SocksPort,SocksPort>> for an explanation of isolation flags. +
    +
   This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)

[[NewCircuitPeriod]] **NewCircuitPeriod** __NUM__::
   Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
   seconds)

// These are out of order because they logically belong together
[[PathBiasCircThreshold]] **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasDropGuards]] **PathBiasDropGuards** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasExtremeRate]] **PathBiasExtremeRate** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasNoticeRate]] **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasWarnRate]] **PathBiasWarnRate** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasScaleThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__::
   These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
   experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
   misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
   fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. +
    +
   The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build
   through a guard before we make these checks.  The PathBiasNoticeRate,
   PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of
   circuits must succeed through a guard so we won't write log messages.
   If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards
   is set to 1, we disable use of that guard. +
    +
   When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold
   circuits through a guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by
   the consensus) so that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. +
    +
   By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
   Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
   If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
   .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.

// These are out of order because they logically belong together
[[PathBiasUseThreshold]] **PathBiasUseThreshold** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasNoticeUseRate]] **PathBiasNoticeUseRate** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasExtremeUseRate]] **PathBiasExtremeUseRate** __NUM__ +

[[PathBiasScaleUseThreshold]] **PathBiasScaleUseThreshold** __NUM__::
   Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
   of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. +
    +
   Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
   building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
   only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage
   are not counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
   successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
   well-formed responses to RELAY cells. +
    +
   By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
   Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
   If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
   .60, and 100, respectively.

[[PathsNeededToBuildCircuits]] **PathsNeededToBuildCircuits** __NUM__::
   Tor clients don't build circuits for user traffic until they know
   about enough of the network so that they could potentially construct
   enough of the possible paths through the network. If this option
   is set to a fraction between 0.25 and 0.95, Tor won't build circuits
   until it has enough descriptors or microdescriptors to construct
   that fraction of possible paths. Note that setting this option too low
   can make your Tor client less anonymous, and setting it too high can
   prevent your Tor client from bootstrapping.  If this option is negative,
   Tor will use a default value chosen by the directory authorities. If the
   directory authorities do not choose a value, Tor will default to 0.6.
   (Default: -1)

[[ReachableAddresses]] **ReachableAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
   A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
   you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
   that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
   example, \'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
   \*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
   99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
   80 otherwise. (Default: \'accept \*:*'.)

[[ReachableDirAddresses]] **ReachableDirAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
   Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
   these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
   GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
   **ReachableAddresses** is used. If **HTTPProxy** is set then these
   connections will go through that proxy.   (DEPRECATED: This option has
   had no effect for some time.)

[[ReachableORAddresses]] **ReachableORAddresses** __IP__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
   Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
   these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
   set explicitly then the value of **ReachableAddresses** is used. If
   **HTTPSProxy** is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +
    +
   The separation between **ReachableORAddresses** and
   **ReachableDirAddresses** is only interesting when you are connecting
   through proxies (see <<HTTPProxy,HTTPProxy>> and <<HTTPSProxy,HTTPSProxy>>). Most proxies limit
   TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
   and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
   information) to port 80.

[[SafeSocks]] **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
   use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
   address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
   Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
   (Default: 0)

// Out of order because it logically belongs after SafeSocks
[[TestSocks]] **TestSocks** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
   each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
   safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see <<SafeSocks,SafeSocks>>). This
   helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
   DNS requests. (Default: 0)

// Out of order because it logically belongs with SafeSocks
[[WarnPlaintextPorts]] **WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
   Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
   connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
   to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
   23,109,110,143)

// Out of order because it logically belongs with SafeSocks
[[RejectPlaintextPorts]] **RejectPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
   Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
   will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None)

[[SocksPolicy]] **SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
   Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
   SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
   policies below, except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address
   not matched by some entry in the policy is accepted.

[[SocksPort]] **SocksPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**unix:**__path__|**auto** [_flags_] [_isolation flags_]::
   Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
   applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
   connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
   you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
   to multiple addresses/ports. If a unix domain socket is used, you may
   quote the path using standard C escape sequences. Most flags are off by
   default, except where specified. Flags that are on by default can be
   disabled by putting "No" before the flag name.
   (Default: 9050) +
    +
       NOTE: Although this option allows you to specify an IP address
       other than localhost, you should do so only with extreme caution.
       The SOCKS protocol is unencrypted and (as we use it)
       unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way could leak your
       information to anybody watching your network, and allow anybody
       to use your computer as an open proxy. +
    +
   If multiple entries of this option are present in your configuration
   file, Tor will perform stream isolation between listeners by default.
   The _isolation flags_ arguments give Tor rules for which streams
   received on this SocksPort are allowed to share circuits with one
   another.  Recognized isolation flags are:
   **IsolateClientAddr**;;
       Don't share circuits with streams from a different
       client address.  (On by default and strongly recommended when
       supported; you can disable it with **NoIsolateClientAddr**.
       Unsupported and force-disabled when using Unix domain sockets.)
   **IsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
       Don't share circuits with streams for which different
       SOCKS authentication was provided. (For HTTPTunnelPort
       connections, this option looks at the Proxy-Authorization and
       X-Tor-Stream-Isolation headers. On by default;
       you can disable it with **NoIsolateSOCKSAuth**.)
   **IsolateClientProtocol**;;
       Don't share circuits with streams using a different protocol.
       (SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, HTTPTunnelPort connections, TransPort connections,
       NATDPort connections, and DNSPort requests are all considered to be
       different protocols.)
   **IsolateDestPort**;;
       Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
       destination port.
   **IsolateDestAddr**;;
       Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
       destination address.
   **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
       If **IsolateSOCKSAuth** is enabled, keep alive circuits while they have
       at least one stream with SOCKS authentication active. After such a
       circuit is idle for more than MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds, it can be
       closed.
   **SessionGroup=**__INT__;;
       If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams
       on this port to share circuits with streams from every other
       port with the same session group.  (By default, streams received
       on different SocksPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one
       another. This option overrides that behavior.)

// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
[[OtherSocksPortFlags]]::
   Other recognized __flags__ for a SocksPort are:
   **NoIPv4Traffic**;;
       Tell exits to not connect to IPv4 addresses in response to SOCKS
       requests on this connection.
   **IPv6Traffic**;;
       Tell exits to allow IPv6 addresses in response to SOCKS requests on
       this connection, so long as SOCKS5 is in use.  (SOCKS4 can't handle
       IPv6.)
   **PreferIPv6**;;
       Tells exits that, if a host has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address,
       we would prefer to connect to it via IPv6. (IPv4 is the default.)
   **NoDNSRequest**;;
       Do not ask exits to resolve DNS addresses in SOCKS5 requests. Tor will
       connect to IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses (if IPv6Traffic is set) and
       .onion addresses.
   **NoOnionTraffic**;;
       Do not connect to .onion addresses in SOCKS5 requests.
   **OnionTrafficOnly**;;
       Tell the tor client to only connect to .onion addresses in response to
       SOCKS5 requests on this connection. This is equivalent to NoDNSRequest,
       NoIPv4Traffic, NoIPv6Traffic. The corresponding NoOnionTrafficOnly
       flag is not supported.
   **CacheIPv4DNS**;;
       Tells the client to remember IPv4 DNS answers we receive from exit
       nodes via this connection.
   **CacheIPv6DNS**;;
       Tells the client to remember IPv6 DNS answers we receive from exit
       nodes via this connection.
   **GroupWritable**;;
       Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
       group-writable.
   **WorldWritable**;;
       Unix domain sockets only: makes the socket get created as
       world-writable.
   **CacheDNS**;;
       Tells the client to remember all DNS answers we receive from exit
       nodes via this connection.
   **UseIPv4Cache**;;
       Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we have when making
       requests via this connection. (NOTE: This option, or UseIPv6Cache
       or UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably
       won't help performance as much as you might expect. Use with care!)
   **UseIPv6Cache**;;
       Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we have when making
       requests via this connection.
   **UseDNSCache**;;
       Tells the client to use any cached DNS answers we have when making
       requests via this connection.
   **NoPreferIPv6Automap**;;
       When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that
       should get automapped (according to AutomapHostsOnResolve),
       if we could return either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer
       an IPv4 answer. (Tor prefers IPv6 by default.)
   **PreferSOCKSNoAuth**;;
       Ordinarily, when an application offers both "username/password
       authentication" and "no authentication" to Tor via SOCKS5, Tor
       selects username/password authentication so that IsolateSOCKSAuth can
       work.  This can confuse some applications, if they offer a
       username/password combination then get confused when asked for
       one. You can disable this behavior, so that Tor will select "No
       authentication" when IsolateSOCKSAuth is disabled, or when this
       option is set.
   **ExtendedErrors**;;
       Return extended error code in the SOCKS reply. So far, the possible
       errors are:

         X'F0' Onion Service Descriptor Can Not be Found

           The requested onion service descriptor can't be found on the
           hashring and thus not reachable by the client. (v3 only)

         X'F1' Onion Service Descriptor Is Invalid

           The requested onion service descriptor can't be parsed or
           signature validation failed. (v3 only)

         X'F2' Onion Service Introduction Failed

           All introduction attempts failed either due to a combination of
           NACK by the intro point or time out. (v3 only)

         X'F3' Onion Service Rendezvous Failed

           Every rendezvous circuit has timed out and thus the client is
           unable to rendezvous with the service. (v3 only)

         X'F4' Onion Service Missing Client Authorization

           Client was able to download the requested onion service descriptor
           but is unable to decrypt its content because it is missing client
           authorization information. (v3 only)

         X'F5' Onion Service Wrong Client Authorization

           Client was able to download the requested onion service descriptor
           but is unable to decrypt its content using the client
           authorization information it has. This means the client access
           were revoked. (v3 only)

         X'F6' Onion Service Invalid Address

           The given .onion address is invalid. In one of these cases this
           error is returned: address checksum doesn't match, ed25519 public
           key is invalid or the encoding is invalid. (v3 only)

         X'F7' Onion Service Introduction Timed Out

           Similar to X'F2' code but in this case, all introduction attempts
           have failed due to a time out. (v3 only)

// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
[[SocksPortFlagsMisc]]::
   Flags are processed left to right. If flags conflict, the last flag on the
   line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for
   conflicting flags.

[[TokenBucketRefillInterval]] **TokenBucketRefillInterval** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
   Set the refill delay interval of Tor's token bucket to NUM milliseconds.
   NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive.  When Tor is out of bandwidth,
   on a connection or globally, it will wait up to this long before it tries
   to use that connection again.
   Note that bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes per second: this
   option only affects the frequency with which Tor checks to see whether
   previously exhausted connections may read again.
   Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 100 msec)

[[TrackHostExits]] **TrackHostExits** __host__,__.domain__,__...__::
   For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
   connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
   exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a \'.\', it is treated as
   matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a \'.', it means
   match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
   that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
   your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
   of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
   user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
   through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.

[[TrackHostExitsExpire]] **TrackHostExitsExpire** __NUM__::
   Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
   association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
   1800 seconds (30 minutes).

[[TransPort]] **TransPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
   Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections.  Set this to
   0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections.  Set the port
   to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
   specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. If multiple
   entries of this option are present in your configuration file, Tor will
   perform stream isolation between listeners by default.  See
   <<SocksPort,SocksPort>> for an explanation of isolation flags. +
    +
   TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
   Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
   a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
   default setting. (Default: 0)

[[TransProxyType]] **TransProxyType** **default**|**TPROXY**|**ipfw**|**pf-divert**::
   TransProxyType may only be enabled when there is transparent proxy listener
   enabled. +
    +
   Set this to "TPROXY" if you wish to be able to use the TPROXY Linux module
   to transparently proxy connections that are configured using the TransPort
   option. Detailed information on how to configure the TPROXY
   feature can be found in the Linux kernel source tree in the file
   Documentation/networking/tproxy.txt. +
    +
   Set this option to "ipfw" to use the FreeBSD ipfw interface. +
    +
   On *BSD operating systems when using pf, set this to "pf-divert" to take
   advantage of +divert-to+ rules, which do not modify the packets like
   +rdr-to+ rules do. Detailed information on how to configure pf to use
   +divert-to+ rules can be found in the pf.conf(5) manual page. On OpenBSD,
   +divert-to+ is available to use on versions greater than or equal to
   OpenBSD 4.4. +
    +
   Set this to "default", or leave it unconfigured, to use regular IPTables
   on Linux, or to use pf +rdr-to+ rules on *BSD systems. +
    +
   (Default: "default")

[[UpdateBridgesFromAuthority]] **UpdateBridgesFromAuthority** **0**|**1**::
   When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
   from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
   a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)

[[UseBridges]] **UseBridges** **0**|**1**::
   When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
   config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
   guards. (Default: 0)

[[UseEntryGuards]] **UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
   to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
   increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
   fraction of your paths. Entry Guards can not be used by Directory
   Authorities or Single Onion Services. In these cases,
   this option is ignored. (Default: 1)

[[UseGuardFraction]] **UseGuardFraction** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   This option specifies whether clients should use the
   guardfraction information found in the consensus during path
   selection. If it's set to 'auto', clients will do what the
   UseGuardFraction consensus parameter tells them to do. (Default: auto)

//Out of order because it logically belongs after the UseEntryGuards option
[[GuardLifetime]] **GuardLifetime**  __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
   If UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard on our guard list
   before  picking a new one.  If less than one day, we use defaults from the
   consensus directory.  (Default: 0)

//Out of order because it logically belongs after the UseEntryGuards option
[[NumDirectoryGuards]] **NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__::
   If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we try to make sure we have at least NUM
   routers to use as directory guards. If this option is set to 0, use the
   value from the guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
   default to 3 if the consensus parameter isn't set.  (Default: 0)

//Out of order because it logically belongs after the UseEntryGuards option
[[NumEntryGuards]] **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
   If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
   as long-term entries for our circuits. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the
   number from the guard-n-primary-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
   default to 1 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)

//Out of order because it logically belongs after the UseEntryGuards option
[[NumPrimaryGuards]] **NumPrimaryGuards** __NUM__::
   If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick NUM routers for our
   primary guard list, which is the set of routers we strongly prefer when
   connecting to the Tor network. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the number from
   the guard-n-primary-guards consensus parameter, and default to 3 if the
   consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)

[[VanguardsLiteEnabled]] **VanguardsLiteEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   This option specifies whether clients should use the vanguards-lite
   subsystem to protect against guard discovery attacks. If it's set to
   'auto', clients will do what the vanguards-lite-enabled consensus parameter
   tells them to do, and will default to enable the subsystem if the consensus
   parameter isn't set. (Default: auto)

[[UseMicrodescriptors]] **UseMicrodescriptors** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information that Tor needs
   in order to build its circuits.  Using microdescriptors makes Tor clients
   download less directory information, thus saving bandwidth.  Directory
   caches need to fetch regular descriptors and microdescriptors, so this
   option doesn't save any bandwidth for them.  For legacy reasons, auto is
   accepted, but it has the same effect as 1. (Default: auto)

[[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __IPv4Address__/__bits__ +

[[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__IPv6Address__]/__bits__::
   When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS
   command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor
   picks an unassigned address from this range. (Defaults:
   127.192.0.0/10 and [FE80::]/10 respectively.) +
    +
   When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
   like dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to "10.192.0.0/10" or
   "172.16.0.0/12" and change the IPv6 network to "[FC00::]/7".
   The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address ranges on a
   properly configured machine will route to the loopback or link-local
   interface. The maximum number of bits for the network prefix is set to 104
   for IPv6 and 16 for IPv4. However, a larger network
   (that is, one with a smaller prefix length)
   is preferable, since it reduces the chances for an attacker to guess the
   used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting
   is needed.

== CIRCUIT TIMEOUT OPTIONS

// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
// Please keep them that way!

The following options are useful for configuring timeouts related
to building Tor circuits and using them:

[[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__::
   Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for
   this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept
   open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each
   of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely
   idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
   connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized
   from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes;
   Max: 24 hours)

// Out of order because it logically belongs before the CircuitBuildTimeout option
[[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
   If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)

[[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
   Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
   open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this
   value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If
   LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
   (Default: 60 seconds)

[[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
   If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
   many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
   If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
   number like 60. (Default: 0)

[[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
   Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
   unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
   2 minutes)

== DORMANT MODE OPTIONS

// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
// Please keep them that way!

Tor can enter dormant mode to conserve power and network bandwidth.
The following options control when Tor enters and leaves dormant mode:

[[DormantCanceledByStartup]] **DormantCanceledByStartup** **0**|**1**::
   By default, Tor starts in active mode if it was active the last time
   it was shut down, and in dormant mode if it was dormant.  But if
   this option is true, Tor treats every startup event as user
   activity, and Tor will never start in Dormant mode, even if it has
   been unused for a long time on previous runs. (Default: 0)
    +
   Note: Packagers and application developers should change the value of
   this option only with great caution: it has the potential to
   create spurious traffic on the network.  This option should only
   be used if Tor is started by an affirmative user activity (like
   clicking on an application or running a command), and not if Tor
   is launched for some other reason (for example, by a startup
   process, or by an application that launches itself on every login.)

[[DormantClientTimeout]] **DormantClientTimeout**  __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   If Tor spends this much time without any client activity,
   enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and
   directory information is not fetched.
   Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes.
   (Default: 24 hours)

[[DormantOnFirstStartup]] **DormantOnFirstStartup** **0**|**1**::
   If true, then the first time Tor starts up with a fresh DataDirectory,
   it starts in dormant mode, and takes no actions until the user has made
   a request.  (This mode is recommended if installing a Tor client for a
   user who might not actually use it.)  If false, Tor bootstraps the first
   time it is started, whether it sees a user request or not.
    +
   After the first time Tor starts, it begins in dormant mode if it was
   dormant before, and not otherwise. (Default: 0)

[[DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams]] **DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams**  **0**|**1**::
   If true, then any open client stream (even one not reading or writing)
   counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout.
   If false, then only network activity counts. (Default: 1)

[[DormantTimeoutEnabled]] **DormantTimeoutEnabled** **0**|**1**::
   If false, then no amount of time without activity is sufficient to
   make Tor go dormant.  Setting this option to zero is only recommended for
   special-purpose applications that need to use the Tor binary for
   something other than sending or receiving Tor traffic. (Default: 1)

== NODE SELECTION OPTIONS

// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
// Please keep them that way!

The following options restrict the nodes that a tor client
(or onion service) can use while building a circuit.
These options can weaken your anonymity by making your client behavior
different from other Tor clients:

[[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
   to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.
   Normal circuits include all
   circuits except for direct connections to directory servers.  The Bridge
   option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
   UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
    +
   This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
   spliced together. +
    +
   The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
   EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
   <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more information on how to specify nodes.

[[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
   patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
   2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must
   be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign.
   (Example:
   ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
    +
   This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
   spliced together. +
    +
   By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
   to override in order to keep working.
   For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
   but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
   Tor will connect to one of them anyway.  If you do not want this
   behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below).  +
    +
   Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
   options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
   Clients can still build circuits through you to any node.  Controllers
   can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. +
    +
   Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose
   country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if
   no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the <<GeoIPExcludeUnknown,GeoIPExcludeUnknown>> option below.

// Out of order because it logically belongs after the ExcludeNodes option
[[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
   patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
   node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network.   Note that any
   node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
   list too.  See
   <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more information on how to specify
   nodes. See also the caveats on the <<ExitNodes,ExitNodes>> option below.
    +
   This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
   spliced together. +
    +
[[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
   patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
   node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network.  See
   <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more information on how to specify nodes. +
    +
   This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
   spliced together. +
    +
   Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
   nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality.  For example,
   if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
   be able to browse the web. +
    +
   Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of
   the Tor network.  It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
   used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
   those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end
   at a non-exit node.  To
   keep a node from being used entirely, see <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> and <<StrictNodes,StrictNodes>>. +
    +
   The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
   ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
    +
   The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides
   this option.

[[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in
   ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and
   possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to
   '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes
   and ExcludeExitNodes.  This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't
   configured or can't be found.  (Default: auto)

[[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
   address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
   second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits.
   This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
   and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
   to discover your primary guard node.
   (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.)
    +
   (Example:
   HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
    +
   This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
   spliced together. +
    +
   When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will
   look like:
    +
       C - G - L2 - M - Rend +
       C - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
       C - G - L2 - M - Intro +
       S - G - L2 - M - Rend +
       S - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
       S - G - L2 - M - Intro +
    +
   where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
   L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
   Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
   option.
    +
   This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create
   paths of the form:
    +
       C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
       C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
       C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
       S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
       S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
       S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
    +
   ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes,
   which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
   picked.
    +
   When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
   and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
   circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
   as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
   is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
   about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
   in the path.
    +
   This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
   https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
   updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
   balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
   HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
   Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.

[[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
   address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
   third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits.
   This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
   and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
   to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes.
   (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.)
    +
   (Example:
   HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
    +
   This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
   spliced together. +
    +
   When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths
   will look like: +
       C - G - M - L3 - Rend +
       C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir +
       C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro +
       S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend +
       S - G - M - L3 - HSDir +
       S - G - M - L3 - Intro +
   where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
   L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
   Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
   option.
    +
   While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be
   combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form:
    +
       C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
       C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
       C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
       S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
       S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
       S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
    +
   ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes,
   which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
   picked.
    +
   When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
   and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
   circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
   as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
   is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
   about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
   in the path.
 +
   This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
   https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
   updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
   balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
   HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
   Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.

[[MiddleNodes]] **MiddleNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
   to use for "middle" hops in your normal circuits.
   Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections
   to directory servers. Middle hops are all hops other than exit and entry.
    +
   This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
   spliced together. +
    +
   This is an **experimental** feature that is meant to be used by researchers
   and developers to test new features in the Tor network safely. Using it
   without care will strongly influence your anonymity. Other tor features may
   not work with MiddleNodes. This feature might get removed in the future.
+
   The HSLayer2Node and HSLayer3Node options override this option for onion
   service circuits, if they are set. The vanguards addon will read this
   option, and if set, it will set HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes to nodes
   from this set.
+
   The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
   MiddleNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
   the <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more information on how to specify nodes.

[[NodeFamily]] **NodeFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints,
   constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
   any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
   when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
   can be used multiple times; each instance defines a separate family.  In
   addition to nodes, you can also list IP address and ranges and country
   codes in {curly braces}. See <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more
   information on how to specify nodes.

[[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
   If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option
   as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if
   doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes does not apply to
   ExcludeExitNodes, ExitNodes, MiddleNodes, or MapAddress).  If StrictNodes
   is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list,
   but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors.
   Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded
   node when it is *necessary* to perform relay reachability self-tests,
   connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client,
   fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download
   directory information.  (Default: 0)

[[server-options]]
== SERVER OPTIONS

// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
// Please keep them that way!

The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
is non-zero):

[[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period
   using a given calculation rule (see <<AccountingStart,AccountingStart>> and <<AccountingRule,AccountingRule>>).
   Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the
   number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or
   received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 TByte, a server
   could send 900 GBytes and receive 800 GBytes and continue running.
   It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 TByte. This can
   be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting
   the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the
   number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
   and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate
   until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers
   from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point
   in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
   enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since
   it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some
   of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
   always "available". +
    +
   Note that (as also described in the Bandwidth section) Tor uses
   powers of two, not powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024, not
   one billion. Be careful: some internet service providers might count
   GBytes differently.

[[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**::
   How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we
   should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate
   using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the
   default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent
   plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the
   received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes.
   (Default: max)

[[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
   Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given,
   each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
   month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed,
   use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The
   day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period
   runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day
   and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day**
   is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the
   same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time.
   (Default: "month 1 0:00")

[[Address]] **Address** __address__::
   The address of this server, or a fully qualified domain name of this server
   that resolves to an address.  You can leave this unset, and Tor will try to
   guess your address.  If a domain name is provided, Tor will attempt to
   resolve it and use the underlying IPv4/IPv6 address as its publish address
   (taking precedence over the ORPort configuration). The publish address is
   the one used to tell clients and other servers where to find your Tor
   server; it doesn't affect the address that your server binds to.  To bind
   to a different address, use the ORPort and OutboundBindAddress options.

[[AddressDisableIPv6]] **AddressDisableIPv6** **0**|**1**::
  By default, Tor will attempt to find the IPv6 of the relay if there is no
  IPv4Only ORPort. If set, this option disables IPv6 auto discovery. This
  disables IPv6 address resolution, IPv6 ORPorts, and IPv6 reachability
  checks. Also, the relay won't publish an IPv6 ORPort in its
  descriptor. (Default: 0)

[[AssumeReachable]] **AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
   This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
   don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
   immediately. (Default: 0)

[[AssumeReachableIPv6]] **AssumeReachableIPv6** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   Like **AssumeReachable**, but affects only the relay's own IPv6 ORPort.
   If this value is set to "auto", then Tor will look at **AssumeReachable**
   instead. (Default: auto)

[[BridgeRelay]] **BridgeRelay** **0**|**1**::
   Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
   from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a
   server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than
   to the public directory authorities. +
    +
   Note: make sure that no MyFamily lines are present in your torrc when
   relay is configured in bridge mode.

//Out of order because it logically belongs after BridgeRelay.
[[BridgeDistribution]] **BridgeDistribution** __string__::
   If set along with BridgeRelay, Tor will include a new line in its
   bridge descriptor which indicates to the BridgeDB service how it
   would like its bridge address to be given out. Set it to "none" if
   you want BridgeDB to avoid distributing your bridge address, or "any" to
   let BridgeDB decide.  See https://bridges.torproject.org/info for a more
   up-to-date list of options. (Default: any)

[[ContactInfo]] **ContactInfo** __email_address__::
   Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
   can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
   something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
   descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
   spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact
   that it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this
   purpose. +
    +
   ContactInfo **must** be set to a working address if you run more than one
   relay or bridge.  (Really, everybody running a relay or bridge should set
   it.)

[[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**::
   This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices
   that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default,
   since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections
   more than it should. (Default: 1)

[[ExitPolicy]] **ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
   Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
   "**accept[6]**|**reject[6]**  __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]". If /__MASK__ is
   omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
   a host or network you can also use "\*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0
   and ::/0), or \*4 to denote all IPv4 addresses, and \*6 to denote all IPv6
   addresses.
   __PORT__ can be a single port number, an interval of ports
   "__FROM_PORT__-__TO_PORT__", or "\*". If __PORT__ is omitted, that means
   "\*". +
    +
   For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:\*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:\*,accept \*:\*" would
   reject any IPv4 traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
   any other IPv4 or IPv6 traffic. +
    +
   Tor also allows IPv6 exit policy entries. For instance, "reject6 [FC00::]/7:\*"
   rejects all destinations that share 7 most significant bit prefix with
   address FC00::. Respectively, "accept6 [C000::]/3:\*" accepts all destinations
   that share 3 most significant bit prefix with address C000::. +
    +
   accept6 and reject6 only produce IPv6 exit policy entries. Using an IPv4
   address with accept6 or reject6 is ignored and generates a warning.
   accept/reject allows either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. Use \*4 as an IPv4
   wildcard address, and \*6 as an IPv6 wildcard address. accept/reject *
   expands to matching IPv4 and IPv6 wildcard address rules. +
    +
   To specify all IPv4 and IPv6 internal and link-local networks (including
   0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8,
   172.16.0.0/12, [::]/8, [FC00::]/7, [FE80::]/10, [FEC0::]/10, [FF00::]/8,
   and [::]/127), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
   ("private" always produces rules for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, even when
   used with accept6/reject6.) +
    +
   Private addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
   policy), along with any configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
   These private addresses are rejected unless you set the
   ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done
   that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
   internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:\*", though that
   may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
   public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
   about internal and reserved IP address space. See
   <<ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces,ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces>> if you want to block every address on the
   relay, even those that aren't advertised in the descriptor. +
    +
   This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it
   all on one line. +
    +
   Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
   want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules using
   accept/reject \*. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and IPv6,
   write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 \*6, and your IPv4 rules using
   accept/reject \*4. If you want to \_replace_ the default exit policy, end
   your exit policy with either a reject \*:* or an accept \*:*. Otherwise,
   you're \_augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. +
    +
   If you want to use a reduced exit policy rather than the default exit
   policy, set "ReducedExitPolicy 1". If you want to _replace_ the default
   exit policy with your custom exit policy, end your exit policy with either
   a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending
   to) the default or reduced exit policy. +
    +
   The default exit policy is:

      reject *:25
      reject *:119
      reject *:135-139
      reject *:445
      reject *:563
      reject *:1214
      reject *:4661-4666
      reject *:6346-6429
      reject *:6699
      reject *:6881-6999
      accept *:*

// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
[[ExitPolicyDefault]]::
   Since the default exit policy uses accept/reject *, it applies to both
   IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.

[[ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces]] **ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces** **0**|**1**::
   Reject all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that the relay knows about, at the
   beginning of your exit policy. This includes any OutboundBindAddress, the
   bind addresses of any port options, such as ControlPort or DNSPort, and any
   public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay. (If IPv6Exit
   is not set, all IPv6 addresses will be rejected anyway.)
   See above entry on <<ExitPolicy,ExitPolicy>>.
   This option is off by default, because it lists all public relay IP
   addresses in the ExitPolicy, even those relay operators might prefer not
   to disclose.
   (Default: 0)

[[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
   Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised
   public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy.
   See above entry on <<ExitPolicy,ExitPolicy>>.
   (Default: 1)

[[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay.  If Tor is running as a
   non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to
   exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option,
   or the default ExitPolicy (if no other exit policy option is specified). +
    +
   If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to exit, and the
   ExitPolicy, ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options are ignored. +
    +
   If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor checks the ExitPolicy,
   ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options. If at least one of these options
   is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 1. If none of these exit
   policy options are set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 0.
   (Default: auto)

[[ReevaluateExitPolicy]] **ReevaluateExitPolicy** **0**|**1**::
   If set, reevaluate the exit policy on existing connections when reloading
   configuration. +
    +
   When the exit policy of an exit node change while reloading configuration,
   connections made prior to this change could violate the new policy. By
   setting this to 1, Tor will check if such connections exist, and mark them
   for termination.
   (Default: 0)

[[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost,
   RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR
   connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private
   addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and
   pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this
   option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off.
   (Default: 0)

[[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__::
   A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.

[[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__::
   A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.

[[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod**  __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
   a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
   server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
   to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30
   minutes. (Default: 6 hours)

[[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**::
   If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 traffic.
   When this option is set and ExitRelay is auto, we act as if ExitRelay
   is 1. (Default: 0)

[[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__::
   Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
   running.
   (Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.)

[[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
   KeyDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable
   by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the
   setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the KeyDirectory is the
   same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto)

[[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**::
   Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log
   level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's
   main event loop. (Default: 0)

[[MaxHSDirCacheBytes]] **MaxHSDirCacheBytes** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**::
   This option configures a threshold of Hidden Service Directory memory
   consumption above which your Tor relay will begin to prune the least-frequently
   accessed hidden service descriptors from the relay's HSDir cache.
   If set to 0, this will default to 20% of MaxMemInQueues. (Default: 0) +
    +
   This pruning used to be done as part of MaxMemInQueues, but it has been
   decoupled to allow more fine-grained control of descriptor cache size under
   DDoS conditions.

[[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues**  __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**::
   This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it
   needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of
   memory.  If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until
   it has recovered at least 10% of this memory.  Do not set this option too
   low, or your relay may be unreliable under load.  This option only
   affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than
   this.  If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable
   default based on your system's physical memory.  (Default: 0)

[[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
   If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in
   this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec)

[[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...::
   Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or
   organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by
   their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints.
   This option can be repeated many times, for
   convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily
   lines are merged into one list.
   When two relays both declare that they are in the
   same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each
   relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to
   list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would
   compromise its concealment. +
    +
   If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay
   **must** list all other relays, as described above. +
    +
   Note: do not use MyFamily when configuring your Tor instance as a
   bridge.

[[FamilyId]] **FamilyId** __ident__::
   Configure this relay to be part of a family
   identified by a shared secret family key with the given key identity.
   A corresponding family key must be stored in the relay's key directory,
   with a filename ending with ".secret\_family\_key".
   This option can appear multiple times.
   Family keys are generated with "--keygen-family";
   this also generates the value you should use in the __ident__ field
   in a file ending with ".public\_family\_id".
   For information on generating and installing a family
   key, see https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/post-install/family-ids/
     +
   In the future, this will be the preferred way for relays
   to advertise family membership.
   But for now, relay families should configure
   both this option _and_ MyFamily, so older clients
   will still recognize the relays' family membership.
     +
   (Note that if the seccomp2 Sandbox feature is enabled,
   it is not possible to change the key filenames while Tor is running.)

[[FamilyIdStar]] **FamilyId** ** * **::
   Configure this relay to be part of _every_ family
   identified by any family ID key found in the family key directory.
   Only filenames ending with ".secret\_family\_key" are considered.
   Specifying family IDs in this way makes it unnecessary to adjust the
   configuration file if the family key is rotated,
   but it increases the likelihood of accidentally using a different
   set of family keys than the ones you had expected.

[[FamilyKeyDirectory]] **FamilyKeyDirectory** __directory__:
   Configure a directory to use, in place of the key directory,
   when searching for family ID keys.

[[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__::
   Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
   characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
   If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified
   by their identity fingerprints.

[[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__::
   How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other
   parallelizable operations.  If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect
   how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell.  (Default: 0)

[[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**::
   If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret
   key.  Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent
   ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary
   signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0)

[[ORPort]] **ORPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
   Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and
   servers.  This option is required to be a Tor server.
   Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not
   run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) +
    +
   Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
   **NoAdvertise**;;
       By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
       NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway.  This
       can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for
       example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else.
   **NoListen**;;
       By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
       NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway.  This
       can be useful if something else  (for example, a firewall's port
       forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
   **IPv4Only**;;
       If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
       address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
   **IPv6Only**;;
       If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
       address, only listen to the IPv6 address.

// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
[[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]::
   For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
   IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.

[[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**::
   This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
   a relay. You can
   choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +
    +
   If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
   descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing
   out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
   directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its
   descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which
   means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the
   appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning
   "publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as
   if you're a bridge".

[[ReducedExitPolicy]] **ReducedExitPolicy** **0**|**1**::
   If set, use a reduced exit policy rather than the default one. +
    +
   The reduced exit policy is an alternative to the default exit policy. It
   allows as many Internet services as possible while still blocking the
   majority of TCP ports. Currently, the policy allows approximately 65 ports.
   This reduces the odds that your node will be used for peer-to-peer
   applications. +
    +
   The reduced exit policy is:

       accept *:20-21
       accept *:22
       accept *:23
       accept *:43
       accept *:53
       accept *:79
       accept *:80-81
       accept *:88
       accept *:110
       accept *:143
       accept *:194
       accept *:220
       accept *:389
       accept *:443
       accept *:464
       accept *:465
       accept *:531
       accept *:543-544
       accept *:554
       accept *:563
       accept *:587
       accept *:636
       accept *:706
       accept *:749
       accept *:873
       accept *:902-904
       accept *:981
       accept *:989-990
       accept *:991
       accept *:992
       accept *:993
       accept *:994
       accept *:995
       accept *:1194
       accept *:1220
       accept *:1293
       accept *:1500
       accept *:1533
       accept *:1677
       accept *:1723
       accept *:1755
       accept *:1863
       accept *:2082
       accept *:2083
       accept *:2086-2087
       accept *:2095-2096
       accept *:2102-2104
       accept *:3128
       accept *:3389
       accept *:3690
       accept *:4321
       accept *:4643
       accept *:5050
       accept *:5190
       accept *:5222-5223
       accept *:5228
       accept *:5900
       accept *:6660-6669
       accept *:6679
       accept *:6697
       accept *:8000
       accept *:8008
       accept *:8074
       accept *:8080
       accept *:8082
       accept *:8087-8088
       accept *:8232-8233
       accept *:8332-8333
       accept *:8443
       accept *:8888
       accept *:9418
       accept *:9999
       accept *:10000
       accept *:11371
       accept *:19294
       accept *:19638
       accept *:50002
       accept *:64738
       reject *:*

   (Default: 0)

[[RefuseUnknownExits]] **RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this
   relay.  If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such
   nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do
   whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus
   is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto)

[[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
   parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
   Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
   it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)

[[ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
   containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
   exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
   URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
   on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)

[[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
   whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
   requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
   correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
   on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)

[[ServerDNSRandomizeCase]] **ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
   outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
   This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
   For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
   0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
   does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)

[[ServerDNSResolvConfFile]] **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
   Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
   __filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
   "**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
   only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
   (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration or a localhost DNS service
   in case no nameservers are found in a given configuration.)

[[ServerDNSSearchDomains]] **ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
   For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
   "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
   connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
   your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)

[[ServerDNSTestAddresses]] **ServerDNSTestAddresses** __hostname__,__hostname__,__...__::
   When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
   aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
   and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject \*:*". This option only affects
   name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default:
   "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")

[[ServerTransportListenAddr]] **ServerTransportListenAddr** __transport__ __IP__:__PORT__::
   When this option is set, Tor will suggest __IP__:__PORT__ as the
   listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to
   launch __transport__. (IPv4 addresses should written as-is; IPv6
   addresses should be wrapped in square brackets.) (Default: none)

[[ServerTransportOptions]] **ServerTransportOptions** __transport__ __k=v__ __k=v__ ...::
   When this option is set, Tor will pass the __k=v__ parameters to
   any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch __transport__. +
   (Example: ServerTransportOptions obfs45 shared-secret=bridgepasswd cache=/var/lib/tor/cache) (Default: none)

[[ServerTransportPlugin]] **ServerTransportPlugin** __transport__ exec __path-to-binary__ [options]::
   The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in __path-to-binary__
   using __options__ as its command-line options, and expects to receive
   proxied client traffic from it. (Default: none)

[[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
   When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
   we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
   seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.
   (Default: 30 seconds)

[[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
   For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid?  Tor uses a
   permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically
   generates new "signing" keys that it uses online.  This option
   configures their lifetime.
   (Default: 30 days)

[[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake,
   set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose
   some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0)

== STATISTICS OPTIONS

// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
// Please keep them that way!

Relays publish most statistics in a document called the
extra-info document. The following options affect the different
types of statistics that Tor relays collect and publish:

[[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
   GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client
   addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
   which countries have blocked access to it. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
   enabled, it will be published as part of the extra-info document.
   (Default: 1)

[[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   Relays only.
   When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics about cell
   processing (i.e. mean time a cell is spending in a queue, mean
   number of cells in a queue and mean number of processed cells per
   circuit) and writes them into disk every 24 hours. Onion router
   operators may use the statistics for performance monitoring.
   If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
   the extra-info document. (Default: 0)

[[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   Relays only.
   When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of
   traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24
   hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is
   being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
   enabled, it will be published as part of the extra-info document.
   (Default: 0)

[[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   Relays and bridges only.
   When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the
   number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24
   hours. Enables relay and bridge operators to monitor how much their
   server is being used by clients to learn about Tor network.
   If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
   the extra-info document. (Default: 1)

[[EntryStatistics]] **EntryStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   Relays only.
   When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
   directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Enables relay
   operators to monitor how much inbound traffic that originates from
   Tor clients passes through their server to go further down the
   Tor network. If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
   as part of the extra-info document. (Default: 0)

[[ExitPortStatistics]] **ExitPortStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   Exit relays only.
   When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
   relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours.
   Enables exit relay operators to measure and monitor amounts of traffic
   that leaves Tor network through their exit node. If ExtraInfoStatistics
   is enabled, it will be published as part of the extra-info document.
   (Default: 0)

[[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
   its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
   Disabling this option also removes bandwidth usage statistics, and
   GeoIPFile and GeoIPv6File hashes from the extra-info file. Bridge
   ServerTransportPlugin lines are always included in the extra-info file,
   because they are required by BridgeDB.
   (Default: 1)

[[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   Relays and bridges only.
   When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated
   statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction
   point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours.  If ExtraInfoStatistics
   is enabled, it will be published as part of the extra-info document.
   (Default: 1)

[[OverloadStatistics]] **OverloadStatistics** *0**|**1**::
   Relays and bridges only.
   When this option is enabled, a Tor relay will write an overload general
   line in the server descriptor if the relay is considered overloaded.
   (Default: 1)
    +
   A relay is considered overloaded if at least one of these conditions is
   met:
       - A certain ratio of ntor onionskins are dropped.
       - The OOM was invoked.
       - TCP Port exhaustion.

    +
   If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it can also put two more specific
   overload lines in the extra-info document if at least one of these
   conditions is met:
       - Connection rate limits have been reached (read and write side).
       - File descriptors are exhausted.

[[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
   Relays and bridges only.
   When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
   sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
   These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
   information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
   If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
   as a part of the extra-info document. (Default: 1)

== DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS

The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with
enough bandwidth automatically become directory servers; see <<DirCache,DirCache>> for
details.)

[[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except
   extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If
   **DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached.
   Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients
   connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay
   and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported.  (Default: 1)

[[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
   Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
   directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above,
   except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by
   some entry in the policy is accepted.

[[DirPort]] **DirPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
   If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port.
   Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you.  This option can occur
   more than once, but only one advertised DirPort is supported: all
   but one DirPort must have the **NoAdvertise** flag set. (Default: 0) +
    +
   The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort. This port can
   only be IPv4.
    +
   As of Tor 0.4.6.1-alpha, non-authoritative relays (see
   AuthoritativeDirectory) will not publish the DirPort but will still listen
   on it. Clients don't use the DirPorts on relays, so it is safe for you
   to remove the DirPort from your torrc configuration.

[[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
   When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
   the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
   to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
   contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html.

[[MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs]] **MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs**  __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate
   consensus diffs for any consensus older than this amount of time.
   If this option is set to zero, Tor will pick a reasonable default from
   the current networkstatus document.  You should not set this
   option unless your cache is severely low on disk space or CPU.
   If you need to set it, keeping it above 3 or 4 hours will help clients
   much more than setting it to zero.
   (Default: 0)


== DENIAL OF SERVICE MITIGATION OPTIONS

Tor has a series of built-in denial of service mitigation options that can be
individually enabled/disabled and fine-tuned, but by default Tor directory
authorities will define reasonable values for the network and no explicit
configuration is required to make use of these protections.

The following is a series of configuration options for relays and then options
for onion services and how they work.

The mitigations take place at relays, and are as follows:

 1. If a single client address makes too many concurrent connections (this is
    configurable via DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount), hang up on further
    connections.
    +
 2. If a single client IP address (v4 or v6) makes circuits too quickly
    (default values are more than 3 per second, with an allowed burst of 90,
    see <<DoSCircuitCreationRate,DoSCircuitCreationRate>> and
    <<DoSCircuitCreationBurst,DoSCircuitCreationBurst>>) while also having
    too many connections open (default is 3, see
    <<DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections,DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections>>),
    tor will refuse any new circuit (CREATE
    cells) for the next while (random value between 1 and 2 hours).
    +
 3. If a client asks to establish a rendezvous point to you directly (ex:
    Tor2Web client), ignore the request.

These defenses can be manually controlled by torrc options, but relays will
also take guidance from consensus parameters using these same names, so there's
no need to configure anything manually. In doubt, do not change those values.

The values set by the consensus, if any, can be found here:
https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#consensusparams

If any of the DoS mitigations are enabled, a heartbeat message will appear in
your log at NOTICE level which looks like:

   DoS mitigation since startup: 429042 circuits rejected, 17 marked addresses.
   2238 connections closed. 8052 single hop clients refused.

The following options are useful only for a public relay. They control the
Denial of Service mitigation subsystem described above.

//Out of order because it logically belongs before the other DoSCircuitCreation options.
[[DoSCircuitCreationEnabled]] **DoSCircuitCreationEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::

   Enable circuit creation DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), tor will
   cache client IPs along with statistics in order to detect circuit DoS
   attacks. If an address is positively identified, tor will activate
   defenses against the address. See <<DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType,DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType>>
    option for more details.  This is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means
   use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
   (Default: auto)

[[DoSCircuitCreationBurst]] **DoSCircuitCreationBurst** __NUM__::

   The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit
   rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit
   creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
   consensus, the value is 90.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::

   The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for. The
   actual value is selected randomly for each activation from N+1 to 3/2 * N.
   "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
   the value is 3600 seconds (1 hour).
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType** __NUM__::

   This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address. The
   possible values are:
    +
     1: No defense.
    +
     2: Refuse circuit creation for the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod period of time.
    +
   "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections]] **DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections** __NUM__::

   Minimum threshold of concurrent connections before a client address can be
   flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client
   address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent
   connections, a detection is positive. "0" means use the consensus
   parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSCircuitCreationRate]] **DoSCircuitCreationRate** __NUM__::

   The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP
   address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. If not
   defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
   (Default: 0)

//out of order because it logically belongs before the other DoSConnection options.
[[DoSConnectionEnabled]] **DoSConnectionEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::

   Enable the connection DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), for client
   address only, this allows tor to mitigate against large number of
   concurrent connections made by a single IP address. "auto" means use the
   consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
   (Default: auto)

[[DoSConnectionDefenseType]] **DoSConnectionDefenseType** __NUM__::

   This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address for the
   connection mitigation. The possible values are:
    +
     1: No defense.
    +
     2: Immediately close new connections.
    +
   "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount]] **DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount** __NUM__::

   The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address.
   Above this limit, a defense selected by DoSConnectionDefenseType is
   applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
   consensus, the value is 100.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSConnectionConnectRate]] **DoSConnectionConnectRate** __NUM__::

   The allowed rate of client connection from a single address per second.
   Coupled with the burst (see below), if the limit is reached, the address
   is marked and a defense is applied (DoSConnectionDefenseType) for a period
   of time defined by DoSConnectionConnectDefenseTimePeriod. If not defined
   or set to 0, it is controlled by a consensus parameter.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSConnectionConnectBurst]] **DoSConnectionConnectBurst** __NUM__::

   The allowed burst of client connection from a single address per second.
   See the DoSConnectionConnectRate for more details on this detection. If
   not defined or set to 0, it is controlled by a consensus parameter.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSConnectionConnectDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSConnectionConnectDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::

   The base time period in seconds that the client connection defense is
   activated for. The actual value is selected randomly for each activation
   from N+1 to 3/2 * N. If not defined or set to 0, it is controlled by a
   consensus parameter.
   (Default: 24 hours)

[[DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous]] **DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous** **0**|**1**|**auto**::

   Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. In other
   words, if a client directly connects to the relay and sends an
   ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, it is silently dropped. "auto" means use the
   consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
   (Default: auto)

The following options are useful only for a exit relay.

[[DoSStreamCreationEnabled]] **DoSStreamCreationEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::

   Enable the stream DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled), tor will apply
   rate limit on the creation of new streams and dns requests per circuit.
   "auto" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
   the value is 0. (Default: auto)

[[DoSStreamCreationDefenseType]] **DoSStreamCreationDefenseType** __NUM__::

   This is the type of defense applied to a detected circuit or stream for the
   stream mitigation. The possible values are:
    +
     1: No defense.
    +
     2: Reject the stream or resolve request.
    +
     3: Close the circuit creating too many streams.
    +
   "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2.
   (Default: 0)

[[DoSStreamCreationRate]] **DoSStreamCreationRate** __NUM__::

   The allowed rate of stream creation from a single circuit per second. Coupled
   with the burst (see below), if the limit is reached, actions can be taken
   against the stream or circuit (DoSStreamCreationDefenseType). If not defined or
   set to 0, it is controlled by a consensus parameter. If not defined in the
   consensus, the value is 100. (Default: 0)

[[DoSStreamCreationBurst]] **DoSStreamCreationBurst** __NUM__::

   The allowed burst of stream creation from a circuit per second.
   See the DoSStreamCreationRate for more details on this detection. If
   not defined or set to 0, it is controlled by a consensus parameter. If not
   defined in the consensus, the value is 300. (Default: 0)


For onion services, mitigations are a work in progress and multiple options
are currently available.

The introduction point defense is a rate limit on the number of introduction
requests that will be forwarded to a service by each of its honest
introduction point routers. This can prevent some types of overwhelming floods
from reaching the service, but it will also prevent legitimate clients from
establishing new connections.

The following options are per onion service:

[[HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense]] **HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense** **0**|**1**::
   Enable DoS defense at the intropoint level. When this is enabled, the
   rate and burst parameter (see below) will be sent to the intro point which
   will then use them to apply rate limiting for introduction request to this
   service.
 +
   The introduction point honors the consensus parameters except if this is
   specifically set by the service operator using this option. The service
   never looks at the consensus parameters in order to enable or disable this
   defense. (Default: 0)

//Out of order because it logically belongs after HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense.
[[HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec]] **HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec** __NUM__::
   The allowed client introduction burst per second at the introduction
   point. If this option is 0, it is considered infinite and thus if
   **HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense** is set, it then effectively
   disables the defenses. (Default: 200)

[[HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec]] **HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec** __NUM__::
   The allowed client introduction rate per second at the introduction
   point. If this option is 0, it is considered infinite and thus if
   **HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense** is set, it then effectively
   disables the defenses. (Default: 25)

The rate is the maximum number of clients a service will ask its introduction
points to allow every seconds. And the burst is a parameter that allows that
many within one second.

For example, the default values of 25 and 200 respectively means that for every
introduction points a service has (default 3 but can be configured with
**HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints**), 25 clients per seconds will be allowed
to reach the service and 200 at most within 1 second as a burst. This means
that if 200 clients are seen within 1 second, it will take 8 seconds (200/25)
for another client to be able to be allowed to introduce due to the rate of 25
per second.

This might be too much for your use case or not, fine tuning these values is
hard and are likely different for each service operator.

Why is this not helping reachability of the service? Because the defenses are
at the introduction point, an attacker can easily flood all introduction point
rendering the service unavailable due to no client being able to pass through.
But, the service itself is not overwhelmed with connections allowing it to
function properly for the few clients that were able to go through or other any
services running on the same tor instance.

The bottom line is that this protects the network by preventing an onion
service to flood the network with new rendezvous circuits that is reducing load
on the network.

A secondary mitigation is available, based on prioritized dispatch of rendezvous
circuits for new connections. The queue is ordered based on effort a client
chooses to spend at computing a proof-of-work function.

The following options are per onion service:

[[HiddenServicePoWDefensesEnabled]] **HiddenServicePoWDefensesEnabled** **0**|**1**::

   Enable proof-of-work based service DoS mitigation. If set to 1 (enabled),
   tor will include parameters for an optional client puzzle in the encrypted
   portion of this hidden service's descriptor. Incoming rendezvous requests
   will be prioritized based on the amount of effort a client chooses to make
   when computing a solution to the puzzle. The service will periodically update
   a suggested amount of effort, based on attack load, and disable the puzzle
   entirely when the service is not overloaded.
   (Default: 0)

[[HiddenServicePoWQueueRate]] **HiddenServicePoWQueueRate** __NUM__::

   The sustained rate of rendezvous requests to dispatch per second from
   the priority queue. Has no effect when proof-of-work is disabled.
   If this is set to 0 there's no explicit limit and we will process
   requests as quickly as possible.
   (Default: 250)

[[HiddenServicePoWQueueBurst]] **HiddenServicePoWQueueBurst** __NUM__::

   The maximum burst size for rendezvous requests handled from the
   priority queue at once. (Default: 2500)

These options are applicable to both onion services and their clients:

[[CompiledProofOfWorkHash]] **CompiledProofOfWorkHash** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
   When proof-of-work DoS mitigation is active, both the services themselves
   and the clients which connect will use a dynamically generated hash
   function as part of the puzzle computation.
    +
   If this option is set to 1, puzzles will only be solved and verified using
   the compiled implementation (about 20x faster) and we choose to fail rather
   than using a slower fallback. If it's 0, the compiler will never be used.
   By default, the compiler is always tried if possible but the interpreter is
   available as a fallback. (Default: auto)

See also <<opt-list-modules,`--list-modules`>>, these proof of work options
have no effect unless the "`pow`" module is enabled at compile time.

== DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS

The following options enable operation as a directory authority, and
control how Tor behaves as a directory authority.  You should not need
to adjust any of them if you're running a regular relay or exit server
on the public Tor network.

// Out of order because it logically belongs first in this section
[[AuthoritativeDirectory]] **AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
   server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
   good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
   already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
   to set this option.

//Out of order because it belongs with the AuthoritativeDirectory option.
[[BridgeAuthoritativeDir]] **BridgeAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
   accepts and serves server descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
   networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)

//Out of order because it belongs with the AuthoritativeDirectory option.
[[V3AuthoritativeDirectory]] **V3AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
   generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
   described in dir-spec.txt file of https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec]
   (for Tor clients and servers running at least 0.2.0.x).

[[AuthDirBadExit]] **AuthDirBadExit** __AddressPattern...__::
   Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
   will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
   publishes, if **AuthDirListBadExits** is set. +
    +
   (The address pattern syntax here and in the options below
   is the same as for exit policies, except that you don't need to say
   "accept" or "reject", and ports are not needed.)

[[AuthDirMiddleOnly]] **AuthDirMiddleOnly** __AddressPattern...__::
   Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
   will be listed as middle-only in any network status document this authority
   publishes, if **AuthDirListMiddleOnly** is set. +

[[AuthDirFastGuarantee]] **AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the
   Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or
   more. (Default: 100 KBytes)

[[AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee]] **AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity
   or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement
   for the Guard flag. (Default: 2 MBytes)

[[AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity]] **AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity** **0**|**1**::
   Authoritative directories only. When set to 0, OR ports with an
   IPv6 address are not included in the authority's votes. When set to 1,
   IPv6 OR ports are tested for reachability like IPv4 OR ports. If the
   reachability test succeeds, the authority votes for the IPv6 ORPort, and
   votes Running for the relay. If the reachability test fails, the authority
   does not vote for the IPv6 ORPort, and does not vote Running (Default: 0)  +
+
   The content of the consensus depends on the number of voting authorities
   that set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity:

     If no authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1, there will be no
     IPv6 ORPorts in the consensus.

     If a minority of authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
     unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will be removed from the consensus. But the
     majority of IPv4-only authorities will still vote the relay as Running.
     Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus

     If a majority of voting authorities set AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1,
     relays with unreachable IPv6 ORPorts will not be listed as Running.
     Reachable IPv6 ORPort lines will be included in the consensus
     (To ensure that any valid majority will vote relays with unreachable
     IPv6 ORPorts not Running, 75% of authorities must set
     AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity 1.)

[[AuthDirInvalid]] **AuthDirInvalid** __AddressPattern...__::
   Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
   will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
   authority publishes.

[[AuthDirListBadExits]] **AuthDirListBadExits** **0**|**1**::
   Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
   opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
   1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
   effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)

[[AuthDirListMiddleOnly]] **AuthDirListMiddleOnly** **0**|**1**::
   Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
   opinion about which nodes should only be used in the middle position.
   (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list questionable relays
   as "middle only"; otherwise, you are effectively voting _against_
   middle-only status for every relay.)

[[AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr]] **AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr** __NUM__::
   Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
   list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
   (Default: 2)

[[AuthDirPinKeys]] **AuthDirPinKeys** **0**|**1**::
   Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, do not allow any relay to
   publish a descriptor if any other relay has reserved its <Ed25519,RSA>
   identity keypair. In all cases, Tor records every keypair it accepts
   in a journal if it is new, or if it differs from the most recently
   accepted pinning for one of the keys it contains. (Default: 1)

[[AuthDirReject]] **AuthDirReject** __AddressPattern__...::
   Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
   will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
   authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
   submitted for publication by this authority.

[[AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad]] **AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad** **0**|**1**::
   If set, the directory authority will start rejecting directory requests
   from non relay connections by sending a 503 error code if it is under
   bandwidth pressure (reaching the configured limit if any). Relays will
   always be answered even if this is on. (Default: 1)

//Out of order because it logically belongs with the other CCs options.
[[AuthDirBadExitCCs]] **AuthDirBadExitCCs** __CC__,... +

//Out of order because it logically belongs with the other CCs options.
[[AuthDirInvalidCCs]] **AuthDirInvalidCCs** __CC__,... +

//Out of order because it logically belongs with the other CCs options.
[[AuthDirMiddleOnlytCCs]] **AuthDirMiddleOnlyCCs** __CC__,... +

[[AuthDirRejectCCs]] **AuthDirRejectCCs** __CC__,...::
   Authoritative directories only. These options contain a comma-separated
   list of country codes such that any server in one of those country codes
   will be marked as a bad exit/invalid for use, or rejected
   entirely.

[[AuthDirSharedRandomness]] **AuthDirSharedRandomness** **0**|**1**::
   Authoritative directories only. Switch for the shared random protocol.
   If zero, the authority won't participate in the protocol. If non-zero
   (default), the flag "shared-rand-participate" is added to the authority
   vote indicating participation in the protocol. (Default: 1)

[[AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys]] **AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys**  **0**|**1**::
   Authoritative directories only. If this option is set to 0, then we treat
   relays as "Running" if their RSA key is correct when we probe them,
   regardless of their Ed25519 key. We should only ever set this option to 0
   if there is some major bug in Ed25519 link authentication that causes us
   to label all the relays as not Running.  (Default: 1)

[[AuthDirTestReachability]] **AuthDirTestReachability** **0**|**1**::
   Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, then we periodically
   check every relay we know about to see whether it is running.
   If set to 0, we vote Running for every relay, and don't perform
   these tests. (Default: 1)

[[AuthDirVoteGuard]] **AuthDirVoteGuard** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints or country codes or address patterns of
   nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their uptime and bandwidth. See
   <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more information on how to specify nodes.

[[AuthDirVoteGuardBwThresholdFraction]] **AuthDirVoteGuardBwThresholdFraction** __FRACTION__::
   The Guard flag bandwidth performance threshold fraction that is the
   fraction representing who gets the Guard flag out of all measured
   bandwidth. (Default: 0.75)

[[AuthDirVoteGuardGuaranteeTimeKnown]] **AuthDirVoteGuardGuaranteeTimeKnown** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   A relay with at least this much weighted time known can be considered
   familiar enough to be a guard. (Default: 8 days)

[[AuthDirVoteGuardGuaranteeWFU]] **AuthDirVoteGuardGuaranteeWFU** __FRACTION__::
   A level of weighted fractional uptime (WFU) is that is sufficient to be a
   Guard. (Default: 0.98)

[[AuthDirVoteStableGuaranteeMinUptime]] **AuthDirVoteStableGuaranteeMinUptime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   If a relay's uptime is at least this value, then it is always considered
   stable, regardless of the rest of the network. (Default: 30 days)

[[AuthDirVoteStableGuaranteeMTBF]] **AuthDirVoteStableGuaranteeMTBF** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   If a relay's mean time between failures (MTBF) is least this value, then
   it will always be considered stable. (Default: 5 days)

[[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__::
   If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to
   serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially
   implemented) "bridge community" design, where a community of bridge
   relay operators all use an alternate bridge directory authority,
   and their target user audience can periodically fetch the list of
   available community bridges to stay up-to-date. (Default: not set)

[[ConsensusParams]] **ConsensusParams** __STRING__::
   STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include
   in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote. This directive can be
   specified multiple times so you don't have to put it all on one line.

[[DirAllowPrivateAddresses]] **DirAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor will accept server descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
   elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
   address, it will reject the server descriptor. Additionally, Tor
   will allow exit policies for private networks to fulfill Exit flag
   requirements. (Default: 0)

[[GuardfractionFile]] **GuardfractionFile** __FILENAME__::
   V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
   guardfraction file which contains information about how long relays
   have been guards. (Default: unset)

[[MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised]] **MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised** __N__::
   A total value, in abstract bandwidth units, describing how much
   measured total bandwidth an authority should have observed on the network
   before it will treat advertised bandwidths as wholly
   unreliable. (Default: 500)

[[MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2]] **MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
   Minimum uptime of a relay to be accepted as a hidden service directory
   by directory authorities. (Default: 96 hours)

[[RecommendedClientVersions]] **RecommendedClientVersions** __STRING__::
   STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
   safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
   directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
   is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
   be set too.

[[RecommendedServerVersions]] **RecommendedServerVersions** __STRING__::
   STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
   safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
   directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
   is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
   be set too.

[[RecommendedVersions]] **RecommendedVersions** __STRING__::
   STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
   safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
   directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
   multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
   this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should be set too.

[[MinimalAcceptedServerVersion]] **MinimalAcceptedServerVersion** __STRING__::
  STRING is the oldest Tor version accepted by the directory authority for
  relays and bridge. Any older version will be rejected.
  (Default: 0.4.7.0-alpha-dev)

[[V3AuthDistDelay]] **V3AuthDistDelay** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred  delay
   between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming  it has all the
   signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
   is not the server's preferred time,  but the consensus of all preferences.
   (Default: 5 minutes)

[[V3AuthNIntervalsValid]] **V3AuthNIntervalsValid** __NUM__::
   V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
   for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
   increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
   directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
   server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
   least 2. (Default: 3)

[[V3AuthUseLegacyKey]] **V3AuthUseLegacyKey** **0**|**1**::
   If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its
   own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a
   different identity.  This feature is used to migrate directory authority
   keys in the event of a compromise.  (Default: 0)

[[V3AuthVoteDelay]] **V3AuthVoteDelay** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
   between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
   other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's
   preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5
   minutes)

[[V3AuthVotingInterval]] **V3AuthVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
   V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting
   interval. Note that voting will __actually__ happen at an interval chosen
   by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
   SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)

[[V3BandwidthsFile]] **V3BandwidthsFile** __FILENAME__::
   V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
   bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured
   bandwidth capacities. To avoid inconsistent reads, bandwidth data should
   be written to temporary file, then renamed to the configured filename.
   (Default: unset)

[[VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory]] **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
   When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
   Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
   version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
   authorities provide this service optionally. See <<RecommendedVersions,RecommendedVersions>>,
   <<RecommendedClientVersions,RecommendedClientVersions>>, and <<RecommendedServerVersions,RecommendedServerVersions>>.

== HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS

The following options are used to configure a hidden service. Some options
apply per service and some apply for the whole tor instance.

The next section describes the per service options that can only be set
**after** the **HiddenServiceDir** directive

**PER SERVICE OPTIONS:**

[[HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts]] **HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts** **0**|**1**::
  If set to 1, then connections to unrecognized ports do not cause the
  current hidden service to close rendezvous circuits. (Setting this to 0 is
  not an authorization mechanism; it is instead meant to be a mild
  inconvenience to port-scanners.) (Default: 0)

[[HiddenServiceDir]] **HiddenServiceDir** __DIRECTORY__::
   Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
   must have a separate directory. You may use this option  multiple times to
   specify multiple services. If DIRECTORY does not exist, Tor will create it.
   Please note that you cannot add new Onion Service to already running Tor
   instance if **Sandbox** is enabled.
   (Note: in current versions of Tor, if DIRECTORY is a relative path,
   it will be relative to the current
   working directory of Tor instance, not to its DataDirectory.  Do not
   rely on this behavior; it is not guaranteed to remain the same in future
   versions.)

[[HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable]] **HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set to 1, allow the filesystem group to read the
   hidden service directory and hostname file. If the option is set to 0,
   only owner is able to read the hidden service directory. (Default: 0)
   Has no effect on Windows.

[[HiddenServiceExportCircuitID]] **HiddenServiceExportCircuitID** __protocol__::
  The onion service will use the given protocol to expose the global circuit
  identifier of each inbound client circuit. The only
  protocol supported right now \'haproxy'. This option is only for v3
  services. (Default: none) +
    +
  The haproxy option works in the following way: when the feature is
  enabled, the Tor process will write a header line when a client is connecting
  to the onion service. The header will look like this: +
    +
  "PROXY TCP6 fc00:dead:beef:4dad::ffff:ffff ::1 65535 42\r\n" +
    +
  We encode the "global circuit identifier" as the last 32-bits of the first
  IPv6 address. All other values in the header can safely be ignored. You can
  compute the global circuit identifier using the following formula given the
  IPv6 address "fc00:dead:beef:4dad::AABB:CCDD": +
    +
     global_circuit_id = (0xAA << 24) + (0xBB << 16) + (0xCC << 8) + 0xDD; +
    +
  In the case above, where the last 32-bits are 0xffffffff, the global circuit
  identifier would be 4294967295. You can use this value together with Tor's
  control port to terminate particular circuits using their global
  circuit identifiers. For more information about this see control-spec.txt. +
    +
  The HAProxy version 1 protocol is described in detail at
  https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt

[[HiddenServiceOnionBalanceInstance]] **HiddenServiceOnionBalanceInstance** **0**|**1**::

  If set to 1, this onion service becomes an OnionBalance instance and will
  accept client connections destined to an OnionBalance frontend. In this
  case, Tor expects to find a file named "ob_config" inside the
  **HiddenServiceDir** directory with content:
    +
     MasterOnionAddress <frontend_onion_address>
    +
  where <frontend_onion_address> is the onion address of the OnionBalance
  frontend (e.g. wrxdvcaqpuzakbfww5sxs6r2uybczwijzfn2ezy2osaj7iox7kl7nhad.onion).


[[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__::
  The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous
  circuit. The maximum value allowed is 65535. (Setting this to 0 will allow
  an unlimited number of simultaneous streams.) (Default: 0)

[[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**::
  If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the
  offending rendezvous circuit to be torn down, as opposed to stream creation
  requests that exceed the limit being silently ignored. (Default: 0)

[[HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints]] **HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints** __NUM__::
   Number of introduction points the hidden service will have. You can't
   have more than 20. (Default: 3)

[[HiddenServicePort]] **HiddenServicePort** __VIRTPORT__ [__TARGET__]::
   Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
   option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
   recent HiddenServiceDir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
   the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You may override the target port,
   address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, addr:port, or
   **unix:**__path__.  (You can specify an IPv6 target as [addr]:port. Unix
   paths may be quoted, and may use standard C escapes.)
   You may also have multiple lines with  the same VIRTPORT: when a user
   connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be
   chosen at random. Note that address-port pairs have to be comma-separated.

[[HiddenServiceVersion]] **HiddenServiceVersion** **3**::
   A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
   service. Currently, only version 3 is supported. (Default: 3)


**PER INSTANCE OPTIONS:**

[[HiddenServiceSingleHopMode]] **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode** **0**|**1**::
   **Experimental - Non Anonymous** Hidden Services on a tor instance in
   HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct) circuits between the onion
   service server, and the introduction and rendezvous points. (Onion service
   descriptors are still posted using 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service
   directories blocking the service.)
   This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by a tor instance a
   Single Onion Service. One-hop circuits make Single Onion servers easily
   locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous. However, the fact that a
   client is accessing a Single Onion rather than a Hidden Service may be
   statistically distinguishable. +
    +
   **WARNING:** Once a hidden service directory has been used by a tor
   instance in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode, it can **NEVER** be used again for
   a hidden service. It is best practice to create a new hidden service
   directory, key, and address for each new Single Onion Service and Hidden
   Service. It is not possible to run Single Onion Services and Hidden
   Services from the same tor instance: they should be run on different
   servers with different IP addresses. +
    +
   HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be set
   to 1. Since a Single Onion service is non-anonymous, you can not configure
   a SOCKSPort on a tor instance that is running in
   **HiddenServiceSingleHopMode**. Can not be changed while tor is running.
   (Default: 0)

//Out of order because it belongs after HiddenServiceSingleHopMode.
[[HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode]] **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode** **0**|**1**::
   Makes hidden services non-anonymous on this tor instance. Allows the
   non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables direct connections in the
   server-side hidden service protocol.  If you are using this option,
   you need to disable all client-side services on your Tor instance,
   including setting SOCKSPort to "0". Can not be changed while tor is
   running. (Default: 0)

[[PublishHidServDescriptors]] **PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
   advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
   you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
   (Default: 1)

[[client-authorization]]
== CLIENT AUTHORIZATION

Service side:

 To configure client authorization on the service side, the
 "<HiddenServiceDir>/authorized_clients/" directory needs to exist. Each file
 in that directory should be suffixed with ".auth" (i.e. "alice.auth"; the
 file name is irrelevant) and its content format MUST be:

         <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>

 The supported <auth-type> are: "descriptor". The supported <key-type> are:
 "x25519". The <base32-encoded-public-key> is the base32 representation of
 the raw key bytes only (32 bytes for x25519).

 Each file MUST contain one line only. Any malformed file will be
 ignored. Client authorization will only be enabled for the service if tor
 successfully loads at least one authorization file.

 Note that once you've configured client authorization, anyone else with the
 address won't be able to access it from this point on. If no authorization is
 configured, the service will be accessible to anyone with the onion address.

 Revoking a client can be done by removing their ".auth" file, however the
 revocation will be in effect only after the tor process gets restarted or if
 a SIGHUP takes place.

Client side:

 To access a v3 onion service with client authorization as a client, make sure
 you have ClientOnionAuthDir set in your torrc. Then, in the
 <ClientOnionAuthDir> directory, create an .auth_private file for the onion
 service corresponding to this key (i.e. 'bob_onion.auth_private').  The
 contents of the <ClientOnionAuthDir>/<user>.auth_private file should look like:

     <56-char-onion-addr-without-.onion-part>:descriptor:x25519:<x25519 private key in base32>

For more information, please see https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-onion-service.html.en#ClientAuthorization .

== TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS

The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.

//Out of order because it logically belongs first in this section.
[[TestingTorNetwork]] **TestingTorNetwork** **0**|**1**::
   If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
   so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
   non-default set of DirAuthorities is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is
   running.
   (Default: 0) +

      DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
      EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
      AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
      ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay 0
      ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay 0
      ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay 0
      ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
      ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
      CountPrivateBandwidth 1
      ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
      ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1
      V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
      V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
      V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
      TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 150 seconds
      TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
      TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
      TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
      MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 minutes
      TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay 0
      TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay 0
      TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
      TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay 0
      TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay 10
      TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay 0
      TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest 5 seconds
      TestingDirConnectionMaxStall 30 seconds
      TestingEnableConnBwEvent 1
      TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 1

[[TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability]] **TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
   are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
   that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.  (Default: 30 minutes)

[[TestingAuthKeyLifetime]] **TestingAuthKeyLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
   Overrides the default lifetime for a signing Ed25519 TLS Link authentication
   key.
   (Default: 2 days)

[[TestingAuthKeySlop]] **TestingAuthKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +

[[TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for how long clients should wait before
   downloading a bridge descriptor for a new bridge.
   Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)

[[TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   How long to wait (in seconds) once clients have successfully
   downloaded a bridge descriptor, before trying another download for
   that same bridge. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork**
   is set. (Default: 10800)

[[TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses. Changing this
   requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)

[[TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download things in general. Changing this
   requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)

[[TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest]] **TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
   When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they batch
   them until they have more, or until this amount of time has passed.
   Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10
   minutes)

[[TestingDirAuthVoteExit]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and
   address patterns of nodes to vote Exit for regardless of their
   uptime, bandwidth, or exit policy. See <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>>
    for more information on how to specify nodes. +
    +
   In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
   has to be set. See <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more
   information on how to specify nodes.

[[TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
   If True (1), a node will never receive the Exit flag unless it is specified
   in the **TestingDirAuthVoteExit** list, regardless of its uptime, bandwidth,
   or exit policy. +
    +
   In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
   has to be set.

[[TestingDirAuthVoteGuard]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
   address patterns of nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their
   uptime and bandwidth. See <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more
   information on how to specify nodes. +
    +
   In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
   has to be set.

[[TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
   If True (1), a node will never receive the Guard flag unless it is specified
   in the **TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** list, regardless of its uptime and bandwidth. +
    +
   In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
   has to be set.

[[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** __node__,__node__,__...__::
   A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and
   address patterns of nodes to vote HSDir for regardless of their
   uptime and DirPort. See <<ExcludeNodes,ExcludeNodes>> for more
   information on how to specify nodes. +
    +
   In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
   must be set.

[[TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict]] **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict** **0**|**1** ::
   If True (1), a node will never receive the HSDir flag unless it is specified
   in the **TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir** list, regardless of its uptime and DirPort. +
    +
   In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork**
   has to be set.

[[TestingDirConnectionMaxStall]] **TestingDirConnectionMaxStall** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**::
   Let a directory connection stall this long before expiring it.
   Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
   5 minutes)

[[TestingEnableCellStatsEvent]] **TestingEnableCellStatsEvent** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CELL_STATS
   events.  Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
   (Default: 0)

[[TestingEnableConnBwEvent]] **TestingEnableConnBwEvent** **0**|**1**::
   If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CONN_BW
   events.  Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.
   (Default: 0)

[[TestingLinkCertLifetime]] **TestingLinkCertLifetime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**|**months**::
   Overrides the default lifetime for the certificates used to authenticate
   our X509 link cert with our ed25519 signing key.
   (Default: 2 days)

[[TestingLinkKeySlop]] **TestingLinkKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours** +

[[TestingMinExitFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinExitFlagThreshold**  __N__ **KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   Sets a lower-bound for assigning an exit flag when running as an
   authority on a testing network. Overrides the usual default lower bound
   of 4 KBytes. (Default: 0)

[[TestingMinFastFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinFastFlagThreshold** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
   Minimum value for the Fast flag.  Overrides the ordinary minimum taken
   from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0.)

[[TestingMinTimeToReportBandwidth]] **TestingMinTimeToReportBandwidth** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   Do not report our measurements for our maximum observed bandwidth for any
   time period that has lasted for less than this amount of time.
   Values over 1 day have no effect. (Default: 1 day)

[[TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download consensuses. Changing this
   requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)

[[TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay]] **TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay** __N__::
   Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download things in general. Changing this
   requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)

[[TestingSigningKeySlop]] **TestingSigningKeySlop** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   How early before the official expiration of a an Ed25519 signing key do
   we replace it and issue a new key?
   (Default: 3 hours for link and auth; 1 day for signing.)

[[TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   Like V3AuthDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
   the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
   **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)

[[TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   Like V3AuthVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
   the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
   **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)

[[TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
   consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
   **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)

[[TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset]] **TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
   Directory authorities offset voting start time by this much.
   Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0)


== NON-PERSISTENT OPTIONS

These options are not saved to the torrc file by the "SAVECONF" controller
command.  Other options of this type are documented in control-spec.txt,
section 5.4. End-users should mostly ignore them.

[[UnderscorePorts]] **{dbl_}ControlPort**, **{dbl_}DirPort**, **{dbl_}DNSPort**, **{dbl_}ExtORPort**, **{dbl_}NATDPort**, **{dbl_}ORPort**, **{dbl_}SocksPort**, **{dbl_}TransPort**::
   These underscore-prefixed options are variants of the regular Port
   options.  They behave the same, except they are not saved to the
   torrc file by the controller's SAVECONF command.


== SIGNALS

Tor catches the following signals:

[[SIGTERM]] **SIGTERM**::
   Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.

[[SIGINT]] **SIGINT**::
   Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
   slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
   (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)

[[SIGHUP]] **SIGHUP**::
   The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
   reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.

[[SIGUSR1]] **SIGUSR1**::
   Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.

[[SIGUSR2]] **SIGUSR2**::
   Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
   sending a SIGHUP.

[[SIGCHLD]] **SIGCHLD**::
   Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
   can clean up.

[[SIGPIPE]] **SIGPIPE**::
   Tor catches this signal and ignores it.

[[SIGXFSZ]] **SIGXFSZ**::
   If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.

== FILES

**`@CONFDIR@/torrc`**::
   Default location of the configuration file.

**`$HOME/.torrc`**::
   Fallback location for torrc, if @CONFDIR@/torrc is not found.

**`@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/`**::
   The tor process stores keys and other data here.

__CacheDirectory__/**`cached-certs`**::
   Contains downloaded directory key certificates that are used to verify
   authenticity of documents generated by the Tor directory authorities.

__CacheDirectory__/**`cached-consensus`** and/or **`cached-microdesc-consensus`**::
   The most recent consensus network status document we've downloaded.

__CacheDirectory__/**`cached-descriptors`** and **`cached-descriptors.new`**::
   These files contain the downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear
   more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is
   used. Lines beginning with **`@`**-signs are annotations that contain more
   information about a given router. The **`.new`** file is an append-only
   journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new
   cached-descriptors file.

__CacheDirectory__/**`cached-extrainfo`** and **`cached-extrainfo.new`**::
   Similar to **cached-descriptors**, but holds optionally-downloaded
   "extra-info" documents. Relays use these documents to send inessential
   information about statistics, bandwidth history, and network health to the
   authorities. They aren't fetched by default. See <<DownloadExtraInfo,DownloadExtraInfo>>
    for more information.

__CacheDirectory__/**`cached-microdescs`** and **`cached-microdescs.new`**::
   These files hold downloaded microdescriptors.  Lines beginning with
   **`@`**-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given
   router. The **`.new`** file is an append-only journal; when it gets too
   large, all entries are merged into a new cached-microdescs file.

__DataDirectory__/**`state`**::
   Contains a set of persistent key-value mappings. These include:
       - the current entry guards and their status.
       - the current bandwidth accounting values.
       - when the file was last written
       - what version of Tor generated the state file
       - a short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the server
         descriptors.

__DataDirectory__/**`sr-state`**::
   _Authority only_. This file is used to record information about the current
   status of the shared-random-value voting state.

__CacheDirectory__/**`diff-cache`**::
   _Directory cache only_. Holds older consensuses and diffs from oldest to
   the most recent consensus of each type compressed in various ways. Each
   file contains a set of key-value arguments describing its contents,
   followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the main file contents.

__DataDirectory__/**`bw_accounting`**::
   This file is obsolete and the data is now stored in the **`state`** file
   instead. Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period
   starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period).

__DataDirectory__/**`control_auth_cookie`**::
   This file can be used only when cookie authentication is enabled. Used for
   cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be overridden by
   the `CookieAuthFile` configuration option. Regenerated on startup. See
   control-spec.txt in https://spec.torproject.org/[torspec] for details.

__DataDirectory__/**`lock`**::
   This file is used to prevent two Tor instances from using the same data
   directory. If access to this file is locked, data directory is already in
   use by Tor.

__DataDirectory__/**`key-pinning-journal`**::
   Used by authorities. A line-based file that records mappings between
   RSA1024 and Ed25519 identity keys. Authorities enforce these mappings, so
   that once a relay has picked an Ed25519 key, stealing or factoring the
   RSA1024 key will no longer let an attacker impersonate the relay.

__KeyDirectory__/**`authority_identity_key`**::
   A v3 directory authority's master identity key, used to authenticate its
   signing key. Tor doesn't use this while it's running. The tor-gencert
   program uses this. If you're running an authority, you should keep this key
   offline, and not put it in this file.

__KeyDirectory__/**`authority_certificate`**::
   Only directory authorities use this file. A v3 directory authority's
   certificate which authenticates the authority's current vote- and
   consensus-signing key using its master identity key.

__KeyDirectory__/**`authority_signing_key`**::
   Only directory authorities use this file. A v3 directory authority's
   signing key that is used to sign votes and consensuses. Corresponds to the
   **authority_certificate** cert.

__KeyDirectory__/**`legacy_certificate`**::
   As authority_certificate; used only when `V3AuthUseLegacyKey` is set.  See
   documentation for <<V3AuthUseLegacyKey,V3AuthUseLegacyKey>>.

__KeyDirectory__/**`legacy_signing_key`**::
   As authority_signing_key: used only when `V3AuthUseLegacyKey` is set.  See
   documentation for <<V3AuthUseLegacyKey,V3AuthUseLegacyKey>>.

__KeyDirectory__/**`secret_id_key`**::
   A relay's RSA1024 permanent identity key, including private and public
   components. Used to sign router descriptors, and to sign other keys.

__KeyDirectory__/**`ed25519_master_id_public_key`**::
   The public part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key.

__KeyDirectory__/**`ed25519_master_id_secret_key`**::
   The private part of a relay's Ed25519 permanent identity key.  This key is
   used to sign the medium-term ed25519 signing key.  This file can be kept
   offline or encrypted. If so, Tor will not be able to generate new signing
   keys automatically; you'll need to use `tor --keygen` to do so.

__KeyDirectory__/**`ed25519_signing_secret_key`**::
   The private and public components of a relay's medium-term Ed25519 signing
   key. This key is authenticated by the Ed25519 master key, which in turn
   authenticates other keys (and router descriptors).

__KeyDirectory__/**`ed25519_signing_cert`**::
   The certificate which authenticates "ed25519_signing_secret_key" as having
   been signed by the Ed25519 master key.

__KeyDirectory__/**`secret_onion_key`** and **`secret_onion_key.old`**::
   A relay's RSA1024 short-term onion key. Used to decrypt old-style ("TAP")
   circuit extension requests. The **`.old`** file holds the previously
   generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were made
   by clients that didn't have the new one.

__KeyDirectory__/**`secret_onion_key_ntor`** and **`secret_onion_key_ntor.old`**::
   A relay's Curve25519 short-term onion key. Used to handle modern ("ntor")
   circuit extension requests. The **`.old`** file holds the previously
   generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were made
   by clients that didn't have the new one.

__KeyDirectory__/__keyname__**`.secret_family_key`**::
   A relay family's family identity key.
   Used to prove membership in a relay family.
   See https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/post-install/family-ids/
   for more information.

__DataDirectory__/**`fingerprint`**::
   Only used by servers. Contains the fingerprint of the server's RSA
   identity key.

__DataDirectory__/**`fingerprint-ed25519`**::
   Only used by servers. Contains the fingerprint of the server's ed25519
   identity key.

__DataDirectory__/**`hashed-fingerprint`**::
   Only used by bridges. Contains the hashed fingerprint of the bridge's
   identity key. (That is, the hash of the hash of the identity key.)

__DataDirectory__/**`bridgelines`**::
   Only used by bridges. Contains the bridge lines that clients can use to
   connect using pluggable transports.

__DataDirectory__/**`approved-routers`**::
   Only used by authoritative directory servers. Each line lists a status and
   an identity, separated by whitespace. Identities can be hex-encoded RSA
   fingerprints, or base-64 encoded ed25519 public keys. See the
   **fingerprint** file in a tor relay's __DataDirectory__ for an example
   fingerprint line. If the status is **!reject**, then descriptors from the
   given identity are rejected by this server. If it is **!invalid** then
   descriptors are accepted, but marked in the vote as not valid.
   If it is **!badexit**, then the authority will vote for it to receive a
   BadExit flag, indicating that it shouldn't be used for traffic leaving
   the Tor network.  If it is **!middleonly**, then the authority will
   vote for it to only be used in the middle of circuits.
   (Neither rejected nor invalid relays are included in the consensus.)

__DataDirectory__/**`v3-status-votes`**::
   Only for v3 authoritative directory servers. This file contains status
   votes from all the authoritative directory servers.

__CacheDirectory__/**`unverified-consensus`**::
   Contains a network consensus document that has been downloaded, but which
   we didn't have the right certificates to check yet.

__CacheDirectory__/**`unverified-microdesc-consensus`**::
   Contains a microdescriptor-flavored network consensus document that has
   been downloaded, but which we didn't have the right certificates to check
   yet.

__DataDirectory__/**`unparseable-desc`**::
   Onion server descriptors that Tor was unable to parse are dumped to this
   file. Only used for debugging.

__DataDirectory__/**`router-stability`**::
   Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
   router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a fair idea of
   how to set their Stable flags.

__DataDirectory__/**`stats/dirreq-stats`**::
   Only used by directory caches and authorities. This file is used to
   collect directory request statistics.

__DataDirectory__/**`stats/entry-stats`**::
   Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
   statistics by Tor entry nodes.

__DataDirectory__/**`stats/bridge-stats`**::
   Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection
   statistics by Tor bridges.

__DataDirectory__/**`stats/exit-stats`**::
   Only used by servers. This file is used to collect outgoing connection
   statistics by Tor exit routers.

__DataDirectory__/**`stats/buffer-stats`**::
   Only used by servers. This file is used to collect buffer usage
   history.

__DataDirectory__/**`stats/conn-stats`**::
   Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate connection
   history (number of active connections over time).

__DataDirectory__/**`stats/hidserv-stats`**::
   Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate counts
   of what fraction of the traffic is hidden service rendezvous traffic, and
   approximately how many hidden services the relay has seen.

__DataDirectory__/**`networkstatus-bridges`**::
   Only used by authoritative bridge directories. Contains information
   about bridges that have self-reported themselves to the bridge
   authority.

__HiddenServiceDirectory__/**`hostname`**::
   The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
   If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
   also contains authorization data for all clients.
+
[NOTE]
   The clients will ignore any extra subdomains prepended to a hidden
   service hostname. Supposing you have "xyz.onion" as your hostname, you
   can ask your clients to connect to "www.xyz.onion" or "irc.xyz.onion"
   for virtual-hosting purposes.

__HiddenServiceDirectory__/**`private_key`**::
   Contains the private key for this hidden service.

__HiddenServiceDirectory__/**`client_keys`**::
   Contains authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
   authorized clients.

__HiddenServiceDirectory__/**`onion_service_non_anonymous`**::
   This file is present if a hidden service key was created in
   **HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode**.

== SEE ALSO

For more information, refer to the Tor Project website at
https://www.torproject.org/ and the Tor specifications at
https://spec.torproject.org. See also **torsocks**(1) and **torify**(1).

== BUGS

Because Tor is still under development, there may be plenty of bugs. Please
report them at https://bugs.torproject.org/.