tor-browser

sctp_auth.c (60745B)

---

/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2008, by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Randall Stewart. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Michael Tuexen. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* a) Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
*    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* b) Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
*    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* c) Neither the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its
*    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
*    from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
* THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
* THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/

#include <netinet/sctp_os.h>
#include <netinet/sctp.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_header.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_pcb.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_var.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_sysctl.h>
#include <netinet/sctputil.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_indata.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_output.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_auth.h>

#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG		(SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1)
#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG2	(SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2)
#endif /* SCTP_DEBUG */

void
sctp_clear_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist)
{
memset(chklist, 0, sizeof(*chklist));
/* chklist->num_chunks = 0; */
}

sctp_auth_chklist_t *
sctp_alloc_chunklist(void)
{
sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist;

SCTP_MALLOC(chklist, sctp_auth_chklist_t *, sizeof(*chklist),
	    SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
if (chklist == NULL) {
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "sctp_alloc_chunklist: failed to get memory!\n");
} else {
	sctp_clear_chunklist(chklist);
}
return (chklist);
}

void
sctp_free_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
{
if (list != NULL)
	SCTP_FREE(list, SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
}

sctp_auth_chklist_t *
sctp_copy_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
{
sctp_auth_chklist_t *new_list;

if (list == NULL)
	return (NULL);

/* get a new list */
new_list = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
if (new_list == NULL)
	return (NULL);
/* copy it */
memcpy(new_list, list, sizeof(*new_list));

return (new_list);
}

/*
* add a chunk to the required chunks list
*/
int
sctp_auth_add_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
{
if (list == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* is chunk restricted? */
if ((chunk == SCTP_INITIATION) ||
    (chunk == SCTP_INITIATION_ACK) ||
    (chunk == SCTP_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) ||
    (chunk == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION)) {
	return (-1);
}
if (list->chunks[chunk] == 0) {
	list->chunks[chunk] = 1;
	list->num_chunks++;
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP: added chunk %u (0x%02x) to Auth list\n",
		chunk, chunk);
}
return (0);
}

/*
* delete a chunk from the required chunks list
*/
int
sctp_auth_delete_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
{
if (list == NULL)
	return (-1);

if (list->chunks[chunk] == 1) {
	list->chunks[chunk] = 0;
	list->num_chunks--;
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP: deleted chunk %u (0x%02x) from Auth list\n",
		chunk, chunk);
}
return (0);
}

size_t
sctp_auth_get_chklist_size(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
{
if (list == NULL)
	return (0);
else
	return (list->num_chunks);
}

/*
* return the current number and list of required chunks caller must
* guarantee ptr has space for up to 256 bytes
*/
int
sctp_serialize_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
{
int i, count = 0;

if (list == NULL)
	return (0);

for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
	if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
		*ptr++ = i;
		count++;
	}
}
return (count);
}

int
sctp_pack_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
{
int i, size = 0;

if (list == NULL)
	return (0);

if (list->num_chunks <= 32) {
	/* just list them, one byte each */
	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
		if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
			*ptr++ = i;
			size++;
		}
	}
} else {
	int index, offset;

	/* pack into a 32 byte bitfield */
	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
		if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
			index = i / 8;
			offset = i % 8;
			ptr[index] |= (1 << offset);
		}
	}
	size = 32;
}
return (size);
}

int
sctp_unpack_auth_chunks(const uint8_t *ptr, uint8_t num_chunks,
   sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
{
int i;
int size;

if (list == NULL)
	return (0);

if (num_chunks <= 32) {
	/* just pull them, one byte each */
	for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
		(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(*ptr++, list);
	}
	size = num_chunks;
} else {
	int index, offset;

	/* unpack from a 32 byte bitfield */
	for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
		for (offset = 0; offset < 8; offset++) {
			if (ptr[index] & (1 << offset)) {
				(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk((index * 8) + offset, list);
			}
		}
	}
	size = 32;
}
return (size);
}

/*
* allocate structure space for a key of length keylen
*/
sctp_key_t *
sctp_alloc_key(uint32_t keylen)
{
sctp_key_t *new_key;

SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_key_t *, sizeof(*new_key) + keylen,
	    SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
if (new_key == NULL) {
	/* out of memory */
	return (NULL);
}
new_key->keylen = keylen;
return (new_key);
}

void
sctp_free_key(sctp_key_t *key)
{
if (key != NULL)
	SCTP_FREE(key,SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
}

void
sctp_print_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
{
uint32_t i;

if (key == NULL) {
	SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
	return;
}
SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
if (key->keylen) {
	for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
		SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
	SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
} else {
	SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
}
}

void
sctp_show_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
{
uint32_t i;

if (key == NULL) {
	SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
	return;
}
SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
if (key->keylen) {
	for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
		SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
	SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
} else {
	SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
}
}

static uint32_t
sctp_get_keylen(sctp_key_t *key)
{
if (key != NULL)
	return (key->keylen);
else
	return (0);
}

/*
* generate a new random key of length 'keylen'
*/
sctp_key_t *
sctp_generate_random_key(uint32_t keylen)
{
sctp_key_t *new_key;

new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
if (new_key == NULL) {
	/* out of memory */
	return (NULL);
}
SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, keylen);
new_key->keylen = keylen;
return (new_key);
}

sctp_key_t *
sctp_set_key(uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen)
{
sctp_key_t *new_key;

new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
if (new_key == NULL) {
	/* out of memory */
	return (NULL);
}
memcpy(new_key->key, key, keylen);
return (new_key);
}

/*-
* given two keys of variable size, compute which key is "larger/smaller"
* returns:  1 if key1 > key2
*          -1 if key1 < key2
*           0 if key1 = key2
*/
static int
sctp_compare_key(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2)
{
uint32_t maxlen;
uint32_t i;
uint32_t key1len, key2len;
uint8_t *key_1, *key_2;
uint8_t val1, val2;

/* sanity/length check */
key1len = sctp_get_keylen(key1);
key2len = sctp_get_keylen(key2);
if ((key1len == 0) && (key2len == 0))
	return (0);
else if (key1len == 0)
	return (-1);
else if (key2len == 0)
	return (1);

if (key1len < key2len) {
	maxlen = key2len;
} else {
	maxlen = key1len;
}
key_1 = key1->key;
key_2 = key2->key;
/* check for numeric equality */
for (i = 0; i < maxlen; i++) {
	/* left-pad with zeros */
	val1 = (i < (maxlen - key1len)) ? 0 : *(key_1++);
	val2 = (i < (maxlen - key2len)) ? 0 : *(key_2++);
	if (val1 > val2) {
		return (1);
	} else if (val1 < val2) {
		return (-1);
	}
}
/* keys are equal value, so check lengths */
if (key1len == key2len)
	return (0);
else if (key1len < key2len)
	return (-1);
else
	return (1);
}

/*
* generate the concatenated keying material based on the two keys and the
* shared key (if available). draft-ietf-tsvwg-auth specifies the specific
* order for concatenation
*/
sctp_key_t *
sctp_compute_hashkey(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2, sctp_key_t *shared)
{
uint32_t keylen;
sctp_key_t *new_key;
uint8_t *key_ptr;

keylen = sctp_get_keylen(key1) + sctp_get_keylen(key2) +
    sctp_get_keylen(shared);

if (keylen > 0) {
	/* get space for the new key */
	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
	if (new_key == NULL) {
		/* out of memory */
		return (NULL);
	}
	new_key->keylen = keylen;
	key_ptr = new_key->key;
} else {
	/* all keys empty/null?! */
	return (NULL);
}

/* concatenate the keys */
if (sctp_compare_key(key1, key2) <= 0) {
	/* key is shared + key1 + key2 */
	if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
		memcpy(key_ptr, shared->key, shared->keylen);
		key_ptr += shared->keylen;
	}
	if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
		memcpy(key_ptr, key1->key, key1->keylen);
		key_ptr += key1->keylen;
	}
	if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
		memcpy(key_ptr, key2->key, key2->keylen);
	}
} else {
	/* key is shared + key2 + key1 */
	if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
		memcpy(key_ptr, shared->key, shared->keylen);
		key_ptr += shared->keylen;
	}
	if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
		memcpy(key_ptr, key2->key, key2->keylen);
		key_ptr += key2->keylen;
	}
	if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
		memcpy(key_ptr, key1->key, key1->keylen);
	}
}
return (new_key);
}

sctp_sharedkey_t *
sctp_alloc_sharedkey(void)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *new_key;

SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_sharedkey_t *, sizeof(*new_key),
	    SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
if (new_key == NULL) {
	/* out of memory */
	return (NULL);
}
new_key->keyid = 0;
new_key->key = NULL;
new_key->refcount = 1;
new_key->deactivated = 0;
return (new_key);
}

void
sctp_free_sharedkey(sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
{
if (skey == NULL)
	return;

if (SCTP_DECREMENT_AND_CHECK_REFCOUNT(&skey->refcount)) {
	if (skey->key != NULL)
		sctp_free_key(skey->key);
	SCTP_FREE(skey, SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
}
}

sctp_sharedkey_t *
sctp_find_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys, uint16_t key_id)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
	if (skey->keyid == key_id)
		return (skey);
}
return (NULL);
}

int
sctp_insert_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys,
	      sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

if ((shared_keys == NULL) || (new_skey == NULL))
	return (EINVAL);

/* insert into an empty list? */
if (LIST_EMPTY(shared_keys)) {
	LIST_INSERT_HEAD(shared_keys, new_skey, next);
	return (0);
}
/* insert into the existing list, ordered by key id */
LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
	if (new_skey->keyid < skey->keyid) {
		/* insert it before here */
		LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
		return (0);
	} else if (new_skey->keyid == skey->keyid) {
		/* replace the existing key */
		/* verify this key *can* be replaced */
		if ((skey->deactivated) || (skey->refcount > 1)) {
			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
				"can't replace shared key id %u\n",
				new_skey->keyid);
			return (EBUSY);
		}
		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
			"replacing shared key id %u\n",
			new_skey->keyid);
		LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
		LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
		sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
		return (0);
	}
	if (LIST_NEXT(skey, next) == NULL) {
		/* belongs at the end of the list */
		LIST_INSERT_AFTER(skey, new_skey, next);
		return (0);
	}
}
/* shouldn't reach here */
return (EINVAL);
}

void
sctp_auth_key_acquire(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

/* find the shared key */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);

/* bump the ref count */
if (skey) {
	atomic_add_int(&skey->refcount, 1);
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
		"%s: stcb %p key %u refcount acquire to %d\n",
		__func__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
}
}

void
sctp_auth_key_release(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id, int so_locked)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

/* find the shared key */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);

/* decrement the ref count */
if (skey) {
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
		"%s: stcb %p key %u refcount release to %d\n",
		__func__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);

	/* see if a notification should be generated */
	if ((skey->refcount <= 2) && (skey->deactivated)) {
		/* notify ULP that key is no longer used */
		sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb,
		                0, &key_id, so_locked);
		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
			"%s: stcb %p key %u no longer used, %d\n",
			__func__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
	}
	sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
}
}

static sctp_sharedkey_t *
sctp_copy_sharedkey(const sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey;

if (skey == NULL)
	return (NULL);
new_skey = sctp_alloc_sharedkey();
if (new_skey == NULL)
	return (NULL);
if (skey->key != NULL)
	new_skey->key = sctp_set_key(skey->key->key, skey->key->keylen);
else
	new_skey->key = NULL;
new_skey->keyid = skey->keyid;
return (new_skey);
}

int
sctp_copy_skeylist(const struct sctp_keyhead *src, struct sctp_keyhead *dest)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey, *new_skey;
int count = 0;

if ((src == NULL) || (dest == NULL))
	return (0);
LIST_FOREACH(skey, src, next) {
	new_skey = sctp_copy_sharedkey(skey);
	if (new_skey != NULL) {
		if (sctp_insert_sharedkey(dest, new_skey)) {
			sctp_free_sharedkey(new_skey);
		} else {
			count++;
		}
	}
}
return (count);
}

sctp_hmaclist_t *
sctp_alloc_hmaclist(uint16_t num_hmacs)
{
sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
int alloc_size;

alloc_size = sizeof(*new_list) + num_hmacs * sizeof(new_list->hmac[0]);
SCTP_MALLOC(new_list, sctp_hmaclist_t *, alloc_size,
	    SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
if (new_list == NULL) {
	/* out of memory */
	return (NULL);
}
new_list->max_algo = num_hmacs;
new_list->num_algo = 0;
return (new_list);
}

void
sctp_free_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
{
if (list != NULL) {
	SCTP_FREE(list,SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
}
}

int
sctp_auth_add_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t hmac_id)
{
int i;
if (list == NULL)
	return (-1);
if (list->num_algo == list->max_algo) {
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP: HMAC id list full, ignoring add %u\n", hmac_id);
	return (-1);
}
#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
if ((hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) &&
    (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256)) {
#else
if (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
#endif
	return (-1);
}
/* Now is it already in the list */
for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
	if (list->hmac[i] == hmac_id) {
		/* already in list */
		return (-1);
	}
}
SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "SCTP: add HMAC id %u to list\n", hmac_id);
list->hmac[list->num_algo++] = hmac_id;
return (0);
}

sctp_hmaclist_t *
sctp_copy_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
{
sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
int i;

if (list == NULL)
	return (NULL);
/* get a new list */
new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(list->max_algo);
if (new_list == NULL)
	return (NULL);
/* copy it */
new_list->max_algo = list->max_algo;
new_list->num_algo = list->num_algo;
for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
	new_list->hmac[i] = list->hmac[i];
return (new_list);
}

sctp_hmaclist_t *
sctp_default_supported_hmaclist(void)
{
sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;

#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(2);
#else
new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(1);
#endif
if (new_list == NULL)
	return (NULL);
#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
/* We prefer SHA256, so list it first */
(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256);
#endif
(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1);
return (new_list);
}

/*-
* HMAC algos are listed in priority/preference order
* find the best HMAC id to use for the peer based on local support
*/
uint16_t
sctp_negotiate_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *peer, sctp_hmaclist_t *local)
{
int i, j;

if ((local == NULL) || (peer == NULL))
	return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);

for (i = 0; i < peer->num_algo; i++) {
	for (j = 0; j < local->num_algo; j++) {
		if (peer->hmac[i] == local->hmac[j]) {
			/* found the "best" one */
			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
				"SCTP: negotiated peer HMAC id %u\n",
				peer->hmac[i]);
			return (peer->hmac[i]);
		}
	}
}
/* didn't find one! */
return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
}

/*-
* serialize the HMAC algo list and return space used
* caller must guarantee ptr has appropriate space
*/
int
sctp_serialize_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
{
int i;
uint16_t hmac_id;

if (list == NULL)
	return (0);

for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
	hmac_id = htons(list->hmac[i]);
	memcpy(ptr, &hmac_id, sizeof(hmac_id));
	ptr += sizeof(hmac_id);
}
return (list->num_algo * sizeof(hmac_id));
}

int
sctp_verify_hmac_param (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs, uint32_t num_hmacs)
{
uint32_t i;

for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
	if (ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]) == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
		return (0);
	}
}
return (-1);
}

sctp_authinfo_t *
sctp_alloc_authinfo(void)
{
sctp_authinfo_t *new_authinfo;

SCTP_MALLOC(new_authinfo, sctp_authinfo_t *, sizeof(*new_authinfo),
	    SCTP_M_AUTH_IF);

if (new_authinfo == NULL) {
	/* out of memory */
	return (NULL);
}
memset(new_authinfo, 0, sizeof(*new_authinfo));
return (new_authinfo);
}

void
sctp_free_authinfo(sctp_authinfo_t *authinfo)
{
if (authinfo == NULL)
	return;

if (authinfo->random != NULL)
	sctp_free_key(authinfo->random);
if (authinfo->peer_random != NULL)
	sctp_free_key(authinfo->peer_random);
if (authinfo->assoc_key != NULL)
	sctp_free_key(authinfo->assoc_key);
if (authinfo->recv_key != NULL)
	sctp_free_key(authinfo->recv_key);

/* We are NOT dynamically allocating authinfo's right now... */
/* SCTP_FREE(authinfo, SCTP_M_AUTH_??); */
}

uint32_t
sctp_get_auth_chunk_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
{
int size;

size = sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk) + sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
return (SCTP_SIZE32(size));
}

uint32_t
sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
{
switch (hmac_algo) {
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
	return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA1);
#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
	return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256);
#endif
default:
	/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
	return (0);
} /* end switch */
}

static inline int
sctp_get_hmac_block_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
{
switch (hmac_algo) {
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
	return (64);
#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
	return (64);
#endif
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
default:
	/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
	return (0);
} /* end switch */
}

#if defined(__Userspace__)
/* __Userspace__ SHA1_Init is defined in libcrypto.a (libssl-dev on Ubuntu) */
#endif
static void
sctp_hmac_init(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx)
{
switch (hmac_algo) {
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
	SCTP_SHA1_INIT(&ctx->sha1);
	break;
#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
	SCTP_SHA256_INIT(&ctx->sha256);
	break;
#endif
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
default:
	/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
	return;
} /* end switch */
}

static void
sctp_hmac_update(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
   uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen)
{
switch (hmac_algo) {
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
	SCTP_SHA1_UPDATE(&ctx->sha1, text, textlen);
	break;
#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
	SCTP_SHA256_UPDATE(&ctx->sha256, text, textlen);
	break;
#endif
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
default:
	/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
	return;
} /* end switch */
}

static void
sctp_hmac_final(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
   uint8_t *digest)
{
switch (hmac_algo) {
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
	SCTP_SHA1_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha1);
	break;
#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
	SCTP_SHA256_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha256);
	break;
#endif
case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
default:
	/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
	return;
} /* end switch */
}

/*-
* Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication: FIPS 198 (RFC 2104)
*
* Compute the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
* algorithm.  Resulting digest is placed in 'digest' and digest length
* is returned, if the HMAC was performed.
*
* WARNING: it is up to the caller to supply sufficient space to hold the
* resultant digest.
*/
uint32_t
sctp_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
   uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
{
uint32_t digestlen;
uint32_t blocklen;
sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128];	/* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
uint32_t i;

/* sanity check the material and length */
if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (text == NULL) ||
    (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
	/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
	return (0);
}
/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
if (digestlen == 0)
	return (0);

/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
if (keylen > blocklen) {
	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
	/* set the hashed key as the key */
	keylen = digestlen;
	key = temp;
}
/* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
memset(ipad, 0, blocklen);
memset(opad, 0, blocklen);
memcpy(ipad, key, keylen);
memcpy(opad, key, keylen);

/* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
	ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
	opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
}

/* perform inner hash */
sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, text, textlen);
sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);

/* perform outer hash */
sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);

return (digestlen);
}

/* mbuf version */
uint32_t
sctp_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
   struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest, uint32_t trailer)
{
uint32_t digestlen;
uint32_t blocklen;
sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128];	/* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
uint32_t i;
struct mbuf *m_tmp;

/* sanity check the material and length */
if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
	/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
	return (0);
}
/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
if (digestlen == 0)
	return (0);

/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
if (keylen > blocklen) {
	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
	/* set the hashed key as the key */
	keylen = digestlen;
	key = temp;
}
/* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
memset(ipad, 0, blocklen);
memset(opad, 0, blocklen);
memcpy(ipad, key, keylen);
memcpy(opad, key, keylen);

/* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
	ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
	opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
}

/* perform inner hash */
sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start of text) */
m_tmp = m;
while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
	m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
	m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
}
/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain for the text */
while (m_tmp != NULL) {
	if ((SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp) == NULL) && trailer) {
		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
				 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - (trailer+m_offset));
	} else {
		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
				 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
	}

	/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
	m_offset = 0;
	m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
}
sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);

/* perform outer hash */
sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);

return (digestlen);
}

/*
* computes the requested HMAC using a key struct (which may be modified if
* the keylen exceeds the HMAC block len).
*/
uint32_t
sctp_compute_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, uint8_t *text,
   uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
{
uint32_t digestlen;
uint32_t blocklen;
sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];

/* sanity check */
if ((key == NULL) || (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) ||
    (digest == NULL)) {
	/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
	return (0);
}
/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
if (digestlen == 0)
	return (0);

/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
	/* save the hashed key as the new key */
	key->keylen = digestlen;
	memcpy(key->key, temp, key->keylen);
}
return (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, text, textlen,
    digest));
}

/* mbuf version */
uint32_t
sctp_compute_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, struct mbuf *m,
   uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest)
{
uint32_t digestlen;
uint32_t blocklen;
sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];

/* sanity check */
if ((key == NULL) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
	/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
	return (0);
}
/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
if (digestlen == 0)
	return (0);

/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
	/* save the hashed key as the new key */
	key->keylen = digestlen;
	memcpy(key->key, temp, key->keylen);
}
return (sctp_hmac_m(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, m, m_offset, digest, 0));
}

int
sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t id)
{
int i;

if ((list == NULL) || (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD))
	return (0);

for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
	if (list->hmac[i] == id)
		return (1);

/* not in the list */
return (0);
}

/*-
* clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id on an association.
* the cached key(s) will be recomputed and re-cached at next use.
* ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
*/
void
sctp_clear_cachedkeys(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
{
if (stcb == NULL)
	return;

if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) {
	sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
	stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key = NULL;
}
if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid) {
	sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
	stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key = NULL;
}
}

/*-
* clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id for all assocs on
* an endpoint.
* ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
*/
void
sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
{
struct sctp_tcb *stcb;

if (inp == NULL)
	return;

/* clear the cached keys on all assocs on this instance */
LIST_FOREACH(stcb, &inp->sctp_asoc_list, sctp_tcblist) {
	SCTP_TCB_LOCK(stcb);
	sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
	SCTP_TCB_UNLOCK(stcb);
}
}

/*-
* delete a shared key from an association
* ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
*/
int
sctp_delete_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

if (stcb == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
	return (-1);

/* does the key exist? */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
if (skey == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
if (skey->refcount > 1)
	return (-1);

/* remove it */
LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */

/* clear any cached keys */
sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
return (0);
}

/*-
* deletes a shared key from the endpoint
* ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
*/
int
sctp_delete_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

if (inp == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
	return (-1);

/* does the key exist? */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
if (skey == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* endpoint keys are not refcounted */

/* remove it */
LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */

/* clear any cached keys */
sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(inp, keyid);
return (0);
}

/*-
* set the active key on an association
* ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
*/
int
sctp_auth_setactivekey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey = NULL;

/* find the key on the assoc */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
if (skey == NULL) {
	/* that key doesn't exist */
	return (-1);
}
if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
	/* can't reactivate a deactivated key with other refcounts */
	return (-1);
}

/* set the (new) active key */
stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = keyid;
/* reset the deactivated flag */
skey->deactivated = 0;

return (0);
}

/*-
* set the active key on an endpoint
* ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
*/
int
sctp_auth_setactivekey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

/* find the key */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
if (skey == NULL) {
	/* that key doesn't exist */
	return (-1);
}
inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid = keyid;
return (0);
}

/*-
* deactivates a shared key from the association
* ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
*/
int
sctp_deact_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

if (stcb == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
	return (-1);

/* does the key exist? */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
if (skey == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
if (skey->refcount == 1) {
	/* no other users, send a notification for this key */
	sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb, 0, &keyid,
	                SCTP_SO_LOCKED);
}

/* mark the key as deactivated */
skey->deactivated = 1;

return (0);
}

/*-
* deactivates a shared key from the endpoint
* ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
*/
int
sctp_deact_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
{
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;

if (inp == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
	return (-1);

/* does the key exist? */
skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
if (skey == NULL)
	return (-1);

/* endpoint keys are not refcounted */

/* remove it */
LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */

return (0);
}

/*
* get local authentication parameters from cookie (from INIT-ACK)
*/
void
sctp_auth_get_cookie_params(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *m,
   uint32_t offset, uint32_t length)
{
struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, tmp_param;
uint16_t plen, ptype;
uint8_t random_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
struct sctp_auth_random *p_random = NULL;
uint16_t random_len = 0;
uint8_t hmacs_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs = NULL;
uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
uint16_t num_chunks = 0;
sctp_key_t *new_key;
uint32_t keylen;

/* convert to upper bound */
length += offset;

phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset,
    sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
while (phdr != NULL) {
	ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
	plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);

	if ((plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) ||
	    (offset + plen > length))
		break;

	if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
		if (plen > sizeof(random_store))
			break;
		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
		    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)random_store, plen);
		if (phdr == NULL)
			return;
		/* save the random and length for the key */
		p_random = (struct sctp_auth_random *)phdr;
		random_len = plen - sizeof(*p_random);
	} else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
		uint16_t num_hmacs;
		uint16_t i;

		if (plen > sizeof(hmacs_store))
			break;
		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
		    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)hmacs_store, plen);
		if (phdr == NULL)
			return;
		/* save the hmacs list and num for the key */
		hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
		hmacs_len = plen - sizeof(*hmacs);
		num_hmacs = hmacs_len / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
		if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL)
			sctp_free_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
		stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(num_hmacs);
		if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
			for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
				(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
				    ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]));
			}
		}
	} else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
		int i;

		if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store))
			break;
		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
		    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store, plen);
		if (phdr == NULL)
			return;
		chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
		num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
		/* save chunks list and num for the key */
		if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL)
			sctp_clear_chunklist(stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
		else
			stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
		for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
			(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(chunks->chunk_types[i],
			    stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
		}
	}
	/* get next parameter */
	offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
	if (offset + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) > length)
		break;
	phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr),
	    (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
}
/* concatenate the full random key */
keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len + sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len;
if (chunks != NULL) {
	keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
}
new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
if (new_key != NULL) {
	/* copy in the RANDOM */
	if (p_random != NULL) {
		keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len;
		memcpy(new_key->key, p_random, keylen);
	} else {
		keylen = 0;
	}
	/* append in the AUTH chunks */
	if (chunks != NULL) {
		memcpy(new_key->key + keylen, chunks,
		       sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks);
		keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
	}
	/* append in the HMACs */
	if (hmacs != NULL) {
		memcpy(new_key->key + keylen, hmacs,
		       sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len);
	}
}
if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
	sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);

/* negotiate what HMAC to use for the peer */
stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id = sctp_negotiate_hmacid(stcb->asoc.peer_hmacs,
    stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);

/* copy defaults from the endpoint */
/* FIX ME: put in cookie? */
stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
/* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
(void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
			 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
}

/*
* compute and fill in the HMAC digest for a packet
*/
void
sctp_fill_hmac_digest_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t auth_offset,
   struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth, struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
{
uint32_t digestlen;
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
sctp_key_t *key;

if ((stcb == NULL) || (auth == NULL))
	return;

/* zero the digest + chunk padding */
digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id);
memset(auth->hmac, 0, SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));

/* is the desired key cached? */
if ((keyid != stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) ||
    (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key == NULL)) {
	if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key != NULL) {
		/* free the old cached key */
		sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
	}
	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
	/* the only way skey is NULL is if null key id 0 is used */
	if (skey != NULL)
		key = skey->key;
	else
		key = NULL;
	/* compute a new assoc key and cache it */
	stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key =
	    sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
				 stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, key);
	stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid = keyid;
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "caching key id %u\n",
		stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
	if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
		sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
			       "Assoc Key");
#endif
}

/* set in the active key id */
auth->shared_key_id = htons(keyid);

/* compute and fill in the digest */
(void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
			  m, auth_offset, auth->hmac);
}

static void
sctp_zero_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint32_t size)
{
struct mbuf *m_tmp;
uint8_t *data;

/* sanity check */
if (m == NULL)
	return;

/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start position) */
m_tmp = m;
while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
	m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
	m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
}
/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain */
while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (size > 0)) {
	data = mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset;
	if (size > (uint32_t)(SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset)) {
		memset(data, 0, SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
		size -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset;
	} else {
		memset(data, 0, size);
		size = 0;
	}
	/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
	m_offset = 0;
	m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
}
}

/*-
* process the incoming Authentication chunk
* return codes:
*   -1 on any authentication error
*    0 on authentication verification
*/
int
sctp_handle_auth(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
   struct mbuf *m, uint32_t offset)
{
uint16_t chunklen;
uint16_t shared_key_id;
uint16_t hmac_id;
sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
uint32_t digestlen;
uint8_t digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];

/* auth is checked for NULL by caller */
chunklen = ntohs(auth->ch.chunk_length);
if (chunklen < sizeof(*auth)) {
	SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
	return (-1);
}
SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauth);

/* get the auth params */
shared_key_id = ntohs(auth->shared_key_id);
hmac_id = ntohs(auth->hmac_id);
SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
	"SCTP AUTH Chunk: shared key %u, HMAC id %u\n",
	shared_key_id, hmac_id);

#if defined(__Userspace__) && defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
return (0);
#endif
/* is the indicated HMAC supported? */
if (!sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, hmac_id)) {
	struct mbuf *op_err;
	struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac *cause;

	SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalhmacid);
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP Auth: unsupported HMAC id %u\n",
		hmac_id);
	/*
	 * report this in an Error Chunk: Unsupported HMAC
	 * Identifier
	 */
	op_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac),
	                               0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
	if (op_err != NULL) {
		/* pre-reserve some space */
		SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(op_err, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
		/* fill in the error */
		cause = mtod(op_err, struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac *);
		cause->cause.code = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_UNSUPPORTED_HMACID);
		cause->cause.length = htons(sizeof(struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac));
		cause->hmac_id = ntohs(hmac_id);
		SCTP_BUF_LEN(op_err) = sizeof(struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac);
		/* queue it */
		sctp_queue_op_err(stcb, op_err);
	}
	return (-1);
}
/* get the indicated shared key, if available */
if ((stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key == NULL) ||
    (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)) {
	/* find the shared key on the assoc first */
	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys,
				   shared_key_id);
	/* if the shared key isn't found, discard the chunk */
	if (skey == NULL) {
		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalkeyid);
		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
			"SCTP Auth: unknown key id %u\n",
			shared_key_id);
		return (-1);
	}
	/* generate a notification if this is a new key id */
	if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id) {
		sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_NEW_KEY, stcb, 0,
		                &shared_key_id, SCTP_SO_NOT_LOCKED);
	}
	/* compute a new recv assoc key and cache it */
	if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key != NULL)
		sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
	stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key =
	    sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
	    stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, skey->key);
	stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid = shared_key_id;
#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
	if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
		sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key, "Recv Key");
#endif
}
/* validate the digest length */
digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_id);
if (chunklen < (sizeof(*auth) + digestlen)) {
	/* invalid digest length */
	SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP Auth: chunk too short for HMAC\n");
	return (-1);
}
/* save a copy of the digest, zero the pseudo header, and validate */
memcpy(digest, auth->hmac, digestlen);
sctp_zero_m(m, offset + sizeof(*auth), SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
(void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key,
    m, offset, computed_digest);

/* compare the computed digest with the one in the AUTH chunk */
if (timingsafe_bcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
	SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP Auth: HMAC digest check failed\n");
	return (-1);
}
return (0);
}

/*
* Generate NOTIFICATION
*/
void
sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
                          uint16_t keyid, int so_locked)
{
struct mbuf *m_notify;
struct sctp_authkey_event *auth;
struct sctp_queued_to_read *control;

KASSERT(stcb != NULL, ("stcb == NULL"));
SCTP_TCB_LOCK_ASSERT(stcb);
SCTP_INP_READ_LOCK_ASSERT(stcb->sctp_ep);

if (sctp_stcb_is_feature_off(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_AUTHEVNT))
	/* event not enabled */
	return;

m_notify = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event),
                                 0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
if (m_notify == NULL)
	/* no space left */
	return;

SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = 0;
auth = mtod(m_notify, struct sctp_authkey_event *);
memset(auth, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event));
auth->auth_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
auth->auth_flags = 0;
auth->auth_length = sizeof(*auth);
auth->auth_keynumber = keyid;
/* XXXMT: The following is BSD specific. */
if (indication == SCTP_AUTH_NEW_KEY) {
	auth->auth_altkeynumber = stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid;
} else {
	auth->auth_altkeynumber = 0;
}
auth->auth_indication = indication;
auth->auth_assoc_id = sctp_get_associd(stcb);

SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = sizeof(*auth);
SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_notify) = NULL;

/* append to socket */
control = sctp_build_readq_entry(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination,
    0, 0, stcb->asoc.context, 0, 0, 0, m_notify);
if (control == NULL) {
	/* no memory */
	sctp_m_freem(m_notify);
	return;
}
control->length = SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify);
control->spec_flags = M_NOTIFICATION;
/* not that we need this */
control->tail_mbuf = m_notify;
sctp_add_to_readq(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, control,
                  &stcb->sctp_socket->so_rcv, 1,
                  SCTP_READ_LOCK_HELD, so_locked);
}

/*-
* validates the AUTHentication related parameters in an INIT/INIT-ACK
* Note: currently only used for INIT as INIT-ACK is handled inline
* with sctp_load_addresses_from_init()
*/
int
sctp_validate_init_auth_params(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int limit)
{
struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, param_buf;
uint16_t ptype, plen;
int peer_supports_asconf = 0;
int peer_supports_auth = 0;
int got_random = 0, got_hmacs = 0, got_chklist = 0;
uint8_t saw_asconf = 0;
uint8_t saw_asconf_ack = 0;

/* go through each of the params. */
phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &param_buf, sizeof(param_buf));
while (phdr) {
	ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
	plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);

	if (offset + plen > limit) {
		break;
	}
	if (plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
		break;
	}
	if (ptype == SCTP_SUPPORTED_CHUNK_EXT) {
		/* A supported extension chunk */
		struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *pr_supported;
		uint8_t local_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE];
		int num_ent, i;

		if (plen > sizeof(local_store)) {
			break;
		}
		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
		                           (struct sctp_paramhdr *)&local_store,
		                           plen);
		if (phdr == NULL) {
			return (-1);
		}
		pr_supported = (struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *)phdr;
		num_ent = plen - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
		for (i = 0; i < num_ent; i++) {
			switch (pr_supported->chunk_types[i]) {
			case SCTP_ASCONF:
			case SCTP_ASCONF_ACK:
				peer_supports_asconf = 1;
				break;
			default:
				/* one we don't care about */
				break;
			}
		}
	} else if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
		/* enforce the random length */
		if (plen != (sizeof(struct sctp_auth_random) +
			     SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_REQUIRED)) {
			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
				"SCTP: invalid RANDOM len\n");
			return (-1);
		}
		got_random = 1;
	} else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
		struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs;
		uint8_t store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
		int num_hmacs;

		if (plen > sizeof(store)) {
			break;
		}
		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
		                           (struct sctp_paramhdr *)store,
		                           plen);
		if (phdr == NULL) {
			return (-1);
		}
		hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
		num_hmacs = (plen - sizeof(*hmacs)) / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
		/* validate the hmac list */
		if (sctp_verify_hmac_param(hmacs, num_hmacs)) {
			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
				"SCTP: invalid HMAC param\n");
			return (-1);
		}
		got_hmacs = 1;
	} else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
		struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks;
		uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE];
		int i, num_chunks;

		if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store)) {
			break;
		}
		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
					   (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store,
					   plen);
		if (phdr == NULL) {
			return (-1);
		}
		/*-
		 * Flip through the list and mark that the
		 * peer supports asconf/asconf_ack.
		 */
		chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
		num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
		for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
			/* record asconf/asconf-ack if listed */
			if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF)
				saw_asconf = 1;
			if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF_ACK)
				saw_asconf_ack = 1;
		}
		if (num_chunks)
			got_chklist = 1;
	}

	offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
	if (offset >= limit) {
		break;
	}
	phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &param_buf,
	    sizeof(param_buf));
}
/* validate authentication required parameters */
if (got_random && got_hmacs) {
	peer_supports_auth = 1;
} else {
	peer_supports_auth = 0;
}
if (!peer_supports_auth && got_chklist) {
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP: peer sent chunk list w/o AUTH\n");
	return (-1);
}
if (peer_supports_asconf && !peer_supports_auth) {
	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
		"SCTP: peer supports ASCONF but not AUTH\n");
	return (-1);
} else if ((peer_supports_asconf) && (peer_supports_auth) &&
	   ((saw_asconf == 0) || (saw_asconf_ack == 0))) {
	return (-2);
}
return (0);
}

void
sctp_initialize_auth_params(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sctp_tcb *stcb)
{
uint16_t chunks_len = 0;
uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
uint16_t random_len = SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_DEFAULT;
sctp_key_t *new_key;
uint16_t keylen;

/* initialize hmac list from endpoint */
stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_copy_hmaclist(inp->sctp_ep.local_hmacs);
if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
	hmacs_len = stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->num_algo *
	    sizeof(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->hmac[0]);
}
/* initialize auth chunks list from endpoint */
stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks =
    sctp_copy_chunklist(inp->sctp_ep.local_auth_chunks);
if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL) {
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
		if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
			chunks_len++;
	}
}
/* copy defaults from the endpoint */
stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid;

/* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
(void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
			 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);

/* now set the concatenated key (random + chunks + hmacs) */
/* key includes parameter headers */
keylen = (3 * sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + random_len + chunks_len +
    hmacs_len;
new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
if (new_key != NULL) {
	struct sctp_paramhdr *ph;
	int plen;
	/* generate and copy in the RANDOM */
	ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)new_key->key;
	ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_RANDOM);
	plen = sizeof(*ph) + random_len;
	ph->param_length = htons(plen);
	SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key + sizeof(*ph), random_len);
	keylen = plen;

	/* append in the AUTH chunks */
	/* NOTE: currently we always have chunks to list */
	ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
	ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_CHUNK_LIST);
	plen = sizeof(*ph) + chunks_len;
	ph->param_length = htons(plen);
	keylen += sizeof(*ph);
	if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks) {
		int i;
		for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
			if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
				new_key->key[keylen++] = i;
		}
	}

	/* append in the HMACs */
	ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
	ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_HMAC_LIST);
	plen = sizeof(*ph) + hmacs_len;
	ph->param_length = htons(plen);
	keylen += sizeof(*ph);
	(void)sctp_serialize_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
				new_key->key + keylen);
}
if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
    sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
}


#ifdef SCTP_HMAC_TEST
/*
* HMAC and key concatenation tests
*/
static void
sctp_print_digest(uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen, const char *str)
{
uint32_t i;

SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s: 0x", str);
if (digest == NULL)
	return;

for (i = 0; i < digestlen; i++)
	SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", digest[i]);
}

static int
sctp_test_hmac(const char *str, uint16_t hmac_id, uint8_t *key,
   uint32_t keylen, uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen,
   uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen)
{
uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];

SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s:", str);
sctp_hmac(hmac_id, key, keylen, text, textlen, computed_digest);
sctp_print_digest(digest, digestlen, "Expected digest");
sctp_print_digest(computed_digest, digestlen, "Computed digest");
if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
	return (-1);
} else {
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
	return (0);
}
}


/*
* RFC 2202: HMAC-SHA1 test cases
*/
void
sctp_test_hmac_sha1(void)
{
uint8_t *digest;
uint8_t key[128];
uint32_t keylen;
uint8_t text[128];
uint32_t textlen;
uint32_t digestlen = 20;
int failed = 0;

/*-
 * test_case =     1
 * key =           0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
 * key_len =       20
 * data =          "Hi There"
 * data_len =      8
 * digest =        0xb617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00
 */
keylen = 20;
memset(key, 0x0b, keylen);
textlen = 8;
strcpy(text, "Hi There");
digest = "\xb6\x17\x31\x86\x55\x05\x72\x64\xe2\x8b\xc0\xb6\xfb\x37\x8c\x8e\xf1\x46\xbe\x00";
if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 1", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
	failed++;

/*-
 * test_case =     2
 * key =           "Jefe"
 * key_len =       4
 * data =          "what do ya want for nothing?"
 * data_len =      28
 * digest =        0xeffcdf6ae5eb2fa2d27416d5f184df9c259a7c79
 */
keylen = 4;
strcpy(key, "Jefe");
textlen = 28;
strcpy(text, "what do ya want for nothing?");
digest = "\xef\xfc\xdf\x6a\xe5\xeb\x2f\xa2\xd2\x74\x16\xd5\xf1\x84\xdf\x9c\x25\x9a\x7c\x79";
if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 2", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
	failed++;

/*-
 * test_case =     3
 * key =           0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
 * key_len =       20
 * data =          0xdd repeated 50 times
 * data_len =      50
 * digest =        0x125d7342b9ac11cd91a39af48aa17b4f63f175d3
 */
keylen = 20;
memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
textlen = 50;
memset(text, 0xdd, textlen);
digest = "\x12\x5d\x73\x42\xb9\xac\x11\xcd\x91\xa3\x9a\xf4\x8a\xa1\x7b\x4f\x63\xf1\x75\xd3";
if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 3", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
	failed++;

/*-
 * test_case =     4
 * key =           0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819
 * key_len =       25
 * data =          0xcd repeated 50 times
 * data_len =      50
 * digest =        0x4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235da
 */
keylen = 25;
memcpy(key, "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", keylen);
textlen = 50;
memset(text, 0xcd, textlen);
digest = "\x4c\x90\x07\xf4\x02\x62\x50\xc6\xbc\x84\x14\xf9\xbf\x50\xc8\x6c\x2d\x72\x35\xda";
if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 4", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
	failed++;

/*-
 * test_case =     5
 * key =           0x0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
 * key_len =       20
 * data =          "Test With Truncation"
 * data_len =      20
 * digest =        0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04
 * digest-96 =     0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1
 */
keylen = 20;
memset(key, 0x0c, keylen);
textlen = 20;
strcpy(text, "Test With Truncation");
digest = "\x4c\x1a\x03\x42\x4b\x55\xe0\x7f\xe7\xf2\x7b\xe1\xd5\x8b\xb9\x32\x4a\x9a\x5a\x04";
if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 5", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
	failed++;

/*-
 * test_case =     6
 * key =           0xaa repeated 80 times
 * key_len =       80
 * data =          "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
 * data_len =      54
 * digest =        0xaa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112
 */
keylen = 80;
memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
textlen = 54;
strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First");
digest = "\xaa\x4a\xe5\xe1\x52\x72\xd0\x0e\x95\x70\x56\x37\xce\x8a\x3b\x55\xed\x40\x21\x12";
if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 6", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
	failed++;

/*-
 * test_case =     7
 * key =           0xaa repeated 80 times
 * key_len =       80
 * data =          "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"
 * data_len =      73
 * digest =        0xe8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91
 */
keylen = 80;
memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
textlen = 73;
strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data");
digest = "\xe8\xe9\x9d\x0f\x45\x23\x7d\x78\x6d\x6b\xba\xa7\x96\x5c\x78\x08\xbb\xff\x1a\x91";
if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 7", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
	failed++;

/* done with all tests */
if (failed)
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: %d cases failed", failed);
else
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: all test cases passed");
}

/*
* test assoc key concatenation
*/
static int
sctp_test_key_concatenation(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2,
   sctp_key_t *expected_key)
{
sctp_key_t *key;
int ret_val;

sctp_show_key(key1, "\nkey1");
sctp_show_key(key2, "\nkey2");
key = sctp_compute_hashkey(key1, key2, NULL);
sctp_show_key(expected_key, "\nExpected");
sctp_show_key(key, "\nComputed");
if (memcmp(key, expected_key, expected_key->keylen) != 0) {
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
	ret_val = -1;
} else {
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
	ret_val = 0;
}
sctp_free_key(key1);
sctp_free_key(key2);
sctp_free_key(expected_key);
sctp_free_key(key);
return (ret_val);
}


void
sctp_test_authkey(void)
{
sctp_key_t *key1, *key2, *expected_key;
int failed = 0;

/* test case 1 */
key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01", 4);
key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x02\x03\x04", 4);
expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x02\x03\x04", 8);
if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
	failed++;

/* test case 2 */
key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
key2 = sctp_set_key("\x02", 1);
expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02", 5);
if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
	failed++;

/* test case 3 */
key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x02", 4);
expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x02", 5);
if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
	failed++;

/* test case 4 */
key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
	failed++;

/* test case 5 */
key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
	failed++;

/* test case 6 */
key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
	failed++;

/* test case 7 */
key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
	failed++;

/* done with all tests */
if (failed)
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: %d cases failed", failed);
else
	SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: all test cases passed");
}


#if defined(STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST)
int
main(void)
{
sctp_test_hmac_sha1();
sctp_test_authkey();
}

#endif /* STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST */

#endif /* SCTP_HMAC_TEST */